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Preface
This dissertation is comprised of two parts. Chapters 1 and 2 address the role of in-
vestment banks in initial public offerings. Chapters 3 and 4 analyze incentive provision
when agents are subject to a ‘behavioral bias’.
In Chapter 1 we model the procedure of an initial public offering (IPO) as a sig-
naling game and analyze how the possibility of potentially profitable trading in the
aftermarket influences pricing decisions by investment banks. When maximizing the
sum of both the gross spread of the offer revenue and profits from aftermarket trading,
investment banks have an incentive to distort the offer price by employing aftermar-
ket short covering and exercise of the overallotment option strategically. This results
either in informational inefficiencies or, on average, exacerbated underpricing. Wealth
is redistributed in favor of investment banks.
In Chapter 2 we address two puzzles of the IPO literature: (1) Why do investment
banks earn positive profits in a competitive market? And (2) Why do banks receive
lower gross spreads in VC backed IPOs? The IPO procedure is modeled as a two-
stage signaling game. In the second stage banks set offer prices given their private
information and the level of the spread. Issuers anticipate the bank’s pricing decision
and set in the first stage spreads to maximize expected revenue. Investors are aware of
this process and subscribe only if their expected profits are non-negative. As a result,
issuers offer high spreads to induce banks to set high prices, allowing them profits.
Competition may take place in additional features of the IPO contract as, for example,
the number of co-managers or analyst coverage. We show that in equilibrium superiorly
informed VC backed issuers impose smaller spreads.
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In Chapter 3 we examine self-control problems – modeled as time-inconsistent,
present-biased preferences – in a multi-tasking environment. An agent must allocate
effort between an incentivized and immediately rewarded activity (e.g. effort at the
workplace) and a private activity that pays out only tomorrow (e.g. studying for a
degree). Present-biased agents take decisions that do not maximize their long-run wel-
fare, irrespective of the intensity of incentives. Sophisticated agents are never harmed
by incentives relative to the case where incentives are absent as they always receive
their reservation utility levels. However, naive agents are always harmed in the pres-
ence of incentives as they wrongly predict future behaviors. Furthermore, we show that
the loss to a naive agent can exceed the principal’s gain from providing incentives. In
this case social welfare is reduced if the principal provides incentives.
In Chapter 4 we analyze how inequity aversion interacts with incentive provision in
an otherwise standard moral hazard model with two risk averse agents. We identify the
conditions under which inequity aversion increases agency costs of providing incentives.
We show, first, that inequity aversion can render equitable flat wage contracts optimal
even though incentive contracts are optimal with selfish agents. Second, to avoid
social comparisons the principal may employ one agent only, thereby forgoing the
efficient effort provision of the second agent. We finally discuss the implications of
social preferences for the internal organization and the boundary of the firm.
The decision whether or not to conduct an initial public offering is an important
decision in the life cycle of a firm. The advantages of having shares in a firm quoted on
a stock exchange are manifold. The owner of a firm can realize part of her investments,
it includes the ability to raise additional equity finance, or even the opportunity to set
up share option plans as incentive device for employees. However, there are also costs
of going public. In this context, initial underpricing is most extensively discussed.
Ritter and Welch (2002) report for 6,249 IPOs in the U.S. between 1980 and 2001 an
average first-day return of 18.8 percent. It is usually argued that initial underpricing
constitutes a wealth transfer from the owner of the firm to the new shareholders, and
as such can be regarded as a cost of going public.
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A number of explanations have been advanced for the ‘underpricing anomaly’ which
seems to violate the fundamental tenet of ‘no arbitrage’. The most prominent ones as-
sume informational asymmetries between (or among) some of the main parties involved:
the issuing firm, the investment bank, and the investors.
Rock (1986) proposes a variant of Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons problem’. He assumes
asymmetric information between different types of investors. Some are perfectly in-
formed about the intrinsic value of the shares on offer whereas others are uninformed.
Given the presence of informed investors, uninformed investors face a ‘winner’s curse’.
Informed investors subscribe only to ‘hot’ IPOs. Assuming that shares are rationed,
uninformed investors stand a greater chance of being allocated shares in ‘cold’ IPOs
from which informed investors abstain. To however attract uninformed investors to
subscribe to IPOs, shares have to be underpriced on average.
Another strand of the literature assumes asymmetric information between the is-
suing firm and the investors. The signaling models by Allen and Faulhaber (1989),
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) argue that underpricing can – in anal-
ogy to Spence’s (1973) job market signaling – be a signal for a high ‘quality’ of the
firm. A single crossing property is established by assuming that subsequent to the IPO
a secondary offering is conducted. In between these two offerings new information may
arise and reveal a low quality firm’s true value. This firm will then be unable to recoup
the loss from underpricing its shares by way of a secondary offering. A separating equi-
librium can thus be established in which only high quality firms underprice because
they can reap the gain from doing so in the secondary offering.
Apart from missing empirical support for signaling theories of underpricing1 there
is the question why firms would not opt for a different, less costly signal? Booth and
Smith (1986), for example, put forth a theory of investment bank choice. Investment
banks as repeated players have reputational capital at stake and can thus certificate
the value of a firm. Other theories stressing the role of investment banks include Ben-
veniste and Spindt (1989). They assume asymmetric information between investment
1Helwege and Liang (1996) report for a U.S. sample of IPOs in 1983 that only 4 percent of firms
conducted a secondary offering in the subsequent 10 years.
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bank and investors. The latter hold superior information about the value of the shares,
and they are assumed to subscribe repeatedly to IPOs. Benveniste and Spindt design
a mechanism in which banks use underpricing and rationing to elicit investors’ infor-
mation prior to an IPO. If shares are underpriced, investors can be punished by small
allocations in subsequent offerings of other firms if the post-IPO phase reveals that
material information was withheld.
The existing theoretical literature however almost completely neglects that the role
of investment banks does not end with the distribution of shares at the day of the
offering. In fact investment banks pursue supposedly price stabilizing activities in the
aftermarket of IPOs that provide potentially profitable trading opportunities. This
is where the model in Chapter 1 adds to the literature. We explicitly account for
stabilizing activities by investment banks in the aftermarket of an IPO and analyze
how this influences the offer price decision in the first place.
The regulating authorities allow investment banks to establish a short position in
an IPO by selling more shares than initially announced. Aftermarket short covering
refers to the practice of filling these positions in the aftermarket of an IPO. This is
done if the market price falls below the offer price. The idea is that filling short
positions stabilizes prices by increasing demand. The difference between market price
and offer price is – along the way – pure profit for the investment bank. If the price
instead rises, the bank is hedged by an overallotment option which grants the right
to obtain additional shares from the issuer at the offer price. The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR) put forward the argument that stabilizing activities ensure an ‘orderly market’
as sudden selling pressure can be countered. In their latest respective release the SEC
(1997, p. 81) opines that aftermarket price stabilization “promotes the interests of
shareholders, underwriters, and issuers.”
In Chapter 1 we challenge this view by showing that – in the context of our model –
stabilizing activities result in either informational inefficiencies or, on average, exacer-
bated underpricing. Furthermore, wealth is redistributed in favor of investment banks.
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We presume that these ‘side effects’ will not be intended by the regulating authori-
ties. Even without trading off potential beneficial effects of stabilization against our
findings, a policy implication arising from the analysis might be the alert that current,
well meant regulation can be gamed to the disadvantage of issuers and investors.
We propose a signaling model of the IPO procedure in which both the investment
bank and investors hold private information about the intrinsic value of the shares.
The bank moves first and sets the offer price. Besides possible trading profits in
the aftermarket, banks are directly remunerated for their services by a fraction of
the offering revenue, the gross spread. In our model banks choose the offer price
strategically to maximize their profits form both the gross spread and trading profits
in the aftermarket. A higher offer price promises a higher revenue, it however reduces
the probability that the IPO is successful. An IPO gets called off if there are not
enough investors subscribing to it, and a higher offer prices reduces the number of
investors subscribing.2
As benchmark, in a setting without aftermarket activities we identify the conditions
for the price equilibrium to be separating. In a separating equilibrium banks with
different information set different offer prices. A bank with favorable information
about the value of the firm deems it more likely that enough investors will hold alike
information. It will thus set a higher price than a bank with less favorable information.
We call a separating equilibrium informationally efficient since the bank’s information
is fully revealed by the offer price. In the aftermarket prices adjust according to market
demand. In equilibrium the security can turn out to be either under- or overpriced,
but on average there is underpricing.
We then introduce stabilizing activities to the model. This augments the incentive
to set high offer prices because the potential profit from aftermarket activities is higher
at higher prices. We find that – relative to the benchmark – either the offer price falls
on average or there is a pooling offer-price equilibrium. In the first case, to uphold
a separating equilibrium, an investment bank with favorable information distorts the
2Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001) report that about 14 percent of cases in their U.S. sample
of more than 2,500 IPOs between 1984-1994 get called off.
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price downwards. This increases, on average, underpricing, i.e. the cost of going public.
In the second case, a separating equilibrium cannot be upheld and investors are thus
unable to infer the investment bank’s signal from the offer price. This equilibrium is
informationally inefficient since investors’ decisions are based on private information
only and not, in addition, on the information of the bank. A major objective of financial
market regulation is market transparency. It is thus beneficial if prices contain more
rather than less information and, consequently, pooling equilibria are undesirable.
The debate among financial economists on the costs of going public has mainly
focused on initial underpricing. Other, direct costs of going public like legal expenses,
audit fees, management time, accountancy, and the gross spread as investment bank
compensation, have received relatively little attention. Among practitioners matters
are different. When Chen and Ritter (2000) published that in more than 90 percent of
IPOs the gross spread is exactly 7 percent, numerous lawsuits against investment banks
for price collusion and a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of “alleged conspiracy
among securities underwriters to fix underwriting fees” were initiated.3 Chapter 2
proposes a different, subtle explanation of why gross spreads are so high that investment
banks are left with profits despite market competition. Furthermore, we address the
related puzzle of why venture capital (VC) backed IPOs are associated with lower gross
spreads than non-VC backed IPOs. To the best of our knowledge, Chapter 2 offers the
first theoretical model to explain the level of gross spreads.
In Chapter 2 we model the IPO procedure as a two-stage signaling game. As in
Chapter 1 we assume that both investment banks and investors hold private infor-
mation about the intrinsic value of the shares. While Chapter 1 is silent about the
role of issuers, in Chapter 2 two different types of issuers are explicitly modeled. VC
backed issuers are assumed to hold private information about the value of the firm.
In contrast, non-VC backed issuers are taken to be uninformed. In the second stage
of the signaling game the investment bank decides on the offer price, given both its
private information and the level of the spread. Issuers anticipate the bank’s pricing
3See Hansen (2001) for an overview of reactions to the Chen and Ritter (2000) article.
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decision. Hence, in the first stage they set spreads strategically to maximize expected
revenue. On both stages we can have either pooling or separating equilibria in spreads
and prices, respectively. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their
expected profits are non-negative.
We find that it can be in the best interest of the issuer to offer high spreads. It is
the investment bank’s discretion to set the final offer price. At high offer prices there
is the danger that the IPO gets called off, because at high prices there may not be
enough investors to subscribe to the offering. We assume that the bank then suffers
a reputation loss. To nevertheless induce the bank to set a high offer price the issuer
must offer a high level of the gross spread. The investment bank then earns a rent:
Given any level of the gross spread, it could always deviate to a low price (at which
the IPO will never fail) and receive its share in the offer revenue with certainty. Hence,
to prevent banks from deviating they are offered a rent at high prices.
Our second main result addresses the differences in spreads between VC and non-
VC backed issuers. We show that in equilibrium superiorly informed VC backed issuers
impose smaller spreads. A VC backed issuer with ‘good news’ about the value of the
shares regards it as likely that the investment bank also holds favorable information.
The issuer then wants the bank to transform this information to the investors via a
separating offer price equilibrium. An issuer with ‘bad news’ will however always mimic
the issuer with favorable information: Issuers receive more than 90 percent of the offer
revenue and thus have a strong interest in high prices – and signaling ‘bad news’ via
the level of the spread reduces investors’ rating of the shares. In equilibrium we thus
observe a pooling spread level and separation offer prices. In contrast, uninformed
non-VC backed issuers prefer the bank to hide its information and set a pooling price
(with uninformed issuers the level of the spread itself cannot carry information). We
show that the according spread offered by non-VC backed issuers is smaller than the
separating price equilibrium inducing spread set by VC backed issuers.
The economic agents in Chapters 1 and 2 – the investors, investment banks, and
issuers – are modeled in accordance with the standard paradigm of neoclassical eco-
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nomics: Individuals have stable and coherent preferences, are purely self-interested,
and fully rational. The investors have no trouble in solving a rather complicated Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium in order to decide whether to order or to abstain. The
investment bank is interested in its own material payoff only and does not care that
some actions taken may harm others. And the issuer does not waive his decision to go
public just because the day of the offering arrives.
Over the last decade, however, empirical and experimental evidence mounted against
the paradigm of homo economicus. Numerous studies have shown that even in eco-
nomically relevant environments people systematically deviate from the predictions of
the standard theory. The resulting pursuit for greater psychological realism led to the
field of behavioral economics, which extends the scope of economics by incorporating
findings from experimental economics, psychology, and sociology into economic the-
ory.4 The models in Chapters 3 and 4 pay tribute to this development. We apply
recent behavioral insights, especially present-biased preferences and inequity aversion,
to contract theory in order to analyze how optimal incentive provision within firms
changes if the ‘idea of agent’ is broadened.
One strand of the literature in behavioral economics analyzes the consequences
of time-inconsistent preferences. In a parsimonious way, the standard model of ex-
ponential discounting captures the fact that people have a preference for immediate
gratification. Exponential discounting however implies, in addition, that intertempo-
ral trade-offs remain unaffected no matter when a decision is taken. The evidence, by
contrast, shows that people exhibit present-biased preferences.5 They show very sharp
impatience for short horizons but are much more patient at long horizons. By way of
example: When being asked to decided whether to work 8 hours on, say, Monday four
weeks from now and relax on Tuesday or, alternatively, to relax on Monday and work
9 hours on Tuesday, most people will opt for the first choice. However, when being
asked again Sunday four weeks from now, present-biased preferences may come into
4For an overview see, for example, Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2003).
5In the wording of Rabin (2002): “As absurd as it sounds, it is probably true to say that exactly
zero papers in all social and behavioral sciences have proposed a test of the basic exponential versus
hyperbolic discounting [...] and claimed exponential explains the generated data better.” (p. 19)
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play. Many people then reverse their decisions and put off the work for another day –
even though this implies to work an extra hour. This kind of behavior is often referred
to as hyperbolic discounting.
The theory of hyperbolic discounting has very fruitfully been applied to savings
decisions. Laibson (1997) shows that present-biased preferences can explain why con-
sumption tracks income more tightly than predicted by the standard life-cycle model
of savings, especially in the absence of commitment devices. O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999c) apply hyperbolic discounting to retirement planning. In the U.S. many em-
ployees are eligible for a so called 401(k) retirement savings plan. Participation rates in
these savings plans are relatively low, which is surprising because they are subsidized
by the government and sometimes by the employer as well. Even though present-biased
agents will want to eventually participate (in the long run people are patient), there
is always something that hinders them to join because it promises a greater immedi-
ate reward (in the short run people are impatient). Consequently, these agents may
procrastinate indefinitely. O’Donoghue and Rabin’s theory is well supported by re-
cent evidence. Madrian and Shea (2001) find that automatic enrollment of employees
in 401(k) plans (employees must choose to opt out of rather than opt into the plan)
exerts a strong influence over their saving choices.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) examine the implications of hyperbolic discounting
for incentive provision. They analyze a principal-agent setting in which the agent must
accomplish a single task but has discretion when to do it. A procrastinating agent is
assumed to face stochastic costs of completion. The principal has an interest in timely
completion and thus offers an incentive contract to induce the agent to finish the task
in time. With asymmetric information about costs timely completion and efficient
delay must be traded-off. The optimal contract involves ‘deadlines’ and increasing
punishment for delay.
The model in Chapter 3 adds to the literature by further exploring how present-
biased preferences and incentive provision interact. Complementary to O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999b), we examine self-control problems in a multi-tasking environment.
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An agent must allocate effort between an incentivized and immediately rewarded ac-
tivity – effort at the workplace – and a private activity that pays out tomorrow only
– say, caring for one’s health. The seminal contribution on multi-tasking principal-
agent theory is Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991). They analyze the implications on
optimal incentive intensity, ownership structure, and job design if some activities are
more difficult to measure than others. The focus of Chapter 3 is different. We explore
how a present-biased agent’s allocation of effort between different tasks is affected by
incentives if effort invested in some tasks pays out immediately while effort devoted to
other tasks pays out with some delay.
Following the literature we assume that present-biased agents can be either naive or
sophisticated. Naive agents are ignorant to the fact that they exhibit time-inconsistent
preferences. They think in the future they will act like time consistent agents. In
contrast, sophisticated agents are aware of their time-inconsistent preferences. In the
context of our model, the difference in crucial. We consider a three period setting. In
the first period a principal offers an incentive contract and the agent decides whether
or not to participate. In the second period the agent chooses effort levels whose cost
accrue immediately. While effort devoted to the principal’s purposes is remunerated
in the second period, effort devoted to the agent’s private benefit pays out in the final
period only. Therefore, by the time a naive agent is offered a contract he holds – in
contrast to a sophisticated agent – a too optimistic belief about second period behavior.
The principal takes agents’ beliefs into account when offering a contract, and we show
that he can exploit naivete´.
The focus of the model is the comparison between a situation in which the agent
can engage in the private activity only, and a situation in which the principal adopts
an additional production opportunity (for engagement in which he offers incentives).
We show that present-biased agents take decisions that do not maximize their long-run
welfare, irrespective of the presence of incentives. Sophisticated agents are, however,
never harmed additionally by the adoption of incentive contracts relative to the case
without incentives. They always receive their reservation utility levels. In contrast,
naive agents can be harmed if the principal offers an incentive contract. The incentive
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contract endows them with an additional ‘occasion’ to give in to their present bias.
Due to the fact that naive agents erroneously belief to act like time-consistent agents
in the future, they do not ask for – and consequently do not get – a compensating
payment when accepting the contract. Furthermore, we show that the resulting loss
to the naive agent can even exceed the principal’s gain from providing incentives. In
this case, we find that social welfare is reduced by the adoption of incentive contracts.
Another strand of the literature in behavioral economics is concerned with the
notions of fairness and reciprocity. The standard hypothesis on human motivation
assumes that all people are exclusively interested in their material self-interest. In
recent years results from experimental economics have challenged this hypothesis by
showing that many people are, in addition, strongly motivated by concerns for fairness
and reciprocity. The most prominent experiment in this context is the ultimatum
game. A pair of subjects has to agree on a division of fixed amount of money. One
subject (the proposer) must propose a division of the amount. The other subject (the
responder) can accept or reject the division. In case of rejection both subjects receive
nothing. In case of acceptance the proposed division is implemented. Given standard
assumptions on human motivation, the subgame perfect equilibrium prescribes that the
proposer offers the smallest monetary unit (or even nothing) to the responder, and the
latter accepts because ‘little is better than nothing’. The experimental outcomes across
hundreds of replications of the ultimatum game are however significantly different from
the theoretical prediction. Responders reject with probability .4 to .6 proposals offering
less than 20 percent of the available surplus, and the probability of rejection decreases
as the size of the offer increases. About 70 percent of proposers offer between 40 and
50 percent of the available surplus.6
Early experimenters like the recent Nobel Prize winner Vernon Smith conducted
market experiments and found that experimental markets converge quickly to the com-
petitive equilibrium. These results have been interpreted as confirmation of the self-
interest hypothesis. However, recently developed models of inequity aversion by Fehr
6See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for an overview of the experimental evidence.
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and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) show that in market environments
the standard competitive equilibrium may prevail even if agents are strongly concerned
about fairness. The theory of inequity aversion assumes that some but not all agents
suffer a utility loss if their own material payoffs differ from the payoffs of other agents in
their reference groups. It can be shown that the interaction of the distribution of types
(fair or selfish) with the strategic environment (market or non-market interaction) can
explain why in some situations very unequal outcome may prevail (competitive equi-
librium) while in others rather equitable outcomes are obtained (ultimatum game).
The reason is that in environments with few players only, a fair agent may be able to
enforce an equitable outcome while this is not possible in a market setting. The virtue
of theories of inequity aversion is that they can – in contrast to other models of social
preferences like altruism or envy – account for a large number of seemingly different
results in wide array of experimental settings.
The model in Chapter 4 goes a step further and applies the theory of inequity
aversion as formulated by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to contract theory. We analyze
how fairness concerns affect incentive provision in an otherwise standard moral hazard
model with two risk-averse agents. In a classic contribution to the theory of incen-
tives Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991, p. 24) state that “it remains a puzzle for this
theory that employment contracts so often specify fixed wages and more generally that
incentives within firms appear to be so muted, especially compared to those of the
market.” In Chapter 4 we show that inequity aversion can serve as an explanation for
the scarcity of incentive contracts within firms.
In the standard principal-agent moral hazard model the optimal contract trades off
incentive provision and agent’s risk bearing. Effort choices cannot be contracted upon
such that wages must condition on stochastic output realizations. In optimum the agent
bears some risk for which he must be compensated. This constitutes the agency costs
of providing incentives. We find that behindness aversion (an agent incurs a utility loss
only when being worse off than the other agent) among agents unambiguously increases
agency costs. This holds true if agents also suffer from being better off, unless they
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account for effort costs when comparing to the other agent. Fairness concerns increase
agency costs because they impose an additional restriction on the design of optimal
contracts. Inequity aversion effects an utility loss in states of the world with diverging
output- and thus diverging wage realizations. The resulting, reduced utility levels could
be generated without inequity aversion as well – simply by lowering the respective wage.
Since these lower utility levels (at lower wage costs) were not optimal without inequity
aversion, they cannot be optimal now.
We find that increased agency costs can undermine efficiency in two ways. First, in-
equity aversion may render equitable flat wage contracts optimal even though incentive
contracts are optimal with selfish agents. Empirical studies (see, for example, Bewley
(1999)) suggest that organizations likes firms are characterized by a dense network
of social relations. Market interactions are, in contrast, rather anonymous. Taking
this into account, our first main result offers an explanation of why incentives within
firms are muted as compared to those in the marketplace. Second, to avoid social
comparisons the principal may employ one agent only, thereby forgoing the efficient
effort provision of the second agent. We call this the ‘reference group effect’. This sec-
ond result has implications for the internal organization and the boundary of the firm.
Suppose the principal can set up different firms but doing so involves fixed costs. The
principal now faces a trade-off. On the one hand, ‘integrating’ several agents within a
single firm causes social comparisons and thus increased agency costs of providing in-
centives. On the other hand, ‘separating’ agents into different firms involves additional
fixed costs. The solution to this trade-off thus defines an optimal size of the firm.
Chapter 1
IPO Pricing and Informational
Efficiency: The Role of Aftermarket
Short Covering∗
1.1 Introduction
Since the Securities Act of 1934, it is legal practice in the U.S. that offering syndicates
stabilize market prices of their recent public offerings. In their latest release the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states: “Although stabilization is a price
influencing activity intended to induce others to purchase the offered security, when ap-
propriately regulated it is an effective mechanism for fostering the orderly distribution
of securities and promotes the interests of shareholders, underwriters, and issuers.”8
With this paper we challenge the assertion that current regulation always serves the
interests of all involved parties. We argue that issuing investment banks can combine
two regulated stabilization tools to generate risk-free profits. Employing a model that
captures the impact of this arbitrage opportunity on the offer price, we find that (a)
either market transparency is lower or, on average, underpricing is exacerbated, and (b)
the issuing investment bank’s profits are boosted at the expense of issuer and investors.
∗The chapter is based on joint work with Andreas Park from the University of Toronto.
8SEC (1997), Regulation M, Release No. 34-38067, p. 81. The Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR (2002)) proposes rules which resemble the SEC regulations.
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Current regulation allows investment banks to pursue the following three types of
aftermarket activities. First, stabilizing bids can be posted at or below the offer price
during the distribution period of the securities. Second, banks can establish a short
position by selling securities in excess of the pre-announced amount. Aftermarket short
covering refers to the practice of filling these positions in the aftermarket, which is done
if the market price falls below the offer price. If the price instead rises, the bank is
hedged by an overallotment option which grants the right to obtain typically up to 15%
additional securities from the issuer at the offer price. Third, penalty bids are used to
penalize customers who immediately resell their securities in the aftermarket.
Although on average IPOs have high first-day returns, there is a significant number
of IPOs with negative returns. In these ‘cold’ IPOs, stabilizing bids and short covering
should ensure liquidity for the security to offset potential selling pressure (in the first
days after the float), and thus prevent sharp drops in prices. Penalty bids are meant
to reduce selling pressure. In this paper we focus exclusively on the impact of short
covering. An investment bank intending to support the security price adheres to the
following procedure. It enters the aftermarket short. This position must be filled
eventually. Suppose that the market price exceeds the offer price. Then there is
supposedly no selling pressure and no need to provide extra liquidity. Covering the
short position in the market, however, would be expensive. This is why almost all IPO
contracts include a so-called ‘Greenshoe’ or overallotment option. It allows the bank to
buy extra securities from the issuer at the offer price. In the bulk of offerings, the initial
short position is perfectly hedged by this option. Increasing prices are therefore no risk
for the bank. Suppose now that the price drops. The bank does provide liquidity,
however, by doing so it also covers the short position in the market – at a price below
the offer price. The difference between the market price and the offer price (minus
the gross spread) is pure profit. In other words, the opportunity to enter the market
short, paired with the overallotment option, provides investment banks with a second,
risk-free potential source of income.
Only recently, new data became available that allowed to analyze investment banks’
activities in the aftermarket directly. Aggarwal (2000) reports that underwriters utilize
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a combination of aftermarket short covering, penalty bids, and exercise of the overallot-
ment option. Stabilizing bids are never observed. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000)
report that the lead underwriter always becomes the dominant market maker. They
also find that market makers take large inventory positions, but reduce their risk by
exercising the overallotment option.
There are two cases studies which support the casual observation that aftermarket
trading can be very profitable. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) provide a study of
the 1995 GenCo2 IPO (U.K.) during which the price fell in the aftermarket. The as-
signed investment banks Barclays de Zoete Wedd and Kleinwort Benson repurchased
45.7 million securities at the low market price to cover their short positions that were
established at the offer price. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) conclude: “It demon-
strates how valuable the over-allotment option potentially is to the syndicate of invest-
ment banks selling the issue. Since they will buy back the shares in the market only
if the price is below the issue price, in closing (partially or in full) their short position
they make profits. These profits accrue to the syndicate itself, as the holder of the
option, rather than to the [. . . ] vendors” (p. 180). Boehmer and Fishe (2001) analyze
a case-study of an IPO in which the lead underwriter took a nearly perfectly hedged
short position which was then covered in the aftermarket. The profits from trading
amounted to 52% of the syndicate’s overall profit from the offering. In their words:
“[. . . ][short covering activities] represent an economically significant profit opportunity
for the Lead” (p. 4).9
The existing literature on the impact of price support on offer prices models stabi-
9Aggarwal (2000) finds that “short covering is not expensive for underwriters” (p. 1077). In
more detail, she finds that for weak offerings investment banks make profits, for strong offerings
however they may lose money. This stems from the fact that either the overallotment option is
not fully exercised or investment banks had established a “naked short” prior to the offering such
that short positions had to be covered at prices above the offer price. Our model cannot explain
why investment banks sometimes establish “naked shorts” or do not fully exercise the overallotment
option. We merely analyze the effects aftermarket short covering can have when investment banks
utilize the possibility to make risk-free profits, i.e. when they do not establish “naked shorts” and
fully exercise the overallotment option when prices rise. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) find that
aftermarket activities of the lead underwriter are profitable and account for about 23% of the overall
profit of underwriting. Reported profits stem from both market making and stabilizing activities
(that is accumulating inventory positions). From the presentation in the paper it does not seem
possible to disentangle whether stabilization contributed to or reduced trading profits. The claim
that stabilization can be a profitable activity is thus not rejected by the data.
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lization to be costly. The two seminal theoretical papers on stabilization, Benveniste,
Busaba, and Wilhelm Jr. (1996) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1996), assume that banks
post stabilizing bids to keep prices up. However, such stabilizing bids are never ob-
served. Both models imply that stabilizing activities decrease underpricing – our model
predicts the opposite. This paper thus contrasts the existing literature as we model
explicitly that investment banks can earn money in the aftermarket, and to the best
of our knowledge we are the first to do so in a theoretical framework.
We propose a stylized model of an offering procedure that is in accordance with em-
pirical findings and perceived industry practice. We assume that both the investment
bank and investors hold private information about the intrinsic value of the offered
security. We assume this information asymmetry to arise at a point in time when all
official, mandatory information has been released. Thus, any further public statement
by bank or issuer will be perceived as cheap talk, and it is only actions, i.e. price-setting,
that can convey additional information. We model the procedure as a signaling game
in which the investment bank moves first and sets the offer price. It chooses the of-
fer price strategically to maximize its profits form both the gross spread of the offer
revenue and trading profits in the aftermarket. The bank anticipates investors’ best
replies to the offer price.
As a benchmark, we first analyze a setting without aftermarket activities and iden-
tify the conditions for the equilibrium to be both unique and separating (that is, a
bank with different information sets different prices). We call a separating equilibrium
informationally efficient since the bank’s information is fully revealed by the offer price.
After the offer is floated, prices adjust according to market demand. In equilibrium,
the security can turn out to be either under- or overpriced, but investors account for
this when ordering the security. We show that on average there is underpricing.
When introducing aftermarket short covering, relative to the benchmark one of
two outcomes transpires: either the offer price falls on average, or separation breaks
down and the offer-price equilibrium morphs into a pooling equilibrium. In the first
case, an investment bank with favorable information distorts the price downwards
and thereby, on average, exacerbates underpricing. In the second case investors are
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unable to infer the investment bank’s signal from the offer price. This equilibrium is
informationally inefficient since investors’ decisions are based on private signals only
and not also on the signal of the bank. A major objective of financial market regulation
is market transparency. Without modelling an explicit payoff from higher transparency
we simply assume that it is desirable if prices contain more rather than less information.
Consequently, pooling equilibria are undesirable.
Furthermore, the price distortion leads to redistribution of wealth in favor of the
investment bank. Looking at per-share profits, the issuer loses if separation prevails;
in a pooling equilibrium he is better off. The issuer’s losses are the investors’ gains
and vice versa. On the comparative statics side, an increase of the gross spread or the
amount of overalloted securities reduces the parameter-set with informational efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce
our model of the offering procedure without aftermarket short covering and identify
necessary and sufficient conditions under which the investment bank reveals its private
signals through separating offer prices. In Section 1.3 we introduce aftermarket short
covering, identify the conditions under which the investment bank pools in the offer
price and thus holds back its private information and show that, if separation is upheld,
prices fall on average. We also provide results on comparative statics. In Section 1.4 we
discuss the redistribution of profits. Section 1.5 concludes. Proofs and specifications
of tools used in the equilibrium analysis are in the Appendix.
1.2 The Benchmark: Offer Prices in a Model
without Aftermarket Short Covering
1.2.1 The Model Ingredients and Agents’ Best Replies
Consider the following stylized model of the IPO process.
The Security. The security on offer can take values V ∈ V = {0, 1}, both equally
likely. The number of securities is denoted by S.
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The Investors. There are N identical, risk neutral investors. N is assumed to be
strictly larger than S. They can either order one unit of the security or none. Each
investor receives a costless, private, conditionally i.i.d. signal si ∈ V about the value of
the security. This information is noisy, i.e. Pr(si = v|V = v) = qi with qi ∈ (12 , 1). If an
investor orders, he may or may not obtain the security during the offering procedure; if
the issue is oversubscribed shares are distributed with uniform probability. If he does,
his payoff is the market price minus the offer price. If the offer is not floated, his payoff
is zero even if he ordered the security. An investor’s type is his signal. We refer to the
investor as a ‘high-signal investor’ if si = 1. For si = 0, it is a ‘low-signal investor’.
The Issuer. We assume that the issuer has no strategic impact. He holds no private
information about the value of the security. The issuer signs a contract with an invest-
ment bank that delegates the pricing decision and constitutes the amount of securities
S to be sold.10 It also specifies the gross spread β of the offer revenue that remains
as remuneration at the bank. The issuer’s payoff is thus fraction (1 − β) of the offer
revenue if the offer is floated, otherwise it is zero.
The Investment Bank. The risk neutral investment bank who signed the contract
with the issuer receives a private signal sb ∈ V about the value of the security. This
signal is noisy and conditionally independent from investors’ signals. Yet it is more
informative, i.e. qb > qi, where Pr(sb = v|V = v) = qb. Signals characterize a bank’s
type. If sb = 1 we refer to the investment bank as a ‘high-signal bank’. For sb = 0, it
is a ‘low-signal bank’. The bank receives the signal after the contract has been signed
and then announces the offer price p.11 If demand is too weak to match supply, i.e.
if the number of investors willing to buy is less than the number of securities to be
sold, we assume that the offer is called off.12 In case of excess demand securities are
10 The two most widely used contracts between issuers and investment banks are firm commitment
and best efforts contracts. These contracts differ with respect to risk allocation and incentive provision
that may be necessary due to imperfectly observable distribution effort and asymmetric information
about the value of the securities. However, in this stylized model we abstract form these complications.
11We discuss fixed-price offerings vs. bookbuilding at the end of this subsection.
12Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001) report for a sample of 2,510 IPOs filed with the SEC from
1984 to 1994 that 14.3% of the offerings got called off. Issuers have the option to withdraw an offer
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allocated at random. We assume that failure of the offering inflicts fixed costs C on the
investment bank.13 These costs are external to our formulation and can be thought of
as deterioration of reputational capital. They may also capture the opportunity costs
resulting from lost market share when being associated with an unsuccessful IPO.14
Without loss of generality, we do not specify any costs the offering procedure itself may
cause for the investment bank. Thus, if the offer is successful, the bank’s payoff is βpS;
if it fails, its payoff is −C.
Signaling Value of the Offer Price. An investor bases his decision on his private
information and on the information that the investment bank reveals about its own
signal through the offer price. We denote this information by µ(p) and write µ(p) = 1
if the price reflects that the bank’s signal is sb = 1, µ(p) = 0 if the price reflects that
sb = 0, and µ(p) =
1
2
to indicate that the price is uninformative. These three are the
only relevant cases in equilibrium. We refer to µ as the price-information about the
bank’s signal.
The Aftermarket Price. The equilibrium market price is determined by the ag-
gregate number of investors’ favorable signals. In our model this number is always
revealed, either directly through investor demand or immediately after the float through
trading activities. Thus write pm(d) for the market price as a function of d ∈ {0, . . . , N},
the number of high-signal investors. Appendix 1.6.1 fleshes out this argument and pro-
vides an extensive treatment of price formation.
Investors’ Decisions and Expected Payoffs. We admit only symmetric, pure
strategies; thus all investors with the same signal take identical decisions. These can
if the investment bank proposes a price that is perceived as too low. During the road show the bank
learns about investors’ valuations. In a firm commitment contract the bank uses this information to
propose an offer price such that it can find enough investors to sell the entire offer; in a best efforts
contract, such that selling all securities will not be too difficult. This model abstracts from the issuer’s
option to withdraw, and it leaves no room to the bank to adjust the offer price to investors’ valuations.
13The model could be extended to allow the bank to buy up unsold securities. Costs then result
from expensively bought inventory positions and not from failure. C would thus be ‘smoothed’. This
would, however, not alter our qualitative results but complicate the analysis considerably.
14Dunbar (2000), for instance, provides evidence that established investment banks lose market
share when being associated with withdrawn offerings.
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then be aggregated so that only three cases need to be considered. First, all investors
buy, denoted B0,1, second, only high-signal investors subscribe, denoted B1, and third,
no investor buys, denoted B∅. Thus, the set of potential collective best replies is
B := {B0,1, B1, B∅}.
To compute his expected payoff, an investors has to account for the probability of
actually getting the security. There are two cases to consider. In the first, all investors
buy. Thus, market demand is N and all investors receive the security with equal
probability S/N . In the second case, only high-signal investors buy. If d − 1 others
buy, then an investor receives the security with probability S/(d). If overall demand
d is smaller than the number of shares on offer, d < S the IPO fails and the investor
who ordered gets it with probability 0.
Investors order the security whenever their expected payoff from doing so is non-
negative. Suppose only high-signal investors buy, B1. After observing the offer price,
an investor’s information set contains both his signal si and the information inferred
from the offer price, µ(p). Since signals are conditionally i.i.d., for every V ∈ V there is
a different distribution over the number of favorable signals (si = 1), which we denote
f(d|V ). The investors’ posterior distribution over demands is given by
g(d− 1|si, µ(p)) := Pr(V = si|si, µ(p)) · f(d− 1|V = si)
+Pr(V 6= si|si, µ(p)) · f(d− 1|V 6= si). (1.1)
Then for a high-signal investor, at price p his rational-expectation payoff from buying





· (pm(d)− p) · g(d− 1|si = 1, µ(p)) ≥ 0. (1.2)
Likewise for B0,1, in which case the summation runs from 1 to N , S/d is substituted
with S/N , and si = 1 is replaced by si = 0.
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Threshold Prices. Denote by psi,µ the highest price that an investor is willing to
pay in equilibrium if all investors with signal s˜i ≥ si order, given signal si and price-
information µ. Thus p1,1 is the highest (separating) price with B1, p1, 1
2
the highest
(pooling) price with B1, p0, 1
2
the highest (pooling) price with B0,1, and p0,0 the highest
(separating) price with B0,1. Note that at all these prices investors are aware that the
security price may drop in the aftermarket and that they may not get the security.
The threshold prices are formally derived in Appendix 1.6.2.
The Investment Bank’s Expected Payoff. First consider case B1. Variable d
denotes the number of buys, i.e. the number of high-signal investors. If the true value
is V = 1, we have







qdi (1− qi)N−d, (1.3)
analogously for V = 0. A bank with signal sb assigns probability αsb(S) to the event
that at least S investors have the favorable signal. Since the investment bank receives
its signal with quality qb, for sb = 1,














(1− qi)dqN−di . (1.4)
α0(S) is defined analogously. If the bank charges a price at which only high-signal
investors buy, its expected profit is
Π(p|sb, B1) = αsb(S) · βpS− (1− αsb(S)) · C. (1.5)
Consider now B0,1, the case where the offer price is low enough so that all investors
are willing to buy, irrespective of their signals. The offer never fails, thus payoffs are
given by Π(p|B0,1) = βpS. If the price is set so high that no investor buys, as in case
B∅, a loss of C results with certainty.
Simplifying Assumptions. The unconditional distribution over favorable signals
is a composite of the two conditional distribution and thus bimodal To obtain closed
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form solutions (or rather approximations) for success-probabilities and prices, we make
two simplifying assumptions: the first simplifies computations, since the two modes of
the distribution over favorable signals are centered around N(1 − qi) and Nqi. The
results of the paper will also hold if it was not satisfied, as long as S < N/2, but the
assumption allows us to get closed form solutions for success-probabilities. The second
assumption ensures that we can analyze the two underlying conditional distributions
separately.
Assumption 1.1 S = (1− qi)N.
For every signal quality qi, there exists an N¯(qi) so that for all N > N¯(qi) the two
conditional distributions over favorable signals generated by V = 0 and V = 1 do
not ‘overlap.’15 By standard results from statistics, sufficient for N¯(qi) is N¯(qi) >
64qi(1− qi)/(2qi − 1)2.
Assumption 1.2 The number of investors N is larger than N¯(qi).
As a consequence of the second assumption we can apply the Law of Large Numbers
and DeMoivre-Laplace’s Theorem.16 Since we assume that the IPO fails whenever
d < S, Assumption 1.1 implies α0(S) = (2− qb)/2 and α1 = (1+ qb)/2; in what follows
we thus omit S. A consequence of the Law of Large Numbers is that pm(d) ∈ {0, 1}
for almost all values of d.17
Fixed Price Offerings vs. Bookbuilding. On most stock exchanges in the world
IPOs are sold through bookbuilding (for instance in the US, the UK, Germany, but not
in France), whereas our model is a fixed-price offering. Current regulation allows risk-
free aftermarket short covering profits and this paper tries to capture their strategic
15To be more precise: We need to ensure that if V = 1, the probability of demand d < S is zero.
16For instance, the mode of a binomial distribution is generally not exactly symmetric. However,
if N is large enough, we can apply DeMoivre-LaPlace (0 < qi ± 2
√
qi(1− qi)/N < 1) and employ the
normal distribution instead. Thus we can treat each mode to be symmetric. The number traders has
to large enough so that for V = 0, there are almost never more than N/2 traders with a favorable
signal and vice versa for V = 1.
17To be more precise, for d À N/2, pm(d) = 1, and for d ¿ N/2, pm(d) = 0. Thus to get
interesting equilibria, it is necessary that S is strictly smaller than N/2. If it was not, an IPO where
only si = 1 investors buy, would never be at risk of being overpriced as it fails in all overpriced cases.
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impact. These potential profits depend primarily on price movements and thus one
should study the the offer price as the strategic decision variable. In any imaginable
framework the investment bank faces a trade-off between higher revenue and likelihood
of failure. Thus it is reasonable to assert that the offer price or, depending on the
formulation, the bookbuilding span has signaling value. A fixed-price mechanism is,
arguably, the simplest possible way to capture the price’s strategic dimension.
A hypothetical bookbuilding model will capture the strategic dimension in a sim-
ilar fashion, yet the analysis would become less tractable without adding insight: In
bookbuilding, the investment bank must set a bookbuilding span. This span can cer-
tainly have signaling value because it is, arguably, similar to setting a single price (a
degenerate span). Suppose bookbuilding spans have to be sufficiently tight so that they
are strictly in the [0, 1]-interval’s interior. During the bookbuilding period, investors
submit their orders which (potentially) reveal their private information – just as with
our fixed price mechanism. At the end of the bookbuilding period the investment bank
will set the final selling price somewhere in the span, distribute the shares, and reveal
overall demand. As long as the span and thus the issue price in the span is strictly in
the interior of the [0, 1]-interval, secondary market prices will adjust to a price outside
the span. Our stylized, parsimonious model is rich enough to capture the same result
that a more complicated bookbuilding model would yield.
1.2.2 Derivation of the Separating Equilibrium
The focus of this paper is the pricing decision of the investment bank given its signal.
In the following we identify the conditions under which a profit maximizing investment
bank will reveal its information through the offer price. A separating equilibrium is
defined as informationally efficient since investors can derive the bank’s signal from the
offer price. In a pooling equilibrium information is shaded and thus it is informationally
inefficient. In this case, investors decide only on the basis of their private signals.
The Equilibrium Concept and Selection Criteria. The equilibrium concept for
this signaling game is, naturally, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A common
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problem with PBEs, however, is their multiplicity, stemming equilibria being sup-
ported by “unreasonable” out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The common way to overcome
this problem is to apply an equilibrium selection rule such as the Intuitive Criterion
(IC), introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987). We follow this line of research and consider
only equilibria that do not fail the IC. All of these PBE selection devices favour sepa-
rating over pooling equilibria. It will turn out, however, that in our framework under
certain conditions the IC cannot rule out pooling price equilibria. Moreover, from the
perspective of the investment bank the pooling equilibrium then Pareto dominates any
separating equilibrium. It would thus be unreasonable not to assume that these equi-
libria will be picked. Thus in what follows, we will only consider equilibria that satisfy
the IC and among these, we consider those that are Pareto efficient for the bank
A pooling equilibrium is specified through (i) an equilibrium offer price p∗ from
which investors infer (ii) price-information µ = 1
2
, and (iii) investors’ best replies given
their private signals, µ, and p∗. A separating equilibrium is (i) a system of prices
{p∗, p¯∗} and price-information such that (ii) at p∗ = p¯∗, the high separation price, the
price-information is that the bank has the favorable signal, µ = 1, at p∗ = p∗, the low
separation price, the price-information is that the bank has the low signal, µ = 0, and
(iii) investors’ best replies given their private signals, µ, and p∗. In both separating
and pooling equilibria, for p 6∈ {p¯∗, p∗} out-of-equilibrium public beliefs are chosen
‘appropriately.’ The following result is a straightforward consequence of signaling, the
proof of which is in Appendix 1.6.5.
Lemma 1.1 [The Highest Possible Low Separating Price] There exists no separating
offer price p∗ > p0,0.
In any separating equilibrium, therefore, the low price must be such that all in-
vestors buy, and the highest such separating price, given price-information µ = 0, is
p∗ = p0,0. In what follows we refer to p0,0 as the low separation price.
Signaling equilibria in our setting come in one of three guises: The already men-
tioned separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium in which only high-signal investors
buy, and a pooling equilibrium in which all investors buy. In the following, we charac-
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terize the conditions guaranteeing that only separating equilibria survive our selection
criterion.
Fix a potential price p ∈ [p0,0, p0, 1
2
], the interval of potential pooling prices at which
all investors would buy. Define φ1(p) as the price at which the high-signal bank would
be indifferent between charging a risky price φ1(p) at which only high-signal investors
buy, B1, and a safe pooling price p with B0,1 (all investors buy). Formally,








Price φ0(p) is defined analogously for the low-signal bank. Thus price φsb(p) is the
lowest risky price that a bank with signal sb is willing to deviate to from safe price
p.18 In what follows we refer to φ1(p) as the high-signal bank’s deviation price, and
to φ0(p) as the low-signal bank’s deviation price. It is straightforward to see that
φ0(p) > φ1(p) for all p ∈ [p0,0, p0, 1
2
], that is, the low-signal bank requires a higher
price as compensation for risk taking. In addition, ∂φj(p)/∂p > 0, j ∈ {0, 1}, so the
higher the pooling price, the higher the lowest profitable deviation price. We can now
establish our first major result.
Proposition 1.1 (Conditions for Informationally Efficient Prices)
If (i) the high-signal bank’s deviation price from the highest safe pooling price is not
higher than the highest separating price, φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1, and if (ii) the low-signal
bank’s deviation price from the low separating price is not smaller than the highest
risky pooling price, φ0(p0,0) ≥ p1, 1
2
then there exists a unique PBE that satisfies the
Intuitive Criterion and it is the separating equilibrium {(p∗ = p0,0, µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯∗ =
min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)}, µ = 1, B1); (p 6= {p∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0, B1 if p0,0 < p ≤
p1,0, B∅ else)}.
Interpretation of the Proposition. The first condition, φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1, together
with the IC is necessary and sufficient to rule out pooling equilibria in which all in-
18Deviation to a high, risky price can lead to increased overpricing, which is commonly perceived
to be bad for a bank’s reputation. Nanda and Yun (1997) analyze the impact of IPO mispricing on
the market value of investment banks. They find that overpriced offerings result in decreased lead-
underwriter market value. In our model, however, investors fully take into account that the offer price
may drop in the aftermarket. Modelling such reputation effects would thus be contradictory in our
setting.
AFTERMARKET SHORT COVERING 27
vestors buy, irrespective of their signals. The second condition, φ0(p0,0) ≥ p1, 1
2
, ensures
that there is no pooling where only high-signal investors buy, B1. The IC itself ensures
that the bank with sb = 1 always charges the highest sustainable separating price. The
high separation price p¯∗ is the minimum of p1,1 and φ0(p0,0). The bank cannot charge
more than p1,1, and it cannot credibly charge more than φ0(p0,0) as otherwise the bank
with sb = 0 would deviate. Finally, since φ1(p0,0) < φ1(p0, 1
2
) ≤ p1,1, the bank with
sb = 1 is willing to separate. The proof’s details are in Appendix 1.6.5. A definition
of the IC can be found, for instance, in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)[ p.448].
Underpricing. In the context of this model the first-day return is the difference
between market price and offer price. We can establish the following proposition. The
proof is in Appendix 1.6.5.
Proposition 1.2 (Underpricing)
In a separating equilibrium, on average, securities are underpriced.
Interpretation of the Result. The intuition behind the result is clear: Both types
of investors only buy if their expected payoff is non-negative. At p0,0 the low-signal
investor just breaks even in expectation but the high-signal investor expects a strictly
positive payoff. At p1,1 the high-signal investor just breaks even and the low-signal
investor abstains. Thus, ex-ante, expected payoff is positive, i.e. there is underpricing.
1.2.3 An Intuitive Characterization of the Equilibrium
The concept of deviation prices φsb is a convenient tool to describe restrictions. We will
now reformulate the conditions from Proposition 1.1 in terms of exogenous costs C.
This allows us to derive a simple linear descriptive characterization of the equilibrium.
Consider first condition (i), φ1(p0, 1
2













then a separating equilibrium cannot be sustained. Even a high-signal bank then
prefers to sell the security at a price where all investors buy.









p∗ = p1, 1
2 p∗ = p0,0
p¯∗ = p1,1
p¯∗ = φ0(p0,0)
p∗ = p0, 1
2
Figure 1.1: Threshold Costs and Equilibrium Prices. For costs smaller than C,
it holds that φ0(p0,0) < p1,1/2 so that the low-signal bank chooses a risky price. A pooling
equilibrium in p1,1/2 results. If C ∈ (C, C¯) a separating equilibrium results. For C ∈ (C, Cˆ)
the high-signal bank cannot charge the highest separation price p1,1 but must set a lower
price φ0(p0,0) to prevent the low-signal bank from mimicking. For C ∈ [Cˆ, C¯) the high signal
bank can charge p¯∗ = p1,1. Finally, if C > C¯ it holds that φ1(p0,1/2) > p1,1 so that even the
high-type bank prefers a safe price and pooling in p0, 1
2
results.
Consider now condition (ii), φ0(p0,0) ≥ p1, 1
2












then a separating equilibrium, again, cannot be sustained (by the SIC). In this case,
even a low-signal bank is willing to choose a high, risky pooling price and the high-signal
bank can thus not credibly signal its information. If C is so high that φ0(p0,0) > p1,1
then for the low-signal bank it does not even pay to deviate to the highest separating
price, p1,1. This bound on C is given by
Cˆ :=
α0p1,1 − p0,0
1− α0 βS. (1.9)
Define, analogously, C¯ and C such that (1.7) and (1.8) hold with equality. We
get C < Cˆ < C¯. The following Corollary to Proposition 1.1 summarizes the above
characterization.
Corollary 1.1 (Proposition 1.1 in Terms of Costs)
If C ∈ (C, C¯) then the unique equilibrium is the separating equilibrium stated in Propo-
sition 1.1. If C ∈ (C, Cˆ) then p¯∗ = φ0(p0,0), and if C ∈ [Cˆ, C¯) then p¯∗ = p1,1.
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It has often been argued that certifying agents, here the investment bank, must have
‘enough’ reputational capital at stake to make certification credible. In this context,
also ‘too much’ reputation can inhibit certification (separation from a low-signal bank)
if it becomes to expensive to jeopardize one’s reputation at a high, risky offer price.
Figure 1.1 plots threshold costs and corresponding equilibrium prices.
1.3 The Impact of Aftermarket Short Covering
In this section we extend the model and allow the investment bank to pursue aftermar-
ket short covering. We analyze its effect on the investment bank’s pricing decision and
investigate under which conditions informational efficiency will be undermined. We
find that, in general, the conditions for a separating equilibrium become more restric-
tive. Upholding separation may come at a cost – thus on average the investment bank
has to distort prices down, which causes more underpricing.
1.3.1 Overview of Short Covering and a Bank’s Strategy
With aftermarket short covering the investment bank has the opportunity to allot a
predetermined amount of up to O securities on top of the principal volume of securities
S. This amount O is referred to as the overallotment facility. It typically constitutes
15% of the number of initial securities S. The investment bank goes short in a position
of this size. If the market price falls below the offer price, the bank fills its short
positions in the aftermarket. This practise is referred to as aftermarket short covering.
If the price is below the offer price, the bank makes a profit. If the market price rises
above the offer price, the bank exercises a so-called overallotment option, the right to
obtain up to O securities from the the issuer at the offer price. The option is only valid
if the bank had indeed established a short position. Consequently, the bank is perfectly
hedged against rising prices. We restrict attention to the case where either the entire
amount of S+O securities is sold or, if only fewer securities can be sold, the IPO fails;
the restriction merely simplifies the analysis and does not affect the qualitative results.
The bank receives the gross spread only on the securities that actually remain floated.
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Intuitively, the size of a potential price drop and thus of profits from aftermarket
short covering is larger the higher the offer price. In the benchmark case’s separating
equilibrium, a low-signal bank would not mimic a high-signal bank because it fears
costs from a potential IPO failure. With short covering expected aftermarket profits
are higher the larger the potential price drop. Moreover, a bank with a low signal
considers such a drop more likely. It is then possible, that potential losses from a failed
offering are offset by higher expected aftermarket gains. Two scenarios are possible:
In equilibrium, the high-signal bank sets a lower price to separate from a low-signal
bank. The high-signal bank, however, is only willing to do so as long as separation
pays. Thus there is a point where defending separation becomes too costly so that
the high-signal bank pools with the low-signal bank and an informationally inefficient
outcome results.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We write Π1(p∗, B, sb) for the investment bank’s expected profits from their share of the
offer revenue. Let Π2(p∗, B, sb) denote the expected second period profit from filling
the short position at lower prices. In case of a separating equilibrium these are
Π2(p¯∗, B1, sb = 1) =
N∑
d=S + O
O ·max {p¯∗(1− β)− pm(d), 0} · Pr(d|sb = 1) (1.10)
if the price is risky and sb = 1. For safe prices, the summation in Π
2(p∗, B0,1, sb = 0) is
from 0 to N , as the IPO never fails. The conditional distribution Pr(d|sb) of demand
d is the distribution derived for αsb(S). Note that a high-signal bank sums from S+O,
since lower demand leads to a failure of the IPO. An investment bank with sb = 0,
on the other hand, sums from 0 since the IPO is always successful. The bank also
accounts for the foregone gross spread β when buying back in the market.
The market price after the offering pm(d) adjusts according to investors’ signals and
with respect to these signals it is informationally efficient. The bank cannot stabilize
‘against’ this efficient price, but, of course, if the price is efficient, it need not and
must not be ‘stabilized’. In our model it is, therefore, not possible to study potentially
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beneficial effects of price stabilization. More generally, however, if one believes in
efficient markets, stabilization is undesirable and, if at all, it can have no more than a
short-term impact.
With short covering, a high separation price, p¯∗ has to be small enough so a low-
signal bank cannot profitably deviate from the low, riskless price, p0,0. Thus the in-
vestment bank with sb = 1 has to determine φ
′
0(p0,0) so that
Π1(φ′0(p0,0)|sb = 0, B1) + Π2(φ′0(p0,0)|sb = 0) =
Π1(p0,0|sb = 0, B0,1) + Π2(p0,0|sb = 0). (1.11)
In what follows, we make two further assumptions. The first states that the overall
amount of shares that can be issued remains constant relative to the scenario without
aftermarket short-covering. This simplifies computations and later allows us to com-
pare the relative payoffs in both scenarios. The second requires that together signals
of investors and bank are sufficiently informative. Figure 1.2 has an illustration of
Assumption 1.4.
Assumption 1.3 S+ O = (1− qi)N.
Assumption 1.4 qi and qb are large enough so that p1, 1
2
> 2p0,0.
Using Assumptions 1.3 and 1.4, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1.2 (The Low-Signal Bank’s Deviation Price Drops)
The low-signal bank’s deviation price with short covering is smaller than without short
covering, φ0(p) ≥ φ′0(p) ∀ p ∈ [p0,0, p0, 1
2
].
In the proof we show that for any low-signal bank’s deviation price φ0(p), second period
profits from aftermarket short covering for the low-signal bank are higher at the high,
risky price p¯∗. Consequently, this bank has an additional incentive to deviate. The
low-signal bank considers it more likely that the price drops, hence its potential gain
from short covering is large, in particular, relative to what it can gain by setting the low
separation price. To prevent a low-signal bank from mimicking, the high-signal bank
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has to reduce its offer price. The proof is in Appendix 1.6.5. In what follows, if there
is a switch from separating to pooling, we restrict attention to those switches that are
to the risky pooling price p1, 1
2
.19 We can now establish the main result. Analogously
to Corollary 1 we spell it out in terms of separation costs as this allows for a more
straightforward interpretation. The proof can be found in Appendix 1.6.5.
Proposition 1.3 (Equilibrium with Short Covering Relative to Benchmark)
1. There exists a lower bound threshold cost C ′ > C such that for all costs C ∈
[C,C ′), the only equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion and Pareto ef-




2. There exists an upper bound threshold cost C¯ ′ such that for all costs C ∈ [C ′, C¯ ′]
the unique equilibrium that satisfies the Intuitive Criterion and Pareto efficiency
is a separating equilibrium. For the high separating price p¯∗ there exists a thresh-
old cost level Cˆ ′ ∈ [Cˆ, C¯ ′) so that
(a) for costs C ∈ [C ′, Cˆ ′) the high separation price is the low-signal bank’s devia-
tion price from the low separating price, p¯∗ = φ′0(p0,0), p1, 1
2
< φ′0(p0,0) < p1,1,
and
(b) for costs C ∈ [Cˆ ′, C¯ ′] the high separation price is the highest possible risky
price p¯∗ = p1,1.
On average, underpricing in the separating equilibrium is exacerbated.
Interpretation of the Result. The first part of the proposition states that for all
costs smaller than C ′, both types of the bank prefer to pool and hence prices are
informationally inefficient. Since C ′ > C pooling occurs for a region of parameters
where without aftermarket short covering there was separation. That is, the cost
19Our results on informational efficiency are not affected by this restriction. On the contrary,
taking pooling in a risk-free price also into account would strengthen our findings. In addition, if
there is a choice between the high, risky pooling price, p1, 12 , and the low, safe pooling price, p0, 12 , the
former will always generate more ex-ante revenue. We thus focus on high pooling prices to keep the
analysis simple.
AFTERMARKET SHORT COVERING 33
region for which we get informational efficiency becomes more restrictive. The second
part of the proposition outlines the region in which separation is sustained. For all
costs smaller than threshold Cˆ ′, the investment bank with the good signal charges
φ′0(p0,0), which, by Lemma 1.2, is smaller than the price charged in that corresponding
parameter region without short covering. In other words, for costs between C ′ and Cˆ ′
offer prices drop. By Proposition 1.2, there is underpricing in a separating equilibrium.
Thus, on average, underpricing is exacerbated when separation is sustained. At first
glance this result is surprising since second period expected gains are larger the higher
the offer price. One might expect that agents are then more inclined to set higher
prices. In our model, this casual intuition fails.
The Impact on the Upper Threshold Level for Costs. So far we have focussed
on the relation of lower bound threshold costs C and C ′ and ‘middle’ bound threshold
costs Cˆ and Cˆ ′. Surely, if Cˆ ′ increases relative to Cˆ (by Lemma 1.2) and C ′ increases
relative to C, then also C¯ ′ should increase relative to C¯. But this is not necessarily
true – it may actually decrease. Furthermore, if it does increase, it is irrelevant. This
is why: Keeping N, β, and O fixed, C¯ and C¯ ′ are functions of the signal qualities qb and
qi. For low signal qualities, C¯
′ actually decreases. For such values the high separation
price p1,1 and the low, risk-free pooling price p0, 1
2
are close. Expected aftermarket
profits are higher for the risk-free price and this outweighs the lower expected pooling
revenue. For high values of qb and qi, both C¯ and C¯
′ exceed the ‘natural’ upper bound
for costs: The worst that can happen, is that a bank loses all (discounted) future
business. This upper bound on C can be estimated. In Appendix 1.6.4 we go into the
details of this argument, but in what follows we restrict attention to C, C ′, Cˆ, and Cˆ ′.
To summarize: The first case of a decreasing upper bound strengthens our result, the
second case does not weaken our argument.
Comparative Statics. We can express the overallotment option O as share r of S,
that is S + O = (1 + r)S. Thus, r = 0 is the benchmark case without short covering.
Potential policy variables in this setup are the bank’s share of the revenue, β, and
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the size of the overallotment option, r. The proof of the following Proposition is in
Appendix 1.6.5.
Proposition 1.4 (Comparative Statics)
The conditions for informational efficiency become more restrictive for the gross spread,
β, or the amount of the overallotment facility, r, increasing.
Interpretation of the Proposition. A higher level of β or an increased amount
of r strengthen an investment bank’s incentive to set higher prices. For a high-signal
bank it is thus more difficult to defend a high separation price, consequently, more
pooling results.
1.3.3 How would the result change without signaling?
In order to understand the impact of signaling, consider the case where the investment
bank gets no signal at all. This is equivalent to the case of a neutral signal qb = 1/2.











qdi (1− qi)N−d + (1− qi)dqN−di
)
. (1.12)
Here an offer price has no signaling value, investors learn nothing from it. If an investor
has favorable signal si = 1, he buys the security if p ≤ p1, 1
2
, if he has si = 0 he buys if
p ≤ p0, 1
2
. Thus price p0, 1
2
is risk-free. The investment bank then sets risky price p1, 1
2
,
if its expected payoffs are higher than those for the risk-free price,
α(S)βp1, 1
2
S− (1− α(S))C ≥ βp0, 1
2
S, (1.13)
and it sets p0, 1
2
otherwise. Thus there exists a threshold C˜, such that for all costs
C ≤ C˜, the investment bank would charge the high price p1, 1
2
, and for all C > C˜,
it would play safe and charge p0, 1
2
. However, once short covering is introduced, this
second profit opportunity may enable the investment bank to charge a higher price.
Simulation of prices show that, Π2(p1, 1
2
) > Π2(p0, 1
2
). Thus there exists a threshold
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cost C˜ ′ larger than C˜ such that the investment bank charges the higher, riskier price
where it used to charge the low price. In this case, there would be more overpricing,
for C ∈ [C˜, C˜ ′). This contrasts our signaling model, which produces the opposite
effect: For a non trivial region of parameters we expect to observe, on average, more
underpricing.
1.4 Payoff Analysis
Although the investment bank has a second source of profits, it is not immediately
obvious that it will indeed be better off – if it has the high signal, it may have to
distort prices downwards. The bank will thus receive lower expected revenues that
may not be outweighed by short covering profits.
Measuring Payoffs. The investment bank’s expected payoffs can be measured at
two points in time: Ex-ante, that is before the bank receives its private information, and
interim, that is after the signals are realized but before investors take decisions. Issuers
have no private information, so their information is exclusively determined ex-ante. As
a convention, we compare per-share profits and costs.
Table 1.1 summarizes a bank’s conditional signal probabilities, the prices that are
charged for each signal, the conditional probabilities of a successful IPO and, given it
is indeed successful, the probability of short covering and its profitability. For instance,
take V = 0 and sb = 1, which occurs with probability 1−qb. In a separating equilibrium
the high-signal bank charges p¯ without and p¯′ with short covering. The IPO is successful
with probability 1/2 and, given this, there is short covering with probability 1. With
probability 1/2 the IPO fails and the bank incurs cost C. Note that if V = 1, by the
Law of Large Numbers, the IPO almost never fails.
1.4.1 Payoff Comparison for the Investment Bank
We will trickle down from the the strongest to the weakest case: First we analyze the
interim type-specific payoffs. This is the strongest case, because we determine when
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Without Aftermarket Short Covering
sb = 1 sb = 0
Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(success) Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(success)
V = 1 qb p¯ = min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} 1 1− qb p0,0 1
V = 0 1− qb p¯ = min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} 12 qb p0,0 1
With Aftermarket Short Covering
sb = 1
Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(success) Pr(short cov.) Profit p− pm
V = 1 qb p¯′ = min{p1,1, φ′0(p0,0)} 1 0 0
V = 0 1− qb p¯′ = min{p1,1, φ′0(p0,0)} 12 1 κp¯′
sb = 0
Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(success) Pr(short cov.) Profit p− pm
V = 1 1− qb p0,0 1 0 0
V = 0 qb p0,0 1 1 κp0,0
Table 1.1: Summary of State-Profits. The table summarizes the probabilities of
signals given values, the separating prices that are charged in each case, the probabilities of
a successful IPO and, given that, the probability of short covering, and its profitability. κ is
defined as (1− β)r/β(1 + r).
types gain individually. We then proceed with the ex-ante payoff gains. We specify
under which conditions the bank would prefer a setting with short covering. Payoffs
are then averaged over signal-types because ex-ante, the signal is unknown. This is
the weaker case. We focus on the extreme scenarios, that is (a) on the costs with the
largest price drops after regime shifts and (b) on costs for which ex-ante payoff with
short covering is lowest.
To derive the results, we construct the payoff differences from both settings at a
given threshold cost and then substitute in closed form approximations of the thresh-
old prices. Details of the formulae can be derived straightforwardly from Table 1.1.
Appendix 1.6.3 outlines how the risky threshold prices can be approximated. The
resulting risky threshold prices that we find can be interpreted as
ps,µ =
expected liquidation value given the price’s information content
fraction of cases where this information can be used
.
So for instance, if µ(p) = 1, the unconditional value of this information piece is the
qb, the quality of the bank’s signal. The fraction of cases where this information can
be used is the probability of a successful IPO, given µ(p) = 1: Here it is α1. Thus
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p1,1 = qb/α1. By the same token p1, 1
2
= .5/(3/4). For the statements below we
computed payoff differences for β = 7% and O = .15 S, which are the empirically most
commonly observed parameters.20 In summary:
Interim Payoffs for the Low-Signal Bank. Suppose that separation is main-
tained. Without short covering, per-share profits are p0,0. With short covering there
are additional expected aftermarket profits of qbκp0,0, as can be seen from Table 1.1.
Suppose now that a pooling equilibrium results. Then, by definition of the pooling
equilibrium, the low-signal bank benefits. In both cases the low-signal bank is better
off with short covering.
Interim Payoffs for the High-Signal Bank. If costs are lower than C or if costs
are higher than Cˆ ′, the bank always wins: In both cases expected revenue remains
constant and the bank also gets short covering profits. Suppose now that costs are in
(C, Cˆ ′) and that the price decrease is strongest, from from p1,1 to p1, 1
2
. Then for signal
qualities in areas A and B in the Left Panel of Figure 1.2, the bank is always better
off, despite the maximal price decrease; in areas C and D the bank loses. It may not
be better off in all cases, but the smaller the price decrease, the smaller areas C and D
become.
Ex-ante Payoffs There are two subcases to consider: (i) The threshold costs for
which the highest price decrease occurs, which is Cˆ. (ii) The threshold cost for which
the ex-ante payoff with short covering is lowest, which is C ′.
(i) Suppose at Cˆ, prices drop from separation in p1,1 and p0,0 to pooling in p1, 1
2
.
At Cˆ, without short covering the low type is indifferent between riskless p0,0 and risky
p1,1. Using the risky payoffs, without short covering payoffs are (α1 − α0)p1,1−costs.
20Chen and Ritter (2000) report that β is almost always 7 percent. Naturally, when both O is
small and β is large, some of the statements below may change. Clearly, if these contract variables
are such that there is very little to be won in the aftermarket (low O) but a lot to be lost in revenue
(high β), then matters may change. However, the essence of the arguments below is that even at the
most extreme price drops there is a non-trivial parameter space where the bank is always better off.
Taking also parameters sets for β and O into the description of the analysis would merely complicate
the exposition.
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With short covering payoffs are (α1 − α0)p1, 1
2
−cost+short covering profits. So costs
cancel, revenues are lower, but, as it turns out, the short-covering profits always over-
compensate for the loss in revenue. Thus despite the maximum price decrease at Cˆ,
ex-ante the investment bank is always better off with short-covering.
(ii) The bank has lowest ex-ante payoffs with short covering at C ′, the costs where
the low bank is indifferent between choosing risky separation price p1, 1
2
= φ′0(p0,0) and
riskless price p0,0. The most extreme drop in revenue happens when Cˆ < C
′, so that
without short covering, the bank plays a separation equilibrium. Note that at this
cost C ′, without short covering the low type is not indifferent between a risky and
a riskless price as φ0(p0,0) > p1,1. Payoffs without short covering are of the order
α1p1,1 + p0,0−costs, with short covering they are α1p1, 1
2
+ p0,0−costs+short covering
profits. The investment bank is better off for parameters qb, qi in areas A, B, and C,
but not D (Left Panel, Figure 1.2). With respect to signal qualities, this area appears to
be large. However, taking (i) into account, this is only relevant for a strict subinterval
of [Cˆ, Cˆ ′] and if also C ′ > Cˆ. For all other costs, the bank is ex-ante always better off.
The Right Panel of Figure 1.2 illustrates this point.
To summarize, in most cases the investment bank is ex-ante and interim better off.
1.4.2 Payoff Comparison for Issuer and Investors
Given our model specification we can only compare the revenue that the issuer receives
in settings with and without short covering.21 Suppose with short covering, separation
is maintained. If the separation price decreases, p¯′ < p¯, the issuer loses. Suppose
now, there is a switch from separation to pooling. The high separation price decreases
from p¯ to p1, 1
2
, but at the same time the low separation price rises from p0,0 to p1, 1
2
.
Comparison of expected payoffs shows that in this case the issuer is better off for
all parameter values.22 Investors’ profits are directly opposed to the issuer’s profit.
Whenever the issuer gains (in expectation) investors lose and vice versa.
21This is equivalent to expected profits: Profit here would be defined as the difference between
revenue per share and the true value, which, by the LLN, is identical to the aftermarket price. We do
not take other factors such as, for e.g., costs for alternative financing (if the IPO fails) into account.
22Recall that we restrict the analysis to per-share profits. Taking into account that the number
of securities eventually sold to the market will be lower with short covering it can be the case that
whenever, simultaneously, qi is very small and qb is very large the issuer is worse off even with pooling.







































































Figure 1.2: Informational Efficiency and Sign of Bank’s Profit Change.
Left Panel: Areas A, B, C, and D indicate permitted values of qi and qb, i.e. qb > qi > .5 and
p1, 1
2
> 2p0,0. For C = Cˆ, A indicates where an informational efficient separating equilibrium
is uphold with short covering; in B, C, and D a pooling equilibrium results. The high-signal
bank is better off in A and B, and worse off in C and D at C = Cˆ. Ex-ante, the bank is
better off in A, B, and C, for all C; in D there exist C1 ∈ [Cˆ, C ′] and C2 ∈ [C ′, Cˆ ′] such that
for C ∈ [C1, C2] it may lose. The figure is based on simulated values for β = .07, r = .15,
and N = 1000.
Right Panel: The lower line indicates ex-ante profits of the bank as a function of C without
short covering. The higher lines indicate profits with aftermarket short covering. For the
values of qi and qb in areas B and C these profits are always higher; in area D it may be the
case that for C ∈ [C1, C2] these profits are lower.
Even though this section is merely concerned with redistribution, it yields an inter-
esting insight. The investment bank is nearly always better off with aftermarket short
covering, in many cases irrespective of its signal. The issuer never gains but often loses
if separation is upheld, but always wins if separation morphs into pooling; the effect
on investors’ payoffs is the opposite.
1.5 Conclusion
Investment banks legally pursue supposedly price stabilizing activities in the post-offer
market. In this paper we analyze how these aftermarket activities influence the setting
of the offer price in the first place. We take a different perspective from existing
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theoretical work as we build the model around the stylized fact that investment banks
can realize risk-free profits through aftermarket short covering. The current model
cannot assess why some investment banks expose themselves to risk and establish
‘naked shorts’, or why they do not exercise the overallotment option in full even when
prices rise above the offer price. This paper only explains the strategic impact of the
possibility of risk-free profits. The investment bank’s behavior must not be perceived
as rogue or fraud, but as a rational response to a change in the environment. Investors
anticipate the bank’s behavior and react rationally to it.
We propose a stylized model of an offering procedure that is in accordance with em-
pirical findings and perceived industry practice. We assume that both the investment
bank and investors hold private information about the intrinsic value of the offered
security. Prices are set so that rational-expectation investors only order the security if
they expect to make a profit, taking into account the behavior of the investment bank.
The market price after the offering will adjust according to investors’ signals. As these
are conditionally i.i.d., the price almost surely reflects the fundamental value of the
security. The bank cannot stabilize ‘against’ this fully efficient price, but, of course, if
the price is efficient, it need not and must not be ‘stabilized’. So in the best of worlds,
one with full transparency, the bank can make an extra profit through short cover-
ing. In the real world the IPO process is opaque; neither investors nor regulators nor
researchers know precisely the banks’ strategies. It is certainly reasonable to assume
that in such an ‘imperfect world’ the strategic impact of the second source of profits is
rather more than less important.
There is little empirical support that stabilization is possible and has desirable,
positive effects. Indeed it is somewhat surprising that regulators allow price manip-
ulations. It is sometimes argued that investment banks will not always stabilize to
avoid a moral hazard problem with investors who believe being fully protected against
over-pricing. It is likely that this reduces the effect of potential aftermarket profits as
described in this paper. The result itself, however, obviously still holds — there are
still hardly any costs involved. In fact, from the regulators perspective price distortions
can easily be ruled out if the bank is prohibited from filling the short position at prices
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below 1 − β times the offer price. As long as the banks can keep the existence of a
short position secret from investors, a moral hazard problem would not occur.
In our setting, the security may turn out to be overpriced. Investors, however, have
already taken this into account. Investment banks always set the highest feasible price
and thus acts in the issuer’s interest. It is important to notice that in our setting the
investment bank does not temper prices to rob issuers. The informational asymmetry
in the paper arises at a point in time when all official, mandatory information has been
released and any other public statement by investment bank or issuer will be perceived
as cheap talk. Only actions, that is prices, can carry a meaningful message.
The offering procedure was modelled as a signaling game. The investment bank
moves first and strategically chooses the offer price to maximize its profits from both
the gross spread of the offer revenue and profits from short covering in the aftermarket.
We establish a benchmark by analyzing the situation without aftermarket activities,
and identify the conditions under which the equilibrium is both unique and separating.
A separating equilibrium is referred to as informationally efficient since the investment
bank’s information is fully revealed by the offer price. We further show that, on av-
erage, securities are underpriced in the separation equilibrium. With the introduction
of aftermarket short covering payoff functions and, consequently, the strategic environ-
ment change. As a result, either the offer price falls on average, or a pooling equilibrium
results. In the first case, an investment bank with favorable information distorts the
price downwards and thereby, on average, exacerbates underpricing. In the second case
investors are unable to infer the investment bank’s signal from the offer price. This
equilibrium is informationally inefficient since investors’ decisions are based on private
signals only and not also on the signal of the investment bank.
The intuition behind the results can be best explained by relating this paper to
job-market signaling with two types of workers. In the so-called Riley-outcome, the
low type chooses education level zero, and the high type chooses his education just high
enough so that it does not pay for the low type to deviate to his level of education. In
our paper this corresponds to a low-signal bank choosing a low, risk-free price. At this
price all investors want to buy the security and consequently the offering will never
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fail. Nevertheless, in the aftermarket any offering can turn out to be overpriced. The
high-signal bank chooses a high, risky price just low enough so that the risky price does
not pay for the low-signal bank. A price is risky when it is so high that only high-signal
investors buy; in this case the offering will fail if there are not enough investors with
the favorable signal. When introducing profits from short covering, the effect is that of
a personal extra benefit from education. Suppose this perk is higher for the low type
of worker than for the high type worker. As a result, the high type has to choose a
higher level of education to maintain separation. In our model, the low-signal bank
considers a price drop in the aftermarket more likely, thus the potential profits from
short covering are higher than for the high signal bank. And so the high-signal bank
has to distort prices downwards in order to maintain separation. At first sight this is a
surprising result, as casual intuition suggests that potential aftermarket profits should
result in more over-pricing. There may also come a point where it does not pay for
the high signal bank to maintain separation, and so it settles for pooling. The result
is informational inefficiency.
The investment bank enjoys higher payoffs with short covering for the vast majority
of parameter constellations. Looking at per-share profits, the issuer never gains but
often loses if separation prevails; but if there is a switch to a pooling equilibrium he is
always better off. Investors’ payoffs are directly opposed to the issuer’s gains or losses.
An increase in the investment bank’s share of the revenue or an increase in the amount
of overalloted securities reduces the parameter-set with informational efficiency.
Our analysis is in accordance with recent empirical analyzes but contrasts the ex-
isting theoretical literature which argues that stabilizing activities in the aftermarket
serve efficiency. We therefore challenge financial market authorities’ view that cur-
rent regulations simultaneously serve the interests of issuers, investors, and investment
banks.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Aftermarket Price Formation
The finally prevailing market price depends on the number of positive signals about
the value of the security. In determining the price we have to distinguish between cases
B1 and B0,1.
Consider first case B1. Since only high-signal investors buy, aggregated demand d
indicates the number of high-signal investors. Suppose d ≥ S, i.e. the IPO is successful.
Investors are assumed to take the aggregated information about signals into account
and update their expectations accordingly. At this updated expectation all investors
irrespective of their private signals are indifferent between selling and holding or buying
and abstaining, depending on whether they own a security or not, respectively. The
updated expectation thus becomes the aftermarket price, denoted by pm(d). We will
later show that case B1 will occur at the high price of a separating equilibrium only,
i.e. investors know that the bank’s signal is sb = 1. Taking further into account that
the true value of the security is either 0 or 1, we can write pm(d|µ = 1) = Pr(V =
1|d, µ = 1). Using Bayes’ rule, we can express the aftermarket price as
pm(d|µ = 1) = Pr(d|V = 1)Pr(sb = 1|V = 1)
Pr(d|V = 1)Pr(sb = 1|V = 1) + Pr(d|V = 0)Pr(sb = 1|V = 0) . (1.14)
Due to the binomial structure of the prior distributions over signals, the conditional
distribution for demand realization d is, for V = 1,





qdi (1− qi)N−d, (1.15)
and for V = 0 analogously. The price-information about sb is unambiguous in a
separating equilibrium. We can therefore replace it with the conditional probability of
the bank’s signal being correct, which is qb or 1− qb. Bayes’ rule yields





i + (1− qb)(1− qi)2d−N
. (1.16)
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Consider now case B0,1 in which all investors order the security, i.e. stated demand
is N and securities are allocated at random. The demand is uninformative since it does
not reveal the number of high-signal investors. Suppose that we are at the low price of
a separating equilibrium. Note that high-signal investors expect the security to be of
higher value than low-signal investors. Hence, there exists a price larger than the offer
price, p˜ > p∗ at which high-signal investors who were not allocated a security would be
willing to buy the security, and low-signal investors would be willing to sell, in case they
were allocated a security. Without modelling the price-finding procedure explicitly we
assume that the following intermediate process takes place. Those high-signal investors
who did not receive the security in the offering submit a unit market-buy-order. Those
low-signal investors who obtained the security in the offering submit a unit market-
sell-order. All other investors abstain. The number of investors who want to buy or
to sell is denoted by d˜ and S˜, respectively. Aggregate demand of high-signal investors
is then d = d˜ + S − S˜ and the market price pm can be determined as before. The
same procedure can be applied to determine the first period market clearing price in
the case of a pooling equilibrium. The conditional expectation which determines the
price, however, will then not contain the component about the signal of the investment
bank.
1.6.2 Threshold Prices
Denote by psi,µ the maximum price at which an investor with signal si and price infor-
mation µ buys, given all investors with s˜i ≥ si buy. At this price the investor’s expected
return from buying the security is zero, normalizing outside investment opportunities
accordingly.
Define ψ(1|1, 1) := Pr(V = 1|si = 1, µ = 1) and ψ(0|1, 1) := Pr(V = 0|si = 1, µ =
1). Consider now the structure of the conditional distribution f(d− 1|V ). For V = 1,
this is a binomial distribution over {0, . . . , N − 1} with center (N − 1)qi, and likewise
for V = 0 with center (N − 1)(1 − qi). Since by Assumption 1.2, N is ‘large enough’
for every qi, f(d− 1|1) = 0 for d < N/2 and f(d|0) = 0 for d > N/2. When combining
both f(d− 1|1) and f(d− 1|0), we obtain a bi-modal function. In g(·|si, µ), investors’
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posterior distribution over demands, these are weighted with ψ(1|si, µ) and ψ(0|si, µ).
Assumption 1.2 now satisfies two purposes. The first is to ensure that we pick N
large enough, so that the two modes do not overlap. The second can be seen from the
following lemma.
Lemma 1.3 For any qi >
1
2
, there exists a number of investors N(qi), such that
pm(d) · g(d− 1|si, µ) ∈ {0, g(d− 1|si, µ)} almost everywhere.
The lemma states that market prices are mostly 0 or 1, if they are not, then the weight
of this demand is negligible. To see this consider the following heuristic argument.
Proof: pm(d) is a s-shaped function in d, given by equation (1.16). For large N ,
pm(d) ∈ {0, 1} almost everywhere. Define I∗ as the interval of d around N/2 s.t. for
d ∈ I∗ we have pm(d) 6∈ {0, 1}. pm(d) is multiplied with density g(d − 1|si, µ), which
peaks at (N − 1)(1− qi) and (N − 1)qi. For N increasing I∗/N → 0 and the bi-modal
distribution becomes more centered around (N − 1)(1− qi) and (N − 1)qi. Hence, for
every qi there is an (N − 1)(qi) such that for d ∈ I∗, g(d|si, µ) · pm(d) = 0, i.e. the
weight on pm(d) 6∈ {0, 1} can be made arbitrarily small. ¤
Using Lemma 1.3 we can determine the threshold prices as follows. Consider first p1,1.




















g(d− 1|1, 1) . (1.17)
For d > N/2, g(d − 1|si, µ) = ψ(1|si, µ)f(d − 1|1) and for d < N/2, g(d − 1|si, µ) =











, and σ := Σ0/Σ1.
Also write `(µ) := ψ(0|1, µ)/ψ(1|1, µ). Thus for the combination of signal si and
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price-information µ with B1 we can write
p1,1 = (1 + σ`(1))
−1 and likewise p1, 1
2
= (1 + σ`(1
2
))−1. (1.18)
Consider now the case for p0,0. At this price all agents receive the security with equal
probability and we sum from 0 to N − 1. Thus


















1.6.3 Approximate Closed Form Solutions
We will now derive approximate closed form solutions so that we can solve our model
analytically. In this appendix we let d denotes the number of other investors with
favourable information — this contrasts the exposition of the main text, but it simplifies
the notation here. First consider the strategy of agent number N . There are N − 1
other investors. Given that he invests and the true value is, say, V = 1, then by the law
of large numbers, demand/the number of favorable signals will always be larger than
N/2. Furthermore, the market price is almost surely pm(d) = 1. If d others order, then
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To compute the sum we proceed in a similar manner as one would to compute the




























































(1− (1− qi)N ). (1.23)
In the second step we made a change of variable, l = d+ 1, but through this change,











d(1− qi)N−1−d ≈ 1
qiN
. (1.24)










N−1−d(1− qi)d ≈ 1
(1− qi)N . (1.25)
Use now familiar notation to denote the combination of private and public beliefs φs,µ.
Recall that we can write p1,1 as
p1,1 =
1
1 + `(1) Σ0
Σ1
. (1.26)
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N−1−d(1−qi)d gets numerically symmetric
























































, and p0,1 ≈ 1− qb
α0
. (1.30)
The information content of a high pooling price is 1/2, and knowing this information,
the probability of the offering being successful is 3/4. Thus the interpretation of risky
prices is thus the ratio of the expected liquidation value given price-information to the
share of successful offerings given this information
p1,µ =
E[ V |µ ]
Pr(IPO successful | µ) . (1.31)
1.6.4 Maximal Reputation Costs
If an IPO fails, the worst that can happen is that the investment bank loses all future
IPO business, i.e. it is out of the market. Assuming that future business takes place
in the same environment (e.g. the quality of signals remains constant), the bank can
maximally lose all discounted future profits. Assume that the bank discounts future
profits at rate δ. Consider the case of highest potential costs C¯ that can occur from
a failing IPO in a separating equilibrium. An upper bound for costs is given by the
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discounted lost future profits if p¯ = p1,1. Then ex-ante profits of a single IPO are
Π(p0,0, p1,1, C) =
1
2






Assuming that an investment bank would conduct one IPO each period and accounting
for the fact that in a separating equilibrium the ex-ante probability of the IPO to be




(1− δ)t · ((3 + qb)/4)t · Π(p0,0, p1,1, Cmax). (1.33)
Thus maximal possible costs can be solved to be





δ(3 + qb) + 2(1− qb) . (1.34)
Comparing values of Cmax to those of C¯ shows that for qi and qb sufficiently large
C¯ À Cmax. Furthermore, for reasonable values of the discount rate, the reverse relation
holds true only for values of qi and qb where we get C¯
′ < C¯. That is, either C¯ ′ < C¯
and informational inefficiencies result, or C¯ is so large that it lies outside the relevant
parameter region in the context of this model.
1.6.5 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1
Suppose p∗ > p0,0. At this price only high-signal investors buy. A high-signal bank will
always set a price where at least high-signal investors buy. Hence, high-signal investors
buy at both prices p∗ and p¯∗. A low-signal bank can now increase its payoff by setting
a higher price as α0 is not affected by this, a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1.1
First we will argue that the only separating equilibrium surviving the IC is the one
outlined in the proposition. Then we will argue that pooling cannot occur.
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Step 1 (Separating) First observe that there cannot be a separating price p¯∗ where
investors choose B0,1 because otherwise the low-signal bank would deviate to
this price. Note that no separating price with p¯∗ > φ0(p0,0) can exist because
at this price, the low-signal bank would prefer to deviate. No price p¯∗ > p1,1
can exist since not even high-signal investors would buy. Furthermore, p¯∗ ≥
φ1(p0,0) must be satisfied since otherwise the high-signal bank would prefer to
deviate to p0,0. Finally no price p¯
∗ below p1,0 is reasonable because the high-
signal bank would then deviate to this price. Take p˜, with max{φ1(p0,0), p1,0} ≤
p˜ ≤ min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)}. Note that such a p˜ always exists as long as φ1(p0,0) ≤ p1,1
and p1,0 ≤ φ0(p0,0). The conditions stated in Proposition 1.1 ensure this is the
case because φ1(p0, 1
2
) > φ1(p0,0) and p1, 1
2
> p1,0.
We analyze the candidate separating equilibrium
{(p∗ = p0,0, µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯∗ = p˜, µ = 1, B1);
(p∗ 6∈ {p∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0, B1 if p0,0 < p ≤ p1,0, B∅ else)}.
By definition of φ0(p0,0) it holds that
βp0,0S = α0βφ0(p0,0)S− (1− α0)C > α0βp˜S− (1− α0)C
so that the low-signal bank would not deviate to p˜. Since max{φ1(p0,0), p1,0} ≤ p˜,
the high-signal bank would also not deviate. Hence this is a PBE.
Now consider the application of the IC. Suppose a high separation price p¯ = ˜˜p
with p˜ < ˜˜p ≤ min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} is observed. This price is equilibrium dominated
for a bank with sb = 0 by definition of φ0(p0,0). The low-signal bank can therefore
be excluded the set of potential deviators. The only remaining agent is the high-
signal bank. The best response of high-signal investors then is to buy at p¯ = ˜˜p,
i.e. B1. Hence the PBE with p¯
∗ = p˜ does not survive the IC. Applying this
reasoning repeatedly, all separating prices with p¯ < min{p1,1, φ0(p0,0)} can be
eliminated.
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Step 2a (Pooling with B0,1) For all investors to buy we must have p ≤ p0, 1
2
. Suppose
there was deviation to p = φ1(p0, 1
2
) < φ0(p0, 1
2
). For the low-signal bank this
would not be profitable by definition of φ0(p0, 1
2
). But for some beliefs about the
signal of the bank and corresponding best responses, high-signal investors could
be better off. The best response for investors with beliefs on the remaining set
of types, i.e. µ = 1, however, is B1 as we have φ1(p0, 1
2
) < p1,1. Hence, applying
IC there cannot be a pooling equilibrium with B0,1.
Step 2b (Pooling with B1) We must have p ≤ p1, 1
2
. Since φ0(p0,0) > p1, 1
2
, the low-
signal bank would prefer to deviate to p0,0, hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
To summarize, restrictions φ1(p0, 1
2
) < p1,1 and φ0(p0,0) > p1, 1
2
ensure that the only
equilibrium surviving the IC is the one depicted in Proposition 1.1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Consider the highest possible separating offer prices. The market price will by the Law
of Large Numbers resemble the true value of the security. Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2
imply that the IPO fails with probability 0.5 if the true value is V = 0 and the high
separation price is set. If the true value is V = 1 the IPO never fails. Thus, ex-ante
there is underpricing if 1
2
(1 − p0,0 − α1p1,1) > 0. Substituting in closed form solutions
for threshold prices p1,1 and p1, 1
2
from Appendix 1.6.3 this can be written as
(1− qb)(1− qi)
qbqi + (1− qb)(1− qi) + qb ≤ 1 (1.35)
Recall that α1 =
1+qb
2
. Numerically, it is straightforward to check that the inequality
holds for all qb, qi ∈ (.5, 1). ¤
Proof of Lemma 1.2
We will analyze two cases. Firstly we will show that at C = Cˆ, p¯∗ = p1,1 = φ0(p0,0)
can no longer be a sustained as a separating equilibrium if short covering is possible.
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Secondly we will show that at C = C, p¯∗ = p1, 1
2
= φ0(p0,0) cannot be sustained as the
separating equilibrium.
We will regard situations in which with respect to the offering price the low-signal
bank is indifferent between charging p0,0 with all investors buying, B0,1, and p¯
∗ where
only high-signal investors buy, B1. If the payoffs from short covering are higher in
the case of deviating to price p¯∗, then this price can no longer be sustained as a sep-
arating price and then, naturally, φ′0(p0,0) < φ0(p0,0). To get this we need to show
Π2(p¯∗|B1, sb = 0) > Π2(p∗|B0,1, sb = 0). Defining ∆(p) s.t. ∀ d ≤ ∆(p) the aftermar-
ket price is not above (1− β)p this is equivalent to
∆(p¯∗)∑
d=S + O
O · {(1− β)p¯∗ − pm(d)} · Pr(d|sb = 0) >
∆(p∗)∑
d=0



















pm(d) · Pr(d|sb = 0)
∼⇔ (1− β)p¯∗ qb
2
> (1− β)p0,0qb. (1.36)
The last step follows from Lemma 1.3 in Appendix 1.6.2. We can now check what
happens at the threshold points. Suppose that C = C so that p¯∗ = p1, 1
2
. Then (1.36)
translates to p1, 1
2
/2 > p0,0 which is ensured by Assumption 1.4. Recall that numerically
this assumption requires that not both qi and qb are small. Suppose that C = Cˆ so that
p¯∗ = p1,1. Then we need that p1,1/2 > p0,0. Informativeness of sb implies p1,1 > p1, 1
2
. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1.3
The second step of the proof of Lemma 1.2 ensures that C ′ ≥ C. The model is set-
up so that all payoffs Π1 + Π2 can be dealt with as one. Hence the aforementioned
procedure can be applied here as well. The proof of the pooling outcome goes exactly
along the lines of the proof of Proposition 1.1. Take a separating equilibrium in which
both agents make less profit than in the pooling equilibrium. Pareto Efficieny rules
this equilibrium out. The existence of Cˆ ′ > Cˆ is again ensured by Lemma 1.2. By
definition, for C > Cˆ ′, the highest attainable price is p1,1, and it is the only one selected
by the IC. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 1.4
From Proposition 1.3 we know that a pooling equilibrium results for all C < C ′. C ′
is defined as the value of C for which equation (1.11) is fulfilled with φ′0(p0,0) = p1, 1
2
.
Solving for C ′ one obtains



































Both terms in brackets are positive by Assumption 1.4 as long as qb < 1. Partial



































Since 2 − qb − r1+rqb > 1 − r1+rqb whenever qb < 1, Assumption 1.4 ensures that the
term is positive. ¤
Chapter 2
Investment Bank Compensation in
Venture and Non-Venture Capital
Backed IPOs∗
2.1 Introduction
This paper proposes a signaling model of the initial public offering (IPO) process that
can explain two related puzzles. First, why investment banks’ share of IPO revenue, the
gross spread, is so large that they are left with profits despite market competition and,
second, why these spreads are significantly lower in venture capital (VC) backed IPOs
than in non-VC backed IPOs. Megginson and Weiss (1991) report for a U.S. sample of
640 IPOs between 1983 and 1987 gross spreads of 7.4% for VC backed IPOs and 8.2%
for non-VC backed IPOs. Data on the profitability of IPOs is hard to obtain. However,
Chen and Ritter (2000) argue that there are economies of scale in underwriting IPOs.
They show that spreads do not differ in offerings that raise between $20 million and $80
million. Since investment banks at least break even in small offerings large offerings
must be profitable. They report that “investment bankers readily admit that the IPO
business is very profitable” (p. 1105).
∗The chapter is based on joint work with Andreas Park from the University of Toronto.
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The cost of going public is subject of a long standing and lasting debate among
financial economists. The literature focuses mainly on the underpricing of IPOs, an
empirically well-documented phenomenon. Ritter and Welch (2002), as a recent exam-
ple, report an average first-day return of 18.8% for 6,249 IPOs in the U.S. between 1980
and 2001. However, underpricing is not the only cost of going public. Issuers leave
a fraction of the offer revenue, the gross spread, to investment banks (underwriters)
as compensation for their services. Chen and Ritter (2000) find that the gross spread
amounts to 7% on average for a U.S. sample of 3,203 IPOs between 1985 and 1998.
Although investment bank compensation thus accounts for a substantial proportion of
the cost of going public, it has hardly attracted attention by theorists so far. In light
of the impact that the Chen and Ritter (2000) paper had, this is even more surprising.
Not only do they find that gross spreads average 7% but that they are exactly 7% in
most of the offerings. Hansen (2001) reports that these findings triggered 27 lawsuits
against investment banks for not competing in price and a U.S. Department of Justice
investigation of “alleged conspiracy among securities underwriters to fix underwriting
fees.” Thus, in practice, the size of the gross spread attracts considerable attention.
Even though this paper does not explain the clustering of spreads that called attention
in the first place, we explain the level of spreads – the underlying bone of contention.
Notwithstanding the legal debate on investment bank collusion and the seemingly
obvious empirical evidence, our theoretical formulation allows a very different, subtle
explanation for high spreads. We find that it can be in the best interest of the issuer to
pay seemingly inflated spreads. That is, issuers would strategically pay high spreads
even if a competing bank offered its service at a lower spread. Issuers hence do not
bargain for lower spreads and, consequently, investment banks do not compete in them.
In our model, there are two reasons for this. First, it is at the bank’s discretion to set
the offer price. At high offer prices the IPO can fail because there may not be enough
investors willing to subscribe. Banks then have to bear reputation costs. To induce
them to take the risk and set high offer prices issuers must set sufficiently high spreads.
Banks earn a rent because given the spread they could set a low, risk-free price and
receive their share in revenue with certainty. Secondly, we assume that investment
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banks hold private information about market’s valuation of the firm on offer. In our
model the size of the spread critically affects the bank’s decision whether to reveal or
to hide this information which in turn affects the offer price. Thus a lower spread may
result in lower expected revenue for the issuer. However, competition could instead take
place in features of the IPO contract that are left outside the model, as for example
additional co-managers or analyst coverage. This fits the findings of Chen and Ritter
(2000) as they report that not only the clustering of spreads at 7% has increased
over time – indicating lack of competition in spreads – but that the number of co-
managers in IPOs and analyst coverage has increased over time as well – indicating
some competition in these features of the IPO contract.
Megginson and Weiss (1991) were the first to show that VC backed issuers pay lower
gross spreads than non-VC backed issuers.23 If the IPO is non-VC backed the founder of
the firm takes all relevant decisions. In VC backed IPOs the venture capitalist usually
holds all control rights, so we assume that in a VC backed IPO the venture capitalist
decides on the level of the spread. Our second main result addresses differences between
IPOs with uninformed and privately informed issuers. Assuming that, in contrast to
the founder, the venture capitalist has private information about market sentiment,
our model predicts that in equilibrium spreads are lower in VC than in non-VC backed
IPOs.
We propose a simple stylized model of the offering procedure, cast into a signaling
game. We assume that investment banks and investors have private but noisy infor-
mation about the intrinsic value of the offered security which is either “good news” or
“bad news”. In a wider sense, this signal can also be understood as information about
market sentiment. Investment banks strategically choose the offer price to maximize
their expected profits from the offer revenue gross spread. A higher price does not nec-
essarily increase revenue: at high prices the IPO may fail as there may not be enough
investors to buy up the entire offering. Prior to the signaling game the issuer offers the
investment bank a contract that specifies the gross spread level. This level critically
affects banks’ pricing decisions. Given the contract variables, the investment bank sets
23For more recent data see Francis and Hasan (2001)
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an optimizing price that, first, either reveals (separation) or camouflages (pooling) its
private information and, second, is either low so that all investors subscribe (risk free)
or high so that only investors with “good news” buy (risky). If the issuer is also pri-
vately informed, the gross spread level can be either separating or pooling, too. Banks,
in turn, account for the spread’s information content when deciding on the offer price.
Anticipating the bank’s pricing decision, the issuer sets the level of the gross spread
strategically so that the bank sets the offer price that gives the issuer highest expected
profit. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected prof-
its are non-negative. At the equilibrium spread the investment bank makes positive
profits.
For informed issuers we consider two cases: In the first, the issuer receives a private
signal that is conditionally independent from the bank’s signal (later interpreted as
VC backed IPOs). In the second case, the issuer’s signal is perfectly correlated with
the investment bank’s signal (strong banking ties). In the first case, the issuer will
not reveal his private information and set a spread that hides his signal. Nevertheless,
the spreads is set so that the investment bank will separate in prices. In the second
case, an issuer with favorable information sets a spread that prevents its low-signal
counterpart from mimicking. Spreads are thus separating and also indicate the bank’s
signal. Prices can hence carry no additional information. With uninformed issuers the
spread cannot convey information. We show that spreads are then set so that both
types of investment bank pool in the offer price, causing an informationally inefficient
equilibrium. The pooling spreads with independently informed issuers (VC backed) are
lower than the spread set by an uninformed issuer (non-VC backed). Furthermore, if
bank’s and issuer’s signals are perfectly correlated, spreads are, on average, the highest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents our model
of the IPO procedure. Section 2.3 derives the equilibrium prices set by the investment
bank. Section 2.4 analyzes the strategic choice of the gross spread by uninformed
and superiorly informed issuers. Section 2.5 presents the main results on levels and
difference of gross spreads. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 A Stylized Model of the IPO Procedure†
Consider the following stylized model of the IPO process.
The Security. The security on offer can take values V ∈ V = {0, 1}, both equally
likely. The realization is not known to any player in the game.
The Investors. There areN identical, risk neutral investors. Each investor receives a
costless, private, conditionally i.i.d. signal si ∈ V about the value of the security. This
information is noisy but (for technical reasons) sufficiently informative, i.e. Pr(si =
v|V = v) = q, with q ∈ (0.6, 1), where v ∈ V.24 If an investor orders, he may or
may not obtain the security during the offering procedure. Shares are distributed
with uniform probability in case the issue is oversubscribed. If an investor obtains
the security his payoff is the market price minus the offer price. If he does not obtain
the security or if the offer is not floated his payoff is zero. An investor’s type is his
signal. We refer to the investor as a ‘high-signal investor’ if si = 1. For si = 0, it is a
‘low-signal investor’.
The Issuer. In general the issuer can be either informed or uninformed. For the
latter we consider two subcases: in the first, the issuer (firm) receives a private signal
sf ∈ {0, 1}, in the second, the issuer and the investment bank (see below) receive
the identical signal. Any signal is costless and conditionally independent from the
investors’ signals but, for simplicity, of the same quality, i.e. Pr(si = v|V = v) = q. The
uninformed issuer receives no signal. We will refer to these types of issuers as ‘privately
informed’, ‘identically informed’, and ‘uninformed’. In Section 2.5 we interpret the
meaning of informative signals and relate informed and uninformed issuers to real-world
types such as VC backed and non-VC backed issuers. The issuer is risk neutral and signs
a contract with an investment bank that delegates the pricing decision and constitutes
†The model presented here is in part similar to the model presented in Chapter 1. However, to
keep this chapter self-contained we accept some redundancies.
24As turns out in the analysis, for q < .6 we have to distinguish a large number of subcases.
Avoiding these complications, we thus require sufficiently informative signals.
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the amount of securities, S, to be sold. It also specifies the publicly announced gross
spread β ∈ (0, 1), the share of the offer revenue that remains as remuneration at the
bank.25 The issuer chooses this spread. If the offer is floated, his profit is fraction
(1− β) of the offer revenue, otherwise it is zero.
Investment Banks. Investment banks are risk neutral. A bank that gets offered
a contract (we will show that it always accepts) receives a costless, private signal
sb ∈ V about the value of the security. The signal is conditionally independent from
the investors’ and privately informed issuer’s signals but, for simplicity, of the same
quality, i.e. Pr(sb = v|V = v) = q. Signals characterize a bank’s type: If sb = 1 we
refer to the investment bank as a ‘high-signal bank’, for sb = 0, it is a ‘low-signal
bank’. After receiving the signal the bank chooses the offer price p. If there is excess
demand, securities are allocated at random; if the number of investors willing to buy
is less than the number of shares to be sold, the offer is called off. We assume that
failure of the offering inflicts fixed costs C on the investment bank. These costs are
external to our formulation and to be thought of as deterioration of reputational capital.
They may also capture the opportunity costs resulting from lost market share when
being associated with an unsuccessful IPO.26 Without loss of generality, the offering
procedure itself causes no costs for the investment bank. Thus, if the offer is successful,
the bank’s payoff is fraction β of the offer revenue; if it fails, a loss of C results.
Signaling Value of the Gross Spread and the Offer Price. The level of the
gross spread and the offer price are announced first. Then investors decide whether or
not to order, basing their decisions on their private information and on the information
25We want each agent to have only one choice variable: issuers choose the spread, banks the price
and investors may or may not invest. Another candidate choice variable is the number of shares S,
or even the number of potential investors N that are addressed, e.g. during the road-show. However,
including these as choice variables would require a different, more elaborate modelling approach.
26There is an extensive large literature on investment bank reputation. Dunbar (2000), for e.g.,
provides evidence that established investment banks lose market share when being associated with
withdrawn offerings. Booth and Smith (1986) argue that in the context of asymmetric information
between insiders and outsiders the investment bank as a repeated player in the IPO market certifies
that the issue is not overpriced. Following this argument, C can be interpreted as measuring the
deterioration of the certification value of the investment bank’s brand name.







































































Figure 2.1: Extensive Form of the Signaling Game.
that issuer and bank reveal about their signals through the level of the gross spread
and the offer price. We denote information contained in prices by µ(p), information in
spreads ν(β). In case of the uninformed issuer, the spread is uninformative and only
prices can carry information. In case of an identically informed issuer, the information
contained in β is hierarchical to the information in p: Issuers with different signals may
set different levels of the gross spread which then reveals the signal of the issuer and
the bank; in this case, prices cannot carry further information. We write µ(p) = 1 if
the price reflects that the bank’s signal is sb = 1, µ(p) = 0 if reveals that sb = 0, and
µ(p) = 1
2
to indicate that the price is uninformative; likewise for ν(β). In equilibrium
these will turn out to be the only relevant cases. Thus µ, ν : [0, 1] → {0, 1/2, 1}. We
refer to µ(p) as the price-information about the bank’s signal and to ν(β) as the spread
information.
The Aftermarket Price. The equilibrium market price is determined by the ag-
gregate number of investors’ favorable signals. In our model this number is always
revealed, either directly through investor demand or immediately after the float through
trading activities. Thus write pm(d) for the market price as a function of d ∈ {0, . . . , N},
the number of high-signal investors. Appendix 2.7.1 fleshes out this argument and pro-
vides an extensive treatment of price formation.
Investors’ Decisions and Expected Payoffs. We admit only symmetric pure
strategies; thus all investors with the same signal take identical decisions. These can
then be aggregated so that only three cases need to be considered: First, all investors
INVESTMENT BANK COMPENSATION 61
subscribe, B0,1, second, only high-signal investors subscribe, B1, and third, no investor
subscribes, B∅. Thus, the set of potential collective best replies is B := {B0,1, B1, B∅}.
To compute his expected payoff, an investor has to account for the probability of
receiving the security. There are two cases to consider. In the first, all investors buy,
i.e. B0,1. Thus, market demand is N and all investors receive the security with equal
probability S/N . In the second case, only high-signal investors buy. If d investors
(including oneself) buy, then each one receives the security with probability S/d. If
overall demand d is smaller than the number of shares on offer, d < S, the IPO fails
and investors who ordered the security get it with probability 0.
Investors order the security whenever their expected payoff from doing so is non-
negative. Suppose only high-signal investors buy, i.e. B1. After observing the offer
price, an investor’s information set contains both his signal si and the information
inferred from the offer price and spread, µ(p) and ν(β). Since signals are conditionally
i.i.d., for every V ∈ V there is a different distribution over the number d− 1 of others’
favorable signals (si = 1), which we denote as f(d − 1|V ). Thus investors’ posterior
distribution that the number of others’ favorable signals is d− 1 is given by
g(d− 1|si, µ(p), ν(β)) :=
∑
V ∈V
Pr(V |si, µ(p), ν(β)) · f(d− 1|V ). (2.1)
If only investors with favorable signals order, then for a high-signal investor, at price





· (pm(d)− p) · g(d− 1|si = 1, µ(p), ν(β)) ≥ 0. (2.2)
Likewise for the respective low-signal investors when all investors order, B0,1, in which
case the summation runs from 1 to N , and si = 1 is replaced by si = 0.
Threshold Prices. Denote by psi,µ,ν the highest price that an investor with signal
si, price information µ(p) and spread information ν(β) is willing to pay in equilibrium
if all investors with signal s˜i ≥ si order. If the issuer is uninformed, ν is replaced
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with a diamond, ¦; if issuer and bank get the same signal and if the issuer signals
his private information, µ(p) is replaced with a diamond to indicate that the price
cannot reveal further information. Suppose, the issuer reveals information ν. Then
p1,1,ν is the highest (price-separating) price with B1, p1, 1
2
,ν the highest (price-pooling)
price with B1, p0, 1
2
,ν the highest (price-pooling) price with B0,1, and p0,0,ν the highest
(price-separating) price with B0,1. Note that at all these prices investors are aware that
the security price may drop (or rise) in the aftermarket and that they may not get the
security. The threshold prices are formally derived in Appendix 2.7.2.
The Investment Bank’s Expected Payoff. First consider case B1. Variable d
denotes the number of orders, i.e. the number of high-signal investors. If the true value
is V = 1, we have








analogously for V = 0. Suppose the issuer gets no signal or its private signal sf . A
bank with signal sb assigns probability αsb,ν(S) to the event that at least S investors









Pr(V = 1|sb, ν) · qd(1− q)N−d + Pr(V = 0|sb, ν) · (1− q)dqN−d
)
.(2.4)
If the bank charges a price at which only high-signal investors buy, its expected profit
is
Π(p|sb, ν, B1) = αsb,ν(S) · βpS− (1− αsbν(S)) · C. (2.5)
Consider now B0,1, the case where the offer price is low enough so that all investors
are willing to buy, irrespective of their signals. The offer never fails, thus payoffs are
given by Π(p|B0,1) = βpS. If the price is set so high that no investor buys, as in case
B∅, a loss of C results with certainty.
The unconditional distribution over favorable signals is a composite of the two con-
ditional distribution and thus bimodal. To obtain (approximate) closed form solutions
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tt = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
The issuer offers a
contract specifying the
level of the spread.







Figure 2.2: The Timing of the Game.
for success-probabilities and prices, we make two simplifying assumptions: the first
simplifies computations, since the two modes of the distribution over favorable signals
are centered around N(1 − q) and Nq. It allows us to get closed form solutions for
success-probabilities. The second assumption ensures that we can analyze the two
underlying conditional distributions separately.
Assumption 2.1 S = (1− q)N.
For every signal quality q, there exists an N˜(q) so that for all N > N˜(q) the two
conditional distributions over favorable signals generated by V = 0 and V = 1 do not
‘overlap’. By standard results from statistics, a sufficient condition for N˜(q) is given
by N˜(q) > 64q(1− q)/(2q − 1)2.
Assumption 2.2 The number of investors N is larger than N˜(q).
As a consequence of the second assumption we can apply the Law of Large Numbers and
DeMoivre-Laplace’s Theorem.27 Since we assume that the IPO fails whenever d < S,
Assumption 2.1 implies, for instance, if the spread is uninformative, i.e. ν = 1/2, then
α0, 1
2
(S) = (2−q)/2 and α1, 1
2
= (1+q)/2. In what follows we thus omit S. A consequence
of the Law of Large Numbers is that pm(d) ∈ {0, 1} for almost all values of d.28
Before proceeding we summarize the timing of the model in Figure 2.2. First,
an (identically) informed issuer receives its signal and then all types of issuer offer
a contract to a bank specifying the spread level. Second, the bank sets the offer
27For instance, the mode of a binomial distribution is generally not exactly symmetric. However,
if N is large enough, we can apply DeMoivre-LaPlace (0 < q ± 2√q(1− q)/N < 1) and employ the
normal distribution instead. Thus we can treat each mode to be symmetric.
28To be more precise, for d À N/2, pm(d) = 1, and for d ¿ N/2, pm(d) = 0. Thus to get
interesting equilibria, it is necessary that S is strictly smaller than N/2. If it was not, an IPO where
only si = 1 investors buy, would never be at risk of being overpriced as it fails in all overpriced cases.
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price given the spread, the information contained therein, and its own signal. Third,
investors decide whether to order given all available information. Finally, in case the
IPO takes place, the number of favorable signals is revealed in the aftermarket and the
price adjusts according to it.
In what follows proceed backwardly. In the next section we analyze the price setting
of the investment bank given the level of the gross spread. In Section 2.4 we derive
each type of issuer’s choice of the spread in anticipation of the bank’s price setting.
Section 2.5 interprets the findings of Sections 2.3 and 2.4 and presents our main results
on investment banking profits and differences in spreads between different classes of
issuers.
2.3 Investment Banks’ Equilibrium Price Choice
There are two cases to consider: First, spreads are uninformative or reflect the issuer’s
independent information. In that case, the investment bank plays a signaling game
and needs to decide whether or not to reveal its private information. Second, in case
of the identically informed issuer, spreads can reveal the bank’s signal. Then the bank
has no strategic decision problem but merely chooses the price that is optimal given
all public information.
2.3.1 Uninformative Spreads or Spreads Reflecting the Is-
suer’s Independent Signal
In the following we identify the conditions under which a profit maximizing investment
bank will reveal its information through the offer price. A separating equilibrium is
defined as informationally efficient since investors can derive the bank’s signal from the
offer price. In a pooling equilibrium information is shaded and thus it is informationally
inefficient. In this case, investors decide only on the basis of their private signals. In
what follows we take the information that may be contained in spreads, ν(β), as given.
Separation and pooling thus always refers to prices.
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The Equilibrium Concept and Selection Criteria. The equilibrium concept for
this signaling game is, naturally, the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A common
problem with PBEs, however, is their multiplicity, stemming equilibria being sup-
ported by “unreasonable” out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The common way to overcome
this problem is to apply an equilibrium selection rule such as the Intuitive Criterion
(IC), introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987). We follow this line of research and consider
only equilibria that do not fail the IC. All of these PBE selection devices favor sepa-
rating over pooling equilibria. It will turn out, however, that in our framework under
certain conditions pooling equilibria cannot be ruled out by the IC. Moreover, these
pooling equilibria then Pareto dominate any separating equilibrium.29 It would thus be
unreasonable not to assume that these equilibria will be picked. Thus in what follows,
we will only consider equilibria that satisfy the IC and among these, we consider those
that are Pareto efficient for the agent who takes the signaling action. In this section
this agent would be the bank.
A pooling equilibrium in prices is specified through (i) an equilibrium offer price
p∗ from which investors infer (ii) price-information µ = 1
2
, and (iii) investors’ best
replies given their private signals, µ, and p∗. A separating equilibrium in prices is (i)
a system of prices {p∗, p¯∗} and price-information such that (ii) at p∗ = p¯∗, the high
separation price, the price-information is that the bank has the favorable signal, µ = 1,
at p∗ = p∗, the low separation price, the price-information is that the bank has the low
signal, µ = 0, and (iii) investors’ best replies given their private signals, µ, and p¯∗ or
p∗. In both separating and pooling equilibria, for p 6∈ {p¯∗, p∗} or p 6= p∗, respectively,
out-of-equilibrium public beliefs are chosen ‘appropriately’. The following result is a
straightforward consequence of signaling, the proof of which is in Appendix 2.7.4.
Lemma 2.1 (The Highest Possible Low Separating Price)
There exists no PBE (price-)separating offer price p∗ > p0,0,ν.
In any separating equilibrium, therefore, the low price must be such that all in-
vestors buy, and the highest such separating price, given price-information µ = 0, is
p∗ = p0,0,ν . In what follows we refer to p0,0,ν as the low separation price.
29Here Pareto domination refers to the payoffs of the respective banks or issuers who take the
decision first, not to investors who react.
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Price-signaling equilibria in our setting come in one of three guises: The already
mentioned separating equilibrium, a pooling equilibrium in which only high-signal in-
vestors buy, and a pooling equilibrium in which all investors buy. In the following,
we characterize the conditions guaranteeing that only separating equilibria survive our
selection criterion.
Fix a potential price p ∈ [p0,0,ν , p0, 1
2
,ν ], the interval of potential pooling prices at
which all investors would buy.30 Define φ1,ν(p) as the price at which the high-signal
bank would be indifferent between charging a risky price φ1,ν(p) at which only high-
signal investors buy, B1, and a safe pooling price p with B0,1 (all investors buy).
Formally,








Price φ0,ν(p) is defined analogously for the low-signal bank. Thus price φsb,ν(p) is the
lowest risky price that a bank with signal sb is willing to deviate to from safe price
p.31 In what follows we refer to φ1,ν(p) as the high-signal bank’s deviation price, and
to φ0,ν(p) as the low-signal bank’s deviation price. It is straightforward to see that
φ0,ν(p) > φ1,ν(p) for all p ∈ [p0,0,ν , p0, 1
2
,ν ], that is, the low-signal bank requires a higher
price as compensation for risk taking. In addition, ∂φsb,ν(p)/∂p > 0, sb ∈ {0, 1}, so
the higher the pooling price, the higher the lowest profitable deviation price. Taking
spread-information as given, we omit ν from the equilibrium specification. In what
follows we analyze equilibria depending on two conditions on primitives.
Condition 1 The high-signal bank’s deviation price from the highest safe pooling
price is not higher than the highest separating price, φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) ≤ p1,1,ν .
Condition 2 The low-signal bank’s deviation price from the low separating price is
not smaller than the highest risky pooling price, φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) ≥ p1, 1
2
,ν .
30The order of prices is immediately obvious from Appendix 2.7.3.
31Deviation to a high, risky price can lead to increased overpricing, which is commonly perceived
to be bad for a bank’s reputation. Nanda and Yun (1997) analyze the impact of IPO mispricing on
the market value of investment banks. They find that overpriced offerings result in decreased lead-
underwriter market value. In our model, however, investors fully take into account that the offer price
may drop in the aftermarket. Modelling such reputation effects would thus be contradictory in our
setting.
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Proposition 2.1 (Equilibrium Price Setting)
(a) If Condition 1 and Condition 2 are both fulfilled then the unique PBE that satisfies
the Intuitive Criterion is the separating equilibrium {(p∗ = p0,0,ν , µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯∗ =
min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)}, µ = 1, B1); (p 6= {p∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0,ν , B1 if p0,0,ν <
p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)}.
(b) If Condition 1 is not fulfilled then the only PBE that satisfies the Intuitive Cri-
terium and Pareto efficiency is the pooling equilibrium {(p∗ = p0, 1
2
,ν , µ =
1
2
, B0,1); (p 6=
p0, 1
2
,ν , µ = 0, B1 if p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)} in which all investors buy.
(c) If Condition 2 is not fulfilled then the only PBE that satisfies the Intuitive Cri-
terium and Pareto Efficiency is the pooling equilibrium {(p∗ = p1, 1
2
,ν , µ =
1
2
, B1); (p 6=
p1, 1
2
,ν , µ = 0, B1 if p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)} in which only high-signal investors buy.
Interpretation of the Proposition. Condition 1, φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1,1,ν , together with
the IC is necessary and sufficient to rule out pooling equilibria in which all investors
buy, irrespective of their signals. Condition 2, φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) > p1, 1
2
,ν , ensures that there is
no pooling where only investors with “good news” buy, B1. The IC itself ensures that
the high-signal bank always charges the highest sustainable separating price. The high
separation price p¯∗ is the minimum of p1,1,ν and φ0,ν(p0,0,ν). The bank cannot charge
more than p1,1,ν and it cannot credibly charge more than φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) as otherwise the
low-signal bank would deviate. Finally, since φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) < φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1,1,ν , the
high-signal bank is willing to separate. If Condition 1 is violated not even the high-
signal bank wants to take the risk of setting a price where only high-signal investors
buy. A separating price pair with all investors buying at both prices cannot be an
equilibrium. The bank charging the lower price always had an incentive to deviate to
the higher price since the success probability remains unchanged. Pareto efficiency for
banks together with the IC then ensures that the highest pooling price at which all
investors buy results as unique equilibrium outcome. If Condition 2 is violated also
the low-signal bank wants to set a high price at which only high-signal investors buy.
A separating price pair with only high-signal investors buying at both prices cannot
be an equilibrium. Again, the bank charging the lower price always had an incentive
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to deviate. Under efficiency only the highest such pooling price survives as the unique
equilibrium. Finally, notice that it cannot be the case that both Condition 1 and
Condition 2 are violated simultaneously.
2.3.2 Spreads Reflecting the Issuer’s Identical Signal
The moment the identically informed issuer separates, the bank has no more control
over the the price’s signaling value. We signify this by including a diamond, ¦, instead
of µ(p) into prices, psi,¦,ν . The bank continues to choose the price that, given its
private information, maximizes expected profit. However, a low-signal bank can no
longer mimic a high-signal bank because investors have inferred the bank’s signal form
the spread.
Suppose the bank has signal sb = 0 and spread-information is ν(β) = 0. Then the
highest price high-signal investors are willing to pay is p1,¦,0. This price is risky as only
investors with signal si = 1 are willing to buy. Price p0,¦,0 is the highest safe price at
which all investors buy. However, if the spread is high enough, the risk of a failing IPO
may still be outweighed by potential gains. If the spread βs0 is large enough so that
risky profits at p1,¦,0 strictly exceed riskless profits at p0,¦,0, i.e.
α¦,0βSp1,¦,0 − (1− α¦,0)C > βSp0,¦,0 (2.7)
then the low-signal bank will choose risky price p1,¦,0. The high-signal bank faces a
similar choice: If the spread is too low, it would rather choose a safe price. Here,
however, the highest riskless price is p0,¦,1, as at this price investors with the low signal
are willing to buy, given they believe that the bank’s/issuer’s signal is sb = 1. So the
high-signal bank only choose risky price p1,¦,1 if spread βs1 is high enough so that risky
profits at p1,¦,1 strictly exceed riskless profits at p0,1, which is
α¦,1βSp1,¦,1 − (1− α¦,1)C > βSp0,¦,1. (2.8)
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It is straightforward to compute that βs0 − βs1 = (2(1− q))−1C/S > 0. Consequently, if
spreads are separating and sufficiently large, then banks will set risky prices.
2.4 The Issuer’s Strategic Choice of the Spread
As with the investment bank, the analysis is split into two parts. In the first, the issuer
is uninformed and thus not involved in a strategic situation. He will set prices so as
to make the bank set equilibrium prices that are revenue-maximizing. In the second
part, the issuer does have private information. The issuer then has the power to play a
signaling game. He anticipates the behavior of the investment bank, and thus he will
set spreads strategically to maximize expected revenue.
2.4.1 Equilibrium Spreads if the Issuer is Uninformed
For the investment bank, the choice of equilibrium prices critically depends on Condi-
tions 1 and 2 from Proposition 2.1. In the following we give an intuitive interpretation
of the equilibrium outcome in terms of the gross spread, demonstrating how the spread
affects these conditions. We then derive the uninformed issuer’s decision about the
spread level. As before we indicate that the issuer is uninformed by replacing ν with a
diamond.
An Intuitive Characterization of the Equilibrium. The concept of deviation
prices φsb,¦ is a convenient tool to describe restrictions. We will now reformulate
Conditions 1 and 2 from Proposition 2.1 in terms of the gross spread β. This allows us
to derive a simple linear descriptive characterization of the equilibrium. Consider first
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Condition 1, φ1,¦(p0, 1
2














then the separating equilibrium cannot be sustained and the pooling equilibrium in
p0, 1
2
,¦ prevails. In other words, if the gross spread is rather low then the incentive to set
a high price and take the risk of failure is reduced whereas the cost of failure remains
unchanged. The threshold value for β s.t. not even the high-signal bank sets a risky
price is given by
βs¦ =
1− α1,¦

























then a separating equilibrium, again, cannot be sustained and the pooling equilibrium
in p1, 1
2
,¦ prevails. In this case the gross spread is so high that even the low-signal
bank is willing to take the risk of failure and set a high price at which only high-signal
investors buy. For the high-signal bank it becomes too costly to uphold separation, i.e.
it would have to lower the high separation price so much that it prefers pooling. This


















Finally, there exists a βˆs¦ ∈ [βs¦, βp¦ ] such that the deviation price of the low-signal
bank is just p1,1,¦, i.e. for values of β above βˆs¦ the high-signal bank has to lower
the high separation price in order to uphold separation. The following Corollary to
Proposition 2.1 summarizes the above characterization; Figure 2.3 offers an illustration
of the corollary.




















Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Offer Prices at Different Levels of Uninformative Spreads.
For levels of the spread below βp¦ , both types of banks pool in p∗ = p0, 1
2
,¦. For β ∈ [βs¦, βˆs¦]
there is separation: The low-signal bank always sets p∗ = p0,0,¦, and the high-signal bank sets




Corollary 2.1 (Proposition 2.1 in Terms of the Gross Spread)
If spreads are uninformative and β ∈ [βs¦, βp¦) then the unique equilibrium is the sep-
arating equilibrium stated in Proposition 2.1. If β ∈ [βs¦, βˆs¦] then p¯∗ = p1,1,¦, and if
β ∈ (βˆs¦, βp¦) then p¯∗ = φ0,¦(p0,0,¦). If β < βs¦ then pooling in p0, 1
2
,¦ prevails. If β ≥ βp¦
there is pooling in p1, 1
2
,¦.
Implicitly, we assumed a tie-breaking rule specifying that at spread thresholds βp¦
banks set a risky pooling price and at βs¦ they set separating prices. At β
p
¦ both types
of banks set p1, 1
2
,¦ even though the low-signal bank is indifferent between p1, 1
2
,¦ and
p0,0,¦. The latter, however, cannot be an equilibrium: Suppose the low-signal bank sets
p0,0,¦. Then the issuer could raise the spread by an arbitrarily small ² > 0 making the
low-signal bank strictly prefer p1, 1
2
,¦. However, by lowering the spread to β
p
¦ + ²/2, the
issuer could raise his profits and yet the low-signal bank would still set p1, 1
2
,¦, and so
on. The similar reasoning applies to price setting at βs¦.
Strategic Choice of the Gross Spread. If the underlying issuer is uninformed,
his strategic choice of spreads conveys no information. For every spread, however, the
issuer knows the best response of both types of banks. Consequently, the issuer has to
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choose the level of the gross spread that maximizes his overall expected payoff. If he
sets the spread too low, even a bank with favorable information chooses a low, riskless
price. If spreads are high, the issuers get a smaller share of the revenue. Furthermore,
for large spreads the high-signal bank may be unable to set a separating price. Pareto
efficiency for the first mover (the issuer) ensures that out of all βs triggering separation
or pooling, the issuer will always choose the smallest one. In particular, to get pooling
in the riskless price p0, 1
2
,¦, the issuer can set spread 0. The issuer then has the choice












in separation, low riskless pooling, and high risky pooling, respectively. To find the
equilibrium spreads, one has to compare the issuers’ payoffs for given equilibrium
spreads. For given parameters q, C,N , the issuer will always choose the spread with
maximal expected payoffs.
1. Pooling in p1, 1
2












2. Pooling in p1, 1
2














where R1(q) and R2(q) are derived by reformulating the inequalities; they depend on
agents’ signal quality. We state their precise form at the end of Appendix 2.7.4.
The above transformations make use of the closed form expressions for prices and
success probabilities. Numerically it can easily be checked that R1(q) < R2(q) for all
q ∈ (.6, 1), that is if high risky pooling is better than separation, it is also better than
low, riskless pooling. We can now state the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.2 (Gross Spreads with Uninformed Issuers)
Assume C/N < R1(q). There is a unique equilibrium that satisfies the IC and effi-
ciency: The uninformed issuer offers a contract with β = βp¦ and both types of invest-
ment banks set pooling offer price p1, 1
2
,¦.
Proof: The choice of β follows directly from the comparison of the respective expected
profits. The resulting price-setting by banks follows from Proposition 2.1. ¤
Interpretation of the Proposition. The ratio C/N measures the failure costs
that the investment bank incurs per potential investor. If failure costs per investor are
small, the level of the spread that triggers the high pooling price is most profitable.
Proposition 2.2 is not a complete equilibrium analysis. However, if we impose the
restriction that maximal spreads cannot exceed 10%, the corresponding ratio C/N will
never exceed R1(q). Spreads above 10% are hardly observed,
32 thus for the empirically
relevant parameter it is reasonable to restrict attention to the equilibrium characterized
in the proposition.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Spreads if the Issuer is Independently In-
formed
Suppose now that the issuer gets his own, private signal, sf , conditionally independent
from all signals si and sb. Then the signaling game has two stages. In the first, the
issuer may or may not signal his information. Bank and investors incorporate this
information. In the second stage, the bank chooses its equilibrium price, which may
or may not reveal the bank’s private signal. There are multiple different constellations
imaginable:










32See for e.g. Chen and Ritter (2000).
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2. The issuer separates in spreads, and
(a) given a low-signal issuer ν = 0, the bank separates in p1,1,0 or p0,0,0, pools
in p1, 1
2
,0, or pools in p0, 1
2
,0, and
(b) given a high-signal issuer signal, ν = 1, the bank separates in p1,1,1 or p0,0,1,
pools in p1, 1
2
,1, or pools in p0, 1
2
,1.
Equilibrium prices for given spread-information are covered by Proposition 2.1, it re-
mains to analyze the issuer’s optimal spread-choice.
Analogously to Corollary 2.1 we can determine threshold levels for the gross spread
such that investment banks just set the low pooling price, separating prices, or the
high pooling price. The lowest spread that induces banks to set the low pooling price




The issuer’s strategic choice of the spread follows from the comparison of the re-
spective profits. As it turns out, there are no spread-separating equilibria — issuers
always pool in the spread. Furthermore, the equilibrium pooling spread induces the
bank to play a separating equilibrium in prices.
Proposition 2.3 (Gross Spreads with Independently Informed Issuers)
Assume C/N < R1(q). Then there exists a unique, spread-pooling equilibrium that
satisfies the IC: Both types of issuers offer a contract with β = βs1
2
and investment




. At p1,1, 1
2
, investors hold price-spread
information µ = 1 and ν = 1
2
and only investors with si = 1 buy. At p0,0, 1
2
, investors
hold price-spread information µ = 0 and ν = 1
2
and all investors buy.
Interpretation of the Proposition. To prove the claim we proceed counterfactual:
We describe spreads and price-choices in a spread-separating equilibrium and show that
a spread-separating situation is not incentive compatible for the low-signal issuer. He
would always deviate and mimic the high-signal issuer. The intuition is straightforward:
With separating spreads both low- and high-signal issuer prefer to play a spread that
induces risky pooling prices; clearly a low-signal issuer would prefer the higher price
INVESTMENT BANK COMPENSATION 75
though. Furthermore, the high-signal issuer cannot defend his position by setting
different spreads, even when trying to play a spread that induces separation-pricing.
We then show that only spread-pooling can result. There will be two candidates for
spread-pooling: The first spread induces price-pooling, the second price-separation.
However, only price-separation is IC-proof. Details of the proof are in Appendix 2.7.4.
2.4.3 Equilibrium Spreads if the Issuer is Identically Informed
If the issuer pools in spreads price setting by banks is as in Subsection 2.3.1. If the
spread, however, is informative the bank has no strategic considerations to take care of
in its optimal price choice: Its signal is the same as the issuer’s who has just revealed
his information. The high-signal bank does not have defend itself against deviation
of the low-signal bank. In Subsection 2.3.2 we have already described banks’ price
setting.
We derived threshold spreads which induce the banks to choose risky prices, βsν ,
ν ∈ {0, 1}. The following order holds for spreads: βs0 > βp¦ > βs1 > βs1
2
= βs¦. If the
issuer signals, the bank’s pricing decision carries no informational value; we indicate
this by substituting µ with a diamond, ¦. Empirically, the gross spread almost never
exceeds 10%, we thus restrict attention to parameter constellations so that βs0 ≤ 10%
(which implies C/N < R1(q)). We can now show the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 (Gross Spreads with Identically Informed Issuers)
Assume spreads do not exceed 10%. Then there exists a unique, separating equilibrium
that satisfies the IC and is first-mover efficient:
(a) The identically informed low-signal issuer offers a contract with spread βs0 and
the investment bank sets price p1,¦,0. Investors derive information ν(β) = 0, and only
those with signal si = 1 buy.
(b) The identically informed high-signal issuer sets spread βs1 and the bank sets price
p1,¦,1. Investors derive information ν(β) = 1, and only those with signal si = 1 buy.
Interpretation of the Proposition. We have derived the threshold spread in Sub-
section 2.3.2. The proof follows in three steps. First, we derive conditions under which
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each issuer is satisfied with the bank choosing a risky price at the proposed spreads
βs0, β
s
1. The conditions will ensure that expected payoffs are higher than profits from
setting zero spreads. In this step we will use that spreads must not exceed 10%. Sec-
ond, we show that these spreads are proof to derivations, so that no type of issuer wants
to mimic the other, and no type favors playing out of equilibrium spreads. Third we
argue that with identically informed issuers there can be no pooling equilibrium (under
the given restriction on β). Details are in Appendix 2.7.4.
To summarize, if the issuers have the same signal as the bank, they play a separation
equilibrium in which both low- and high-signal issuer set spreads at which the bank
sets a risky price. Notice that this is the only informationally efficient case where prices
contain all existing information. In the case with uninformed issuers, banks pool in
prices; in the case with independently informed issuers, spreads are pooling.
2.5 Results and Interpretation
We claimed to address two issues: First, why do investment banks make positive profits
in a competitive market and second, why do VC backed IPOs have lower spreads. We
deal with these issues in this section.
Even though it is hard to obtain data on banking profits, Chen and Ritter (2000)
report that “investment bankers readily admit that the IPO business is very profitable”
(p. 1105). Chen and Ritter argue that there are economies of scale in underwriting
IPOs. They show that spreads do not differ in offerings that raise between $20 million
and $80 million. Since banks at least break even in small offerings large offerings must
be profitable. Megginson and Weiss (1991) were the first to report that spreads are
significantly lower in VC backed IPOs than in non-VC backed IPOs. They show for
a U.S. sample of 640 IPOs between 1983 and 1987 that gross spreads for VC backed
issuers amount to 7.4% whereas they are 8.2% for non-VC backed issuers. Francis
and Hasan (2001) find smaller but significant differences between spreads of VC and
non-VC backed IPOs for their U.S. sample of 843 IPOs between 1990 and 1993 as well.
In the following we show that our model can help explain both these phenomena.
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In addition, we address implications of the model on the level of spreads when a
commercial bank conducts the IPO of a former client. We finally show that our model
is consistent with underpricing.
2.5.1 Positive Profits for Investment Banks
Equilibrium spreads allow investment banks positive profits. Issuers first announce the
level of the spread and then banks choose prices at their discretion. They can always
set a low, riskless price at which all investors buy, so that they receive their revenue
share with certainty. Issuers, on the other hand, have a keen interest that banks set
high prices, receiving the bulk of the revenue (almost always more than 90%). At high
prices, however, only high-signal investors buy, making such prices risky. Spreads,
therefore, have to be sufficiently high so that, banks are compensated for the risk of
failure. This effect alone should leave them with zero expected profits. Moreover,
spreads must be incentive compatible so that banks set high prices and do not deviate
to a risk-free low price. An investment bank’s expected profit, therefore, is always at
least what they would gain by deviating to a low risk free price. Since we assume that
the offering procedure itself causes no costs for the investment bank, it follows that
investment banks earn positive profits.
Proposition 2.5 (Positive Profits for Investment Banks)
Investment banks enjoy positive profits that will not disappear in the face of competition.
Suppose a competing investment bank offered to conduct an IPO at a lower spread than
specified in the contract the issuer offered initially. The issuer would not accept: even
though he would get a higher fraction of the revenue, lower spreads trigger different
equilibrium prices, leading to lower payoffs. In our model, banks have full discretion
over the offer price. Issuers must, therefore, set incentive compatible spreads. In reality
banks do not have full discretion over prices: many offerings fail because issuer and
bank cannot agree on the offer price.33 However, the qualitative result does not hinge
33See Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001).
INVESTMENT BANK COMPENSATION 78
upon the assumption that banks have full discretion. Banks have a good deal of power
when it comes to price setting, and this is all we need for the qualitative result to hold.
Issuers thus have no incentive to bargain for lower spreads. Competition, however,
may take place in features of the IPO contract that we do not model. Chen and Ritter
(2000), for example, report that over time the number of co-managers in IPOs and
thus analyst coverage has increased over time as well. These findings complement our
results nicely: Chen and Ritter state that, apparently, issuers cannot negotiate the
spread; we find assert that they do not want to.
2.5.2 VC Issuers set Lower Spreads than Non-VC Issuers
In a strict sense, signals provide information about the asset’s true liquidation value.
In a wider sense, signals can be seen as information about market sentiment – market
prices determine an investor’s payoff, the true liquidation value only affects market
prices through the distribution of signals. In this way it is not unreasonable to assert
that an issuer is uninformed whereas banks and investors are informed. Certainly, some
entrepreneurs have little experience with financial markets. Venture capitalists, on the
other hand, are financial institutions and so they should be able to assess market sen-
timent. As the venture capitalist usually holds all relevant control rights, we interpret
the independently informed issuer to be a VC-backed issuer. The uninformed issuer
we interpret to be the single non-VC backed entrepreneur. In this model investment
banks also hold private information. Before setting the offer price they closely interact
with investors, for example during the road show, and thus are informed about the
market’s valuation of the firm on offer.
Proposition 2.6 (VC Backed Issuers set Lower Gross Spreads)
Assume spreads do not exceed 10%. Then VC backed issuers set lower levels of the
gross spread than non-VC backed issuers.
Proof: If spreads do not exceed 10%, C/N < R1(q), then Proposition 2.2 states that
uninformed issuers set spread level βp¦ . From Proposition 2.3, the only IC-proof and
efficient equilibrium spread with independently informed issuers is pooling spread βs1
2
.




= βp¦ . ¤
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A VC backed issuer holds private information before setting the spread level. An
issuer with “good news” regards it as likely that the bank will also receive “good news”,
and he wants the bank to transform this information to investors via separating prices.
The high-signal issuer also considers it likely that there are enough high-signal investors
such that the IPO will not fail at the risky separation price. An issuer with “bad news”
will always mimic the high-signal issuer. Issuers receive almost always more than 90%
of the offer revenue and thus have a strong interest in high prices. The reduction in
offer price from signaling “bad news” is thus too costly for the low-signal issuer – even
if he is forced to set the price-separation inducing spread as well.
2.5.3 Strong Commercial Banking Ties
Before going public many companies have strong, long-lasting ties with commercial
banks, for instance through credit-financing. Thus if a commercial bank organizes
a long-term client’s IPO, it is reasonable to believe that they truly have identical
information. Only recently US regulators allowed commercial banks to offer investment
banking services, including IPO underwriting. Our model predicts that bank spreads
in such IPOs will be, on average, higher than in uninformed (non-VC backed) issuer’s
or VC-backed IPOs. In particular, if bank’s and issuer’s signal are unfavorable, the
issuer is willing to set a high spread so that the bank still chooses the risky price.
Proposition 2.7 (Identically Informed Issuers set Higher Average Spreads)
Assume spreads do not exceed 10%. Then on average, identically informed issuers set
higher levels of the spread than uninformed (non-VC backed) or VC backed issuers.
When restricting the analysis to the ‘empirically relevant’ parameter space where
spreads do not exceed 10% the uninformed issuer sets the spread such that invest-
ment banks with different signals pool in a high, risky offer price. If issuers receive
the same signal as the bank, they separate in spreads. In both cases, however, spreads
are so high that banks set the high risky price irrespective of their signals. If investors
observe the low separation spread they infer that the issuer’s inside information is bad.
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But then even the high risky price at which only high-signal investors buy is relatively
low. The issuer thus has to set a relatively high spread to make the bank set the risky
price. The opposite effect occurs when the high separation spread is set. However, the
first effect dominates so that, on average, spreads are higher with identically informed
issuers than in non-VC or VC backed offerings.
One may then conjecture that the low-signal issuer contemplates abandoning its
commercial bank to look for an independent third-party bank. In equilibrium, it turns
out, however, that this deviation is not profitable. Let a deviation be common knowl-
edge. The resulting beliefs will render this deviation unprofitable. It is numerically
straightforward to show that the high signal issuer would not be interested in this
move: The best that can happen to him is that he is perceived as a high type issuer.
But then even the highest expected payoff he’ll get from working with an independent
bank is, in expectation, lower than what he gets from his commercial bank. The reason
is that with a third party, there is a risk that the bank gets an unfavorable signal and
charges the low price.
Thus if the high type would not change, any change of banking-partner would be
perceived as coming from a low type bank. It is straightforward to check numerically
that the low-type bank then would not want to deviate either.
2.5.4 Underpricing
Even though this paper is not mainly concerned with explaining underpricing, in equi-
librium the model is consistent with the empirical findings on first-day returns. In
the context of this model underpricing is the difference between offer price and market
price. We can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2.8 (Underpricing)
(a) If spreads are uninformative but prices are separating then, on average, securities
are underpriced. (b) If spreads are informative and all equilibrium prices risky then,
on average, ordering the security yields zero profits.
The intuition behind the result is simple. Both types of investors only buy if their
expected payoff is non-negative. At p0,0 the low-signal investor just breaks even in
INVESTMENT BANK COMPENSATION 81
expectation but the high-signal investor expects a strictly positive payoff. At p1,1 the
high-signal investor just breaks even and the low-signal investor abstains. Ex-ante
expected payoffs are positive, hence underpricing. If, however, spreads are separating
and prices risky, then only investors with the favorable signal buy. With them buying,
prices are defined so that they yield zero profit.
2.6 Conclusion
We addressed and answered two puzzles of the IPO literature. First, why do investment
banks earn positive profits in a competitive market as argued, for example, by Chen
and Ritter (2000)? Second, why do banks receive lower gross spreads in VC backed
than in non-VC backed IPOs as argued, for example, by Megginson and Weiss (1991)?
Although investment bank compensation accounts for a substantial proportion of the
cost of going public, it has hardly attracted theorists’ attention. Our model is, to the
best of our knowledge, the first to explain the level of the gross spread. We model the
IPO procedure as a two-stage signaling game and find, first, that investment banks are
left with profits and, second, that signaling considerations under different information
constellations cause spreads to differ between classes of issuers.
In the first signaling stage, the issuer decides on the spread. Assuming that ven-
ture capitalists decide on spreads in VC backed offerings and that they have private
information about market sentiment, they set different spreads than a non-VC backed
issuer without much experience with financial markets. In the second stage, investment
banks set offer prices given their private information, the spread, and the information
contained in the spread. Issuers anticipate the bank’s pricing decision and set the
gross spread to maximize their expected revenue. Finally, investors decide whether to
subscribe or refrain. They are aware of the IPO process details and order only if their
expected profit is positive. In equilibrium, VC backed issuers offer lower spreads than
non-VC backed issuers. Furthermore, issuers must offer high enough spreads to ensure
that banks set high prices – allowing them substantial profits. Issuers act rationally,
they do not want to cut spreads since lower spreads induce different, less favorable
equilibrium offering prices.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Aftermarket Price Formation
The finally prevailing market price depends on the number of positive signals about
the value of the security. In determining the price we have to distinguish between cases
B1 and B0,1.
Consider first case B1. Since only high-signal investors buy, aggregated demand d
indicates the number of high-signal investors. Suppose d ≥ S, i.e. the IPO is successful.
Investors are assumed to take the aggregated information about signals into account
and update their expectations accordingly. At this updated expectation all investors
irrespective of their private signals are indifferent between selling and holding or buying
and abstaining, depending on whether they own a security or not, respectively. The
updated expectation thus becomes the aftermarket price, denoted by pm(d). We will
later show that case B1 will occur at the high price of a separating equilibrium only,
i.e. investors know that the bank’s signal is sb = 1. Taking further into account that
the true value of the security is either 0 or 1, we can write pm(d|µ = 1) = Pr(V =
1|d, µ = 1). Using Bayes’ rule, we can express the aftermarket price as
pm(d|µ = 1) = Pr(d|V = 1)Pr(sb = 1|V = 1)
Pr(d|V = 1)Pr(sb = 1|V = 1) + Pr(d|V = 0)Pr(sb = 1|V = 0) . (2.17)
Due to the binomial structure of the prior distributions over signals, the conditional
distribution for demand realization d is, for V = 1,






and for V = 0 analogously. The price-information about sb is unambiguous in a
separating equilibrium. We can therefore replace it with the conditional probability of
the bank’s signal being correct, which is q or 1− q. Bayes’ rule yields
pm(d|µ = 1) = qq
2d−N
qq2d−N + (1− q)(1− q)2d−N . (2.19)
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Consider now case B0,1 in which all investors order the security, i.e. stated demand
is N and securities are allocated at random. The demand is uninformative since it does
not reveal the number of high-signal investors. Suppose that we are at the low price of
a separating equilibrium. Note that high-signal investors expect the security to be of
higher value than low-signal investors. Hence, there exists a price larger than the offer
price, p˜ > p∗ at which high-signal investors who were not allocated a security would be
willing to buy the security, and low-signal investors would be willing to sell, in case they
were allocated a security. Without modelling the price-finding procedure explicitly we
assume that the following intermediate process takes place. Those high-signal investors
who did not receive the security in the offering submit a unit market-buy-order. Those
low-signal investors who obtained the security in the offering submit a unit market-
sell-order. All other investors abstain. The number of investors who want to buy or
to sell is denoted by d˜ and S˜, respectively. Aggregate demand of high-signal investors
is then d = d˜ + S − S˜ and the market price pm can be determined as before. The
same procedure can be applied to determine the first period market clearing price in
the case of a pooling equilibrium. The conditional expectation which determines the
price, however, will then not contain the component about the signal of the investment
bank.
2.7.2 Threshold Prices
Denote by psi,µ,ν the maximum price at which an investor with signal si and price-
information µ and spread information ν buys, given all investors with s˜i ≥ si buy. At
this price the investor’s expected return from buying the security is zero, normalizing
outside investment opportunities accordingly.
Define ψ(1|1, 1, ν) := Pr(V = 1|si = 1, µ = 1, ν) and ψ(0|1, 1, ν) := Pr(V = 0|si =
1, µ = 1, ν). Consider now the structure of the conditional distribution f(d − 1|V ).
For V = 1, this is a binomial distribution over {0, . . . , N − 1} with center (N − 1)q,
and likewise for V = 0 with center (N − 1)(1 − q). Since by Assumption 2.2, N is
‘large enough’ for every q, f(d − 1|1) = 0 for d < N/2 and f(d|0) = 0 for d > N/2.
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When combining both f(d − 1|1) and f(d − 1|0), we obtain a bi-modal function. In
g(·|si, µ, ν), investors’ posterior distribution over demands, these are weighted with
ψ(1|si, µ, ν) and ψ(0|si, µ, ν). Assumption 2.2 now satisfies two purposes. The first is
to ensure that we pick N large enough, so that the two modes do not overlap. The
second can be seen from the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 For any q > 1
2
, there exists a number of investors N(q), such that pm(d)·
g(d|si, µ, ν) ∈ {0, g(d|si, µ, ν)} almost everywhere.
The lemma states that market prices are mostly 0 or 1, if they are not, then the weight
of this demand is negligible. To see this consider the following heuristic argument.
Proof: pm(d) is a s-shaped function in d, given by equation (2.19). For large N ,
pm(d) ∈ {0, 1} almost everywhere. Define I∗ as the interval of d around N/2 s.t. for
d ∈ I∗ we have pm(d) 6∈ {0, 1}. pm(d) is multiplied with density g(d|si, µ, ν), which
peaks at (N − 1)(1 − q) and (N − 1)q. For N increasing I∗/N → 0 and the bi-modal
distribution becomes more centered around (N − 1)(1 − q) and (N − 1)q. Hence, for
every q there is an (N − 1)(q) such that for d ∈ I∗, g(d|si, µ, ν) · pm(d) = 0, i.e. the
weight on pm(d) 6∈ {0, 1} can be made arbitrarily small. ¤
Using Lemma 2.2 we can determine the threshold prices as follows. Consider first p1,1,ν .




















g(d− 1|1, 1, ν) . (2.20)
For d > N/2, g(d − 1|si, µ, ν) = ψ(1|si, µ, ν)f(d − 1|1) and for d < N/2, g(d −











, and σ := Σ0/Σ1.
Also write `(µ, ν) := ψ(0|1, µ, ν)/ψ(1|1, µ, ν). Thus for the combination of signal si,
INVESTMENT BANK COMPENSATION 85
price-information µ and spread information ν with B1 we can write
p1,1,ν = (1 + σ`(1, ν))
−1 and likewise p1, 1
2




Consider now the case for p0,0,ν . At this price all agents receive the security with equal
probability and we sum from 0 to N − 1. Thus














,ν = ψ(1|0, 12 , ν). (2.23)
2.7.3 Approximate Closed Form Solutions
We will now derive approximate closed form solutions so that we can solve our model
analytically. In this appendix we let d denotes the number of other investors with
favorable information — this contrasts the exposition of the main text, but it simplifies
the notation here. First consider the strategy of agent number N . There are N − 1
other investors. Given that he invests and the true value is, say, V = 1, then by the law
of large numbers, demand/the number of favorable signals will always be larger than
N/2. Furthermore, the market price is almost surely pm(d) = 1. If d others order, then





















To compute the sum we proceed in a similar manner as one would to compute the
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(1− (1− q)N ). (2.26)
In the second step we made a change of variable, l = d+ 1, but through this change,










qd(1− q)N−1−d ≈ 1
qiN
. (2.27)









qN−1−d(1− q)d ≈ 1
(1− q)N . (2.28)
Use now familiar notation to denote the combination of private and public beliefs
φs,µ. For the time being, assume the issuer is uninformed so that ν is replaced with a
diamond. Recall that we can write p1,1,¦ as
p1,1,¦ =
(





















qN−1−d(1− q)d gets numerically symmetric
around (1− q)N − 1. Thus we can express





























































, and p0,1,¦ ≈ 1− q
α0,¦
. (2.33)
The information content of a high pooling price is 1/2, and knowing this informa-
tion, the probability of the offering being successful is 3/4. Thus the interpretation of
risky prices is thus the ratio of the expected liquidation value given price- and spread-
information to the share of successful offerings given this information
p1,µ,ν =
Pr(V = 1 | µ, ν)
Pr(IPO successful | µ, ν) . (2.34)
2.7.4 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Suppose p∗ > p0,0,ν . At this price only high-signal investors buy. A high-signal bank
will always set a price where at least investors with signal si = 1 buy. Hence, investors
with signal si = 1 buy at both prices p
∗ and p¯∗. A low-signal bank can now increase
its payoff by setting a higher price as α0,ν is not affected by this, a contradiction. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.1
(a) First we will argue that given Conditions 1 and 2 the only separating equilibrium
surviving the Intuitive Criterion (IC) is the one outlined in Proposition 2.1(a). Then
we will argue that pooling cannot occur.
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Step 1 (Separating) First observe that there cannot be a separating price p¯∗ where
investors choose B0,1 because otherwise the low-signal bank would deviate to this
price. Note that no separating price with p¯∗ > φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) can exist because at this
price, the low-signal bank would prefer to deviate. No price p¯∗ > p1,1,ν can exist
since not even investors with si = 1 would buy. Furthermore, p¯
∗ ≥ φ1,ν(p0,0,ν)
must be satisfied since otherwise the high-signal bank would prefer to deviate to
p0,0,ν . Finally no price p¯
∗ below p1,0,ν is reasonable because the high-signal bank
would then deviate to this price. Take p˜, with max{φ1,ν(p0,0,ν), p1,0,ν} ≤ p˜ ≤
min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)}. Note that such a p˜ always exists as long as φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) ≤
p1,1,ν and p1,0,ν ≤ φ0,ν(p0,0,ν). The conditions stated in Proposition 2.1 ensure
this is the case because φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) > φ1,ν(p0,0,ν) and p1, 1
2
,ν > p1,0,ν .
We analyze the candidate separating equilibrium
{(p∗ = p0,0,ν , µ = 0, B0,1); (p¯∗ = p˜, µ = 1, B1);
(p∗ 6∈ {p∗, p¯∗}, µ = 0, B0,1 if p ≤ p0,0,ν , B1 if p0,0,ν < p ≤ p1,0,ν , B∅ else)}.
By definition of φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) it holds that
βp0,0,νS = α0,νβφ0,ν(p0,0,ν)S− (1− α0,ν)C > α0,νβp˜S− (1− α0,ν)C (2.35)
so that the low-signal bank would not deviate to p˜. Since max{φ1,ν(p0,0,ν), p1,0,ν} ≤
p˜, the high-signal bank would also not deviate. Hence this is a PBE.
Now consider the application of the IC. Suppose a high separation price p¯ = ˜˜p
with p˜ < ˜˜p ≤ min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)} is observed. This price is equilibrium
dominated for a bank with sb = 0 by definition of φ0,ν(p0,0,ν). The low-signal
bank can therefore be excluded the set of potential deviators. The only remain-
ing agent is the high-signal bank. The best response of investors with signal
si = 1 then is to buy at p¯ = ˜˜p, i.e. B1. Hence the PBE with p¯
∗ = p˜ does
not survive the IC. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all separating prices with
p¯ < min{p1,1,ν , φ0,ν(p0,0,ν)} can be eliminated.
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Step 2 (Pooling with B0,1) For all investors to buy we must have p ≤ p0, 1
2
,ν . Suppose
there was deviation to p = φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < φ0,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν). For the low-signal bank this
would not be profitable by definition of φ0,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν). But for some beliefs about
the signal of the bank and corresponding best responses, investors with sb = 1
could be better off. The best response for investors with beliefs on the remaining
set of types, i.e. µ = 1, however, is B1 as we have φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1,1,ν . Hence,
applying the IC, there cannot be a pooling equilibrium with B0,1.
Step 3 (Pooling with B1) We must have p ≤ p1, 1
2
,ν . Since φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) > p1, 1
2
,ν , the low-
signal bank would prefer to deviate to p0,0,ν , hence this cannot be an equilibrium.
(b) We will first argue that if Condition 1 is not fulfilled each separating equilibrium
is Pareto dominated by pooling in the risk-less price. Then we will show that also a
pooling price at which only high-signal investors buy is Pareto dominated. We will
finally argue that among all PBE pooling equilibrium prices at which all investors buy
only the one outlined in Proposition 2.1 is Pareto efficient.
Step 1 (Separating) If Condition 1 is not fulfilled we have
βp0, 1
2
,νS = α1,νβφ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν)S− (1− α1,ν)C > α1,νβp1,1,νS− (1− α1,ν)C (2.36)
so the high-signal bank prefers pooling in p0, 1
2
,ν to the highest possible separation
price p1,1,ν . Likewise, since p0, 1
2
,ν > p0,0,ν the risk-free pooling price is Pareto
dominating for the sb = 0 bank. Thus separation is always Pareto dominated
and deselected.
Step 2 (Pooling with B1) Since the high-signal bank can profitably deviate from p1,1,ν
it will and can do so from p1, 1
2
,ν < p1,1,ν . Pooling with B1 can thus be no
equilibrium.
Step 3 (Pooling with B0,1) Not even the high-signal bank wants to set a price where
only high-signal investors buy. Candidate prices for an equilibrium are thus only
prices with B0,1. Consider p = p˜ < p0, 1
2
,ν . Since both types of banks would
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prefer p = ˜˜p with p˜ < ˜˜p < p0, 1
2
,ν Pareto efficiency prescribes that investors must
hold µ = 1
2
and thus all investors will buy at p = ˜˜p. Applying this reasoning
repeatedly, all prices with p < p0, 1
2
,ν can be eliminated.
(c) We will first argue that if Condition 2 is not fulfilled every separating equilibrium
is Pareto dominated. We will then argue that the only pooling equilibrium in which
only high-signal investors buy is the one outlined in Proposition 2.1. We finally show
that pooling in a price where all investors buy cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 1 (Separating) Since Condition 2 does not hold we have
βp0,0,νS = α0,νβφ0,ν(p0,0,ν)S− (1− α0,ν)C < α0,νβp1,1,νS− (1− α0,ν)C (2.37)
so the low-signal bank will mimic the high-signal bank at any price p˜ ≥ φ0,ν(p0,0,ν).
To uphold separation the high-signal bank must lower its price below φ0,ν(p0,0,ν) <
p1, 1
2
,ν . However, a high separation price below p1, 1
2
,ν cannot be an efficient equi-
librium since both types of banks would prefer pooling price p1, 1
2
,ν . There can
thus be no separating equilibrium.
Step 2 (Pooling with B1) From Step 1 we know that both types of banks prefer pooling
in p˜ ∈ [φ0,ν(p0,0,ν), p1, 1
2
,ν ] even to the separating equilibrium with the highest
possible p¯. Consider the candidate pooling price ˜˜p with p˜ < ˜˜p < p1, 1
2
,ν . Since
both types prefer ˜˜p to p˜ efficiency prescribes µ = 0.5 and thus p˜ cannot be an
equilibrium. Applying this reasoning repeatedly, all prices with p < p1, 1
2
,ν can be
eliminated. The only pooling equilibrium surviving is thus the one depicted in
Proposition 2.1.
Step 3 (Pooling with B0,1) Suppose that p0, 1
2
,ν was an equilibrium, supported by out-
of-equilibriums belief that any deviation is by a low-signal bank. Then consider
a deviation to φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν). Naturally, φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < φ0,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν), and thus, ap-
plying the IC, this deviation can only be triggered by a high-signal bank. It is
straightforward to check that, numerically, a violation of Condition 2 implies that
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Condition 1 holds, i.e. φ1,ν(p0, 1
2














which is increasing in costs C. The largest C so that Condition 2 just holds
C = βS(α0,νp0, 1
2
,ν − p0,0,ν/(1− α0,ν). Any C violating Condition is smaller than
C. Numerically, then φ1,ν(p0, 1
2
,ν) < p1, 1
2
,ν , thus efficiency holds. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.3
To prove this result, we proceed in five steps: In the first we derive the issuer’s optimal
spread choice under the assumption that spreads are separating. The issuer then
chooses the spread that maximizes his payoff; the spread will induce the bank to set
either a separating or a pooling price. This step serves as benchmark for comparing
deviation payoffs. The first-mover Pareto efficiency requirement ensures, that in any
spread-separating equilibrium, the low-signal issuer will always set his preferred spread,
irrespective of the high-signal issuer’s choice. In the second step, we argue that the low-
signal issuer will always mimic the high-signal issuer’s optimal choice. In the third step
we show that the high-signal issuer cannot defend separation in spreads by choosing a
different level of the spread. This step consists of three sub-steps in which we show that
neither constellation (price-separation inducing or price-pooling inducing spreads) can
be upheld. In the fourth step we show that pooling in spreads is indeed an equilibrium,
but we also show that there can be two equilibria. In the fifth step we argue that only
the price-separation inducing spread satisfies the Intuitive Criterion (IC).
The results can only be obtained numerically: When comparing different payoffs,
the decisive equations are complicated polynomials, that cannot be expressed in an
appealing simple form. Explicit solutions, however, can be obtained from the authors
upon request. Furthermore, throughout the proof we use the restriction that β < 10%.
Table 2.1 describes how an issuer computes his expected payoffs. In this proof we
let βsν denote the spread that yields separation given spread information ν.
34
34We emphasize that this is not the same as the spreads defined in Subsection 2.3.2. Nevertheless,
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Pr(V |sf = 1) q 1− q
V = 1 V = 0
Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(IPO successful|V ) Pr(sb|V ) Price Pr(IPO successful|V )
sb = 1 q p1,1,1 1 1− q p1,1,1 12
sb = 0 1− q p0,0,1 1 q p0,0,1 1
Table 2.1: Probabilities Summary. Equilibrium price choice, signal probabilities, and
success-probabilities in price-separating equilibria. Issuer’s expected profit from charging,
e.g., βs1 is (1− βs1) · (q · (qp1,1,1+(1− q)p0,0,1)+ (1− q) · ((1− q)p1,1,1 12 + qp0,0,1)) = (q2+(1−
q)2/2)p1,1,1 + 2q(1− q)p0,0,1.
Step 1: Suppose first that the spread is separating and indicates sf = 1, so that
ν = 1. The issuer has the choice between expected profits in separation, low
riskless pooling, and high risky pooling. For given parameters q, C,N , the issuer
will always choose the spread with maximal expected payoffs. The following two
inequalities always holds when C/N < R1(q).
1. Pooling in p1, 1
2






)p1,1,1 + 2q(1− q)p0,0,1
)
> (1− βp1)α1 p1, 1
2
,1(2.39)
2. Pooling in p1, 1
2
,1 is better than pooling in p0, 1
2
,1 if
(1− βp1)α1,1 p1, 1
2
,1 > p0, 1
2
,1 (2.40)
Suppose now that the spread triggers ν = 0. Again, we have to compare expected
profits. All the inequalities hold if we restrict C/N < R1(q).
1. Pooling in p1, 1
2
,0 is better than separation in p1,1,0 and p0,0,0 if
(1− βp0)
(
(1− q) + q
2
)






q(1− q)p1,1,0 + (q2 + (1− q)2)p0,0,0
)
(2.41)
2. Pooling in p1, 1
2
,0 is better than pooling in p0, 1
2
,0 if
(1− βp0)α0,0 p1, 1
2
,0 > p0, 1
2
,0 (2.42)
for the purposes of exposition in the proof this notation is best; since the spreads βsν as defined here
are no equilibria, there should be no confusion. Details of the β’s used in this proof are placed after
the proof.
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Thus if spreads are separating, irrespective of the spread-information inducing
risky, high price-pooling is better than both price-separation and low price-
pooling.
Step 2: We now show that the low-signal issuer will always mimic the high-signal
issuer, and that defending separation is too costly. For the low-signal issuer it is
profitable to mimic the high-signal issuer in βp1 if
(1− βp1)
(





,1 > (1− βp0)
(






Numerically the deviation profit is always higher, thus spread-separating in βp1 , β
p
0
cannot be an equilibrium.
Step 3: The high-signal issuer’s defenses against mimicking have to be analyzed for
any of the three candidate equilibrium spreads. Price-pooling inducing βp1 , price-
separating inducing βs1, and risk-less pooling inducing β = 0 would be defended
by setting a higher βs. However, none of these defenses turn out to be feasible.
(a) Defending Price-Separation. The lowest spread β˜ for which the low-signal
















Solving for β˜, numerically β˜ exceeds by far 10% (and thus lies outside the relevant
parameter region). It also exceeds βp1 , which brings us to the next case.
(b) Defending Risky Price-Pooling. If the high-signal issuer sets β˜ > βp1 the
low-signal issuer will no longer mimic if
(1− β˜)
(





,1 = (1− βp0)
(






Solving for β˜, numerically β˜ exceeds by far 10% (and thus lies outside the relevant
parameter region).
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(c) Defending Riskless Price-Pooling. If the high-signal issuer sets β˜ ∈ (0, βs1) the
low-signal issuer will no longer mimic if
(1− β˜) p0 1
2
,1 = (1− βp0)
(






Solving for β˜, numerically it exceeds by far 10% (and thus lies outside the relevant
parameter region).
Thus, there is no spread-separating equilibrium.
Step 4: Consider now the spread-pooling equilibria. As usual, there are three can-




. It turns out that profits under β = 0 are
dominated by profits under the other two spreads. Moreover, βs1
2
is preferred by
the high-signal issuer, βp1
2
from the low-signal issuer.

















Numerically, given C/N < R1(q), this inequality always holds. Risky price-




















Numerically, given C/N < R1(q), this inequality also always holds. However, the




























holds numerically, given C/N < R1(q).





(q2 + (1− q)2/2)p1,1, 1
2
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Numerically, given C/N < R1(q), this inequality always holds. Risky price-




















Numerically, given C/N < R1(q), this inequality always holds. However, price-





(q2 + (1− q)2/2)p1,1, 1
2



















holds numerically, given C/N < R1(q).
Step 5: Thus there are two spread-equilibria that can be constructed to be PBEs.
Conveniently, however, spread βp1
2
fails the Intuitive Criterion. To see this, define
β˜(q) to be the spread for given q that makes the low type not wanting to deviate
from βp1
2
, even if he was perceived to be the highest type. For simplicity, assume
























Numerically, for q > 0.72, β˜(q) can be set to βs1, for smaller q, it has to be
larger. However, numerically it also holds that for all q, β˜ < βˆs1 = C/S(1 −
α0,1)/(α0,1p1,1,1 − p0,0,1), where βˆs1 is the spread so that the low type bank is
indifferent between choosing p1,1,1 and p0,0,1. (Recall that for higher spread the
bank lowers the price to φ0,1(p0,0,1)). Consequently at every β˜(q) the bank charges
a separation price. Furthermore, numerically at for all q, the high type prefers to
deviate to β˜(q) if he is perceived to be the high type, whereas the low type prefers
the current equilibrium. Hence there is a deviation that, in the best of all worlds
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for beliefs, is only profitable for the high type issuer and so the equilibrium βp1
2
fails the IC.
Consider now the price-separation-inducing spread and construct the same de-





















((1− q)2 + q2)
)
. (2.54)
Any β˜ satisfying this equation with equality could be taken as a benchmark for
deviation-considerations. However, since there’s no feasible β˜ that satisfies our
restriction and equation (2.54) with equality, the out of equilibrium belief of low
type deviation is IC-proof.
As a consequence of all this, the only IC-proof and issuer-efficient equilibrium is
pooling in spreads βs1
2
which induce price-separation. ¤
In the proof we used the following threshold values for spreads. They are computed in
the same way as demonstrated in Subsection 2.4.1. Note that βsν is not the same as
the ones used in the next proof.
βs1 =
1− α1,1


































Proof of Proposition 2.4
If the issuer signals his information, the bank’s price choice carries no extra value. Thus
in prices, µ is substituted with a diamond. For the bank’s probability of a successful
IPO, spreads do not carry information, thus in αj,ν , j = 0, 1, spread information ν
is substituted with a diamond. In Subsection 2.3.2, Equation (2.9) we have already
described the spreads which induce banks to choose risky prices: (1) The high-signal
bank chooses risky p1,¦,1 with B1 if it is offered at least βs1. (2) The low-signal bank
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First, we have to show that both types of issuer actually do want the respective bank to
set those risky prices. (1) The high-signal issuer prefers the high-signal bank to set p1,¦,1
and not p0,¦,1 if its expected revenue is higher at the risky price, α1(1−β)p1,¦,1S ≥ p0,¦,1S.
(Note that β = 0 is sufficient for the bank to set the risk-free price.) Solving for β








Applying the same reasoning to the low-signal issuer, he prefers the low-signal bank to
set risky p1,¦,0 and not p0,¦,0 if α0(1−β)p1,¦,0S ≥ p0,¦,0S. Thus the separating threshold





⇔ C/N ≤ 2q(2q − 1)
2
(1− q)2 p0,¦,0
2 =: R4(q). (2.57)
We restrict the analysis to the empirically relevant parameter space where spreads
do not exceed 10%. Since we know βs0 > β
p > βs1 we impose β
s
0 < 10%. This translates
into any β has to be smaller than (4q − 1 − 5q2 + 2q3)/5(1 − 2q + 2q2) =: R5(q).
Numerically it is easy to check that R5 < min{R1, R2, R3, R4}, that is, requiring spreads
not to exceed 10% is sufficient for all other restrictions to hold.
Second, we have to show that there is no profitable deviation for either issuer.
(1) Consider the low-signal issuer. Notice that βs1 < β
s
0 and p1,¦,1 > p1,¦,0, i.e. the
high-signal issuer’s spread is lower and the offer price is higher so the low-signal issuer
had the incentive to deviate if the low-signal bank sets p1,¦,1 when being offered βs1.
However, at βs1 the high-signal bank is just indifferent between risky p1,¦,1 and risk-
free p0,¦,1. Since the low-signal bank holds less favorable prospects about investors’
valuations it will not set p1,¦,1 and thus investors learn that the issuer’s/bank’s signal
35If any of these restrictions on C/N is satisfied strictly, the necessary spreads can be set lower.
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is s = 0. But in this case βs0 is the best choice for the low-signal issuer. (2) Consider
now the high-signal issuer. Since βs1 < β
s
0 and p1,¦,1 > p1,¦,0 the high-signal issuer will
never mimic the low-signal issuer.
Third, we have to check if pooling in spreads can be an equilibrium. If there is
pooling in spreads banks set prices as in Section 2.3. Since we assume C/N < R5 we















< p1,¦,1 the high-signal issuer will want to deviate,
and he is the only one who can do so profitably under the conditions set by the IC, so
this cannot be an IC-proof equilibrium. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.5
We will show that the bank earns non-negative profits at all three possible spread
levels.
(a) With informed issuers, if sb = 0, the spread is β
s
0 and the low-signal bank sets
p1,¦,0 and incurs the risk of losing C. Instead of taking this risk, the bank may choose
a risk-free price p0,¦,0 > 0. Being compensated for the risk means that the low-signal
banks gets more than βs0Sp0,¦,0 > 0.
(b) Likewise, if sb = 1, the issuer sets β
s
1 and the bank sets p1,¦,1. Instead, the bank
could set price p0,¦,1 > 0 and realize risk-free profits. To make the bank set the risky
price, the issuer has to pick a compensation which gives the bank at least βs0Sp0,¦,1 > 0.
(c) With uninformed issuers the spread is βp¦ and the high pooling price p1, 1
2
,¦ results.





S > (1− α0 + α1
2
) C ⇔ βp > 2− α0 − α1





Numerical simulations show that holds true for all q ∈ (.6, 1). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.7
From Propositions 2.2 and 2.4 we know that an uninformed issuer always sets βp¦ ; an
identically informed issuer with signal sb = 0 sets β
s
0, if he has signal sb = 1 he sets β
s
1.
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Ex ante, the identically informed issuer gets either signal with equal probability. Thus




















− p0,0 . (2.59)
Checking this numerically, the inequality holds if C/N < R1(q). By Proposition 2.6,
the VC-backed issuer sets even lower spreads.
Instead of spread deviations suppose that an issuer abandons his commercial bank
and seeks investment banking services from a third party, and let this be common
knowledge. It is numerically straightforward to show that the high-signal issuer would
not be interested in this move: The best to happen is that he would be perceived as a
high-signal issuer. But then the highest expected payoff he could get from an indepen-
dent bank is lower than what he gets from his commercial bank. The reason is that
with a third party, there is a risk that the bank gets an unfavorable signal and charges
the low price. Thus if the high-signal bank would not change, any change of banking-
partner would be perceived as coming from a low-signal bank. It is straightforward to
check numerically that the low-signal bank then would not want to deviate either. ¤
List of Restrictions:
R1 = 2q(2q − 1)2(q − 1)2(1− q2 + q)/(4q − 9q2 + 19q3 − 25q4 + 17q5 − 2q6 − 1)
R2 = 2(q − 1)(1− q − 3q2 + 2q3)(2q − 1)/3q(1− 2q + 2q2)
R3 = (2q − 1)2/2q,
R4 = 2q(2q − 1)2(q − 1)2/(1− 2q + 2q2)2
R5 = (4q − 1− 5q2 + 2q3)/5(1− 2q + 2q2)
Chapter 3




We examine self-control problems – modeled as time-inconsistent, present-biased pref-
erences – in a multi-tasking environment. An agent must allocate effort between an
incentivized and immediately rewarded activity and a private activity that pays out
with some delay. Effort costs accrue immediately. As an example think of a situation in
with an agent has to decide how much to work on her job and how much to care about
her health. Effort on the job is assumed to pay out immediately (e.g. wage payment
at the end of the month, piecework rate, job promotion, etc.) while time dedicated to
care for one’s health (free weekends, workouts, balanced diet instead of fast-food, etc.)
pays out in the long-run only. Alternatively, one can think of a student’s decision how
much to study for a degree and how much to work for money while being a student.
The existing literature on present-biased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,
1999b, 2001)) analyzes environments in which an agent must accomplish a single task
only but has discretion when to do it. In contrast, we model situations in which agents
must allocate effort between tasks and has to decide how much of each activity to
accomplish – with the complication that some tasks pay out earlier than others.
PRESENT-BIASED AGENTS 101
We consider three types of agents. Time-consistent agents, sophisticated agents,
and naive agents. Throughout the paper we abstract from complications of adverse
selection. The principal is thus assumed to know the type of agent he is contracting
with. To capture the basic effects we start out with the most simple set-up. The
agent has to allocate effort between two tasks only. Effort allocated to the first task
is incentivized by a principal by way of a linear contract and rewarded immediately.
Effort devoted to the second task serves the agent’s private benefit but pays out with
some delay. Effort is taken to be perfectly observable and contractable. There is no
risk involved. We consider a three-period setting. In a first period the principal offers
a contract and the agent decides whether to accept or to refrain. In the next period
the agent chooses effort levels. According to the incentive scheme, effort devoted to the
principal’s purposes pays out immediately, and all effort costs are borne in immediately.
In the final period the agent’s private benefit is realized.
We show that present-biased agents take decisions that do not maximize their
long-run interest, irrespective of the intensity of incentives. Sophisticated agents are,
however, never harmed by incentives relative to a situation without incentives as they
always receive their reservation utility levels. With naive agents there are two effects.
On the one hand, they wrongly belief to have a high reservation utility because they
think they will not give in to a present bias in a situation without incentives. They
thus only participate if they are paid high enough wages. On the other hand, they
wrongly predict tomorrow’s effort choices (naive agents think to act like time-consistent
agents but in fact they will always give in to their present bias) which is exploited by
the principal. We show that the second effect always dominates. Naive agents are
thus harmed by incentives relative to the situation without incentives. Furthermore,
we show that social welfare can decrease in the presence of incentives. With naive
agents it may happen that their additional loss due to present-biased effort choices in
the situation with incentives exceeds the principal’s gain from offering the incentive
contract. The model thus offers a new theoretical possibility of detrimental effects
of incentives, complementary to existing arguments like the crowding out of intrinsic
motivation by extrinsic rewards.
PRESENT-BIASED AGENTS 102
While the current paper is (to the best of our knowledge) the first analysis of
present-biased preferences in a multi-tasking environment, there is an extensive lit-
erature that analyzes choice problems with time-inconsistent preferences in situations
where agents have discretion when do complete a task. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a)
derive a present-biased agent’s decision with exogenously given levels for costs and re-
wards – one of those being immediate, the other delayed. O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999b) analyze a principal-agent setting. A procrastinating agent faces stochastic
costs of completing a task. The principal offers an incentive contract to induce the
agent to complete that task in time. If the principal knows the agent’s cost distribu-
tion he can always achieve the first-best. With asymmetric information about costs
the first-best is achieved with time-consistent agents only. With time-inconsistent
agents incentives for timely completion and efficient delay in case of high costs must
be traded-off. The second-best contract involves an increasing punishment for delay.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) show that providing a present-biased agent with addi-
tional choice options can harm those agents. Agents may refrain from completing an
activity because they change to a better but never-to-completed alternative. DellaV-
igna and Malmendier (2003) analyze the health club industry and provide evidence
for both, time-inconsistent behavior and naivete´. DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004)
go a step further and derive the optimal contract design of firms if consumers have
time-inconsistent preferences. They show that optimal contracts for naive agents have
observed features in some industries like, among others, the health club and credit
card industry – suggesting that people have self-control problems and that they are
not fully aware of it.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the multi-




In this section we lay out our model of time-inconsistent preferences in a multi-tasking
environment. First, present-biased preferences and possible believes about future be-
havior are introduced. Second, a multi-tasking principal-agent environment is set up.
In contrast to the seminal contribution by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991), we add
the complication that effort devoted to some tasks pays out immediately while effort
devoted to other tasks pays out with delay. We assume that effort costs accrue imme-
diately. Finally, we combine both approaches in a simple, three-period model with two
tasks only.
3.2.1 Present-Biased Preferences and Beliefs
Let ut be an agent’s instantaneous utility in period t. In each period an agent does
not only care about her instantaneous utility, but also about her discounted future
instantaneous utilities. Let U t(ut, ..., uT ) denote an agent’s intertemporal preference
from the point of view of period t. The standard model employed by economists is
exponential discounting, that is U t(ut, ..., uT ) =
∑T
τ=t δ
τuτ , where δ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the
discount factor. In a parsimonious way, exponential discounting captures the fact that
agents are impatient. In addition, it implies that agent’s decisions are time-consistent.
When considering trade-offs between two periods in time it does not matter when the
agent is asked to take a decision. However, people tend to exhibit time-inconsistent
preferences (Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1989), Kirby (1997), Kirby and Herrnstein
(1995)). By way of example: When being asked, most people will prefer to receive
$100 in 6 weeks over $90 in 5 weeks from now. However, when being asked again for
their preference 5 weeks from now, some people will reverse their decisions to wait for
the higher payment and opt for the immediate payment of $90. Such present-biased
preferences have been modelled by Phelps and Pollack (1968) and later, among others,
by Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b, 2001).36 We follow this
36See Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) for a comprehensive overview of the litera-
ture.
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literature and apply a two-parameter model that can capture present-biased preferences
by a simple modification of exponential discounting.
Definition 3.1 (β, δ)-preferences are time-inconsistent preferences that are repre-




τuτ , where 0 < β,
δ ≤ 1.
In this formulation, δ represents the long-run, time-consistent discount parameter.
The parameter β represents the the bias for the present. If β = 1, (β, δ)-preferences
coincide with standard exponential discounting. But if β < 1, an agent places more
relative weight to period τ in period τ than she did in any other period prior to τ .
Applied to the above example: Be δ = .95 the weekly discount factor and β = .9
the present-bias. The agent then prefers $100 in week 6 over $90 in week 5 in every
week before week 5 as $90 < .95 · $100. But in week 5 her preference reverses as
$90 > .9 · .95 · $100.
Most researchers have modeled time-inconsistent preferences by interpreting an
agent at each point in time as a separate agent.37 An agent thus consists of ‘multiple
selves’, where each ‘self’ is choosing current behavior to maximize current preferences.
The ‘current self’ knows that her ‘future selves’ control future behaviors and thus holds
believes about her future selves. Strotz (1956) and Pollack (1968) applied two extreme
assumptions and established the following labels:
Definition 3.2 (i) A sophisticated agent is fully aware of her future selves. Such an
agent takes into account that future selves may exhibit time-inconsistent preferences.
(ii) A naive agent thinks that future selves will take time-consistent decisions. Such an
agent does not take into account that future selves in fact take present-biased decisions.
There is a long standing and lasting debate over whether people are naive or sophis-
ticated. On the one hand, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) report on self-commitment
devices such as alcohol clinics, Christmas clubs, or fat farms, indicating that people
are (at least partially) aware of their time-inconsistent behaviors. On the other hand,
37For an alternative approach see Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).
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DellaVigna and Malmendier (2003, 2004) report on evidence from, among others, the
health club and credit card industry that suggests that people are not (fully) aware of
their future self-control problems. Apart from the two extreme assumptions, in prin-
cipal, any degree of sophistication could be modeled. However, in this paper we follow
the approach in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) and analyze fully sophisticated and
fully naive agents only.
3.2.2 Multi-Tasking with Immediate and Delayed Benefits
We analyze a situation in which an agent must allocate effort between different tasks.
We further assume that all effort costs are immediate while some but not all tasks pay
out with a delay only. Effort on the job is assumed to pay out immediately (wage
payment) while time dedicated to care for, say, one’s health pays out in the long-run
only (absence of health problems). As another example, consider a student’s decision
to work a couple of hours per week for a firm or to fully concentrate on one’s studies.
While the wages from working for the firm are paid out immediately, higher wages that
come along with good grades are realized only in the future.
In a classic paper Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) derive optimal linear incentive
contracts in a principal-agent setting with non-verifiable effort such that wages must
condition on noisy signals.38 Without loss of generality we employ the linear incentive
model in this paper as well. However, the focus of our model very different. Holm-
stro¨m and Milgrom are interested in the implications on optimal incentive provision
if performance measure are of diverging quality. They show that it can be optimal to
refrain from providing explicit incentives if, for example, only one of two tasks can be
measured, but some engagement in both tasks is desirable. They further analyze asset
ownership and job design. In the current model we abstract from problems of measure-
ment and risk allocation. We are interested in the implications for incentive provision
if the incentivized task pays out immediate while the private activity pays out only
38The underlying assumption in their model is that the agent chooses effort levels continuously
over the time interval [0, 1] to control the drift vector of a Brownian motion. At each point in time
the agent can observe his accumulated performance before acting. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987)
show that in such a setting the optimal incentive contract is indeed linear.
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with delay. While existing models of time-inconsistent behavior analyze environments
in which an agent must accomplish a single task but has discretion when to do it, our
focus is on effort allocation between tasks.
3.2.3 Combining Present-Biased Preferences and Multi-Tasking
We now combine present-biased preferences with multi-tasking. To capture the basic
effects we start out with the most simple set-up. The agent has to allocate effort
between two tasks only. Effort allocated to the first task, e1, is incentivized by a
principal and rewarded by way of a linear incentive scheme (e.g. effort in the work
place). The principal’s benefit from e1 is captured by B(e1), with B
′(e1) > 0 and
B′′(e1) < 0. Function B(e1) is assumed to measure the principal’s benefit in monetary
terms. The reward is based on a signal µ that is produced by e1. In this basic setting
we abstract from issues of risk-allocation and assume that the signal is deterministic,
i.e. µ(e1) = e1. The incentive scheme can thus be written as w(e1) = αe1 + γ. The
principal’s profit is then given by Π = B(e1)−αe1−γ. Effort devoted to the second task,
e2, serves the agent’s private benefit V (e2), with V
′(e2) > 0 and V ′′(e2) < 0 (e.g. caring
for one’s health). We assume that V (e2) accrues with one period delay only. Effort
costs, C(e1, e2), are however immediate. We assume Ci(e1, e2) > 0, Cii(e1, e2) > 0,
and Cij(e1, e2) > 0, with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, subscripts denoting partial derivatives. We thus
assume that effort levels are substitutes at the margin. This will be the case if, for
example, effort is interpreted as measuring the time devoted to a certain activity. Both,
V (e2) and C(e1, e2) are assumed to represent the agent’s benefit and cost in monetary
terms.
We consider a setting with three periods only. In period t = 0 the principal offers a
contract, i.e. values for α and γ, and the agent decides whether to accept or to refrain.
In the next period, t = 1, the agent chooses effort levels. According to the incentive
scheme, the effort devoted to the principal’s purposes, e1, pays out immediately. The
agent also decides on effort devoted to the own private benefit. All effort costs are
borne in immediately in t = 1. In the final period, t = 2, the agent’s private benefit is
realized. The timing of the game is summarized in Figure 3.1.
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tt = 0 t = 1 t = 2
The principal offers a
contract and the agent
decides whether to








Figure 3.1: The Timing of the Game.
3.2.4 Benchmark: Incentives for Time-Consistent Agents
As a benchmark we first derive the optimal contract for time-consistent agents (TCs).
Throughout the paper we will assume explicit functional forms in order to obtain closed
form solutions. In Section 3.4 we discuss the generality of our results.
Assumption 3.1 B(e1) = b ln(e1), V (e2) = v ln(e2), and C(e1, e2) = .05(e1 + e2)
2.
In addition, but without loss of generality we normalize δ to unity. We first look at
effort levels without incentives. In this case no action is taken in period t = 0. Without
incentives effort devoted to the principals benefit, e1, will always be set to zero. In




V (e2)− C(e2) = v ln(e2)− .05(e2)2. (3.1)
Solving the first-order conditions yields ˜eTC2 =
√
10v, where superscript TC stands
for ‘time consistency’ and the tilde indicates the situation without incentives. A TC
then realizes an intertemporal (reservation) utility level of UTC = V ( ˜eTC2 )−C( ˜eTC2 ) =
.5v(ln(10v)− 1). This is also a TC’s welfare, defining an agent’s welfare as follows.
Definition 3.3 The welfare of an agent is the sum of her instantaneous utility levels




With TCs there is no difference between long-run and short-run perspective. The
difference will however be important with time-inconsistent agents.
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Consider now a principal who offers a linear incentive contract w(e1) = αe1 + γ in
period t = 0. To determine the parameters of the contract the principal maximizes
max
α,γ
B(e1(α))− αe1(α)− γ (3.2)
subject to the participation constraint (PC)
αeTC1 (α) + γ + V (e
TC
2 (α))− C(eTC1 (α), eTC2 (α)) ≥ UTC , (3.3)
where eTCi (α) with i ∈ {1, 2} are the effort levels that a TC chooses given incentive
intensity α. In optimum (3.3) must hold with equality. Substitution of the PC yields
max
α
B(eTC1 (α)) + V (e
TC
2 (α))− C(eTC1 (α), eTC2 (α))− UTC . (3.4)
The principal thus maximizes the intertemporal social welfare by choice of incentive
intensity α, where social welfare is defined as follows.
Definition 3.4 Social welfare is the sum the agent’s welfare and the principal’s profit.
Recall that we assumed B(e1), V (e2), and C(e1, e2) to be measured in monetary terms.
As the incentivized activity can be measured without error, the linear incentive scheme
allows the principal to implement any level of e1 at first-best costs.




αe1 + γ + v ln(e2)− .05(e1 + e2)2. (3.5)
Solving the first-order conditions we get
eTC1 (α) = 10α−
v
α





















the first-best levels of e1 and e2 that maximize social welfare.
3.2.5 Incentives for Sophisticated Agents
The optimal incentive contract for sophisticated agents (sophisticates) is derived anal-
ogously. Absent incentives a sophisticate chooses e2 in t = 1 to maximize
max
e2
β V (e2)− C(e2) = βv ln(e2)− .05(e2)2, (3.9)
which differs from (3.1) in the time-inconsistency parameter β only. Her optimal choice
of e2 is given by
˜ePB2 =
√
10βv, where superscript PB indicates ‘present bias’. Ab-
sent incentives a sophisticate thus realizes a welfare level UPB = V ( ˜tPB2 ) − C( ˜tPB2 ) =
.5v(ln(10βv)−β). Notice that from a long-run perspective the discount factor between
periods one and two is given by 1 and not by β. The difference of UTC and UPB is
thus an agent’s welfare loss in monetary terms due to time-inconsistent preferences.
Subtracting UPB from UTC we get .5v(β−1− ln(β)), which is positive whenever β < 1,
and increasing with β decreasing.
The principal’s objective function (3.2) is now subject to a sophisticate’s PC
αePB1 (α) + γ + V (e
PB
2 (α))− C(ePB1 (α), ePB2 (α)) ≥ UPB. (3.10)
Notice that the agent’s benefit from e2, V , is not discounted by β. A sophisticate
decides in period t = 0 whether or not to accept the incentive contract. Both sides
of (3.10) are thus discounted by β which therefore cancels. In optimum the PC must
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hold with equality. Substituting (3.10) into (3.2) yields
max
α
B(ePB1 (α)) + V (e
PB
2 (α))− C(ePB1 (α), ePB2 (α))− UPB. (3.11)
When choosing incentive intensity α the principal now has to take into account that
the agent will give in to her present-biased preference when she decides on effort levels
in period t = 1. If the contract is accepted a sophisticate maximizes
max
e1,e2
αe1 + γ + βv ln(e2)− .05(e1 + e2)2. (3.12)
Solving the first-order conditions gives effort choices
ePB1 (α) = 10α−
βv
α




which differ from (3.6) only in the time-inconsistency parameter β. Maximizing now
















Again, for β = 1 both effort and incentive levels of TCs and sophisticates coincide.
By comparison of (3.7) and (3.14) it can be seen that αTC > αS whenever β < 1.







is, given Assumption 3.1, TCs receive stronger incentives to work for the principal but
work less hard than sophisticates. TCs choose a higher effort level in their private
activities. This higher effort level increases effort costs such that it becomes relatively
more expensive for the principal to compensate for the incentivized activity. Figures
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Figure 3.2: Alpha levels. The figure shows alpha levels as functions of β, given b = 2 and
v = 4. The top straight line depicts incentive intensity with TCs. The curve in the middle is
alpha for sophisticates, the lowest curve for naifs. For β = 1 incentive intensities coincide.
Sophisticates harm themselves due to time-inconsistent preferences. Their welfare
is maximized at effort levels (3.8) which differ from (3.15) whenever β < 1. However,
there is no additional loss caused by the introduction of explicit incentives for an
immediately rewarded task. The participation constraint ensures that a sophisticate
always receives her reservation welfare level of US.
3.2.6 Incentives for Naive Agents
We now turn to naive agents (naifs). Absent incentives there is no difference between
sophisticates and naifs. No action is taken in period t = 0, and it is only then that
beliefs about preferences in period t = 1 can differ. In the case with incentives it
appears - at first sight - unclear whether naifs or sophisticates will be better off. There
are two opposing effects. On the one hand, in period t = 0 naifs wrongly believe that
they will take a time-consistent, welfare maximizing decision in period t = 1. Hence,
to ensure a naif’s participation she must be given a perceived reservation utility of UTC
which exceeds her true reservation utility of UPB. On the other hand, a naif wrongly
predicts her effort choices in t = 1 given incentive intensity α. She expects to act like a
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Figure 3.3: Levels of e1. The figure depicts
levels of e1 as functions of β, given b = 2 and
v = 4. The straight line in the middle is
eTC1 , the highest, decreasing line is e
S
1 , and
the lowest, increasing line depicts eN1 . For
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Figure 3.4: Levels of e2. The figure depicts
levels of e2 as functions of β, given b = 2
and v = 4. The top, straight line is eTC2 ,
the line in the middle is eN2 , and the lowest,
steepest line depicts eS2 . For β = 1 levels of
e2 coincide.
act like a present-biased agent according to (3.13). Her perceived utility must not fall
short of UTC , but as she will make different effort choices her realized utility level will
fall short of UTC . In Section 3.3 we show that, given Assumption 3.1, it will always
even fall short of UPB. That is, the effect due to wrong beliefs about future selves
dominates and naifs are thus worse off than sophisticates. Since a sophisticate receives
her reservation utility level which is identical to a naif’s welfare without incentives, a
naif is harmed by the principal’s incentive contract.
In the following we derive the optimal incentive contract from a principal’s point
of view. The principal’s objective function (3.2) is now subject to a naif’s PC which is




B(ePB1 (α))− αePB1 (α)− UTC + αeTC1 (α) + V (eTC2 (α))− C(eTC1 (α), eTC2 (α)).(3.16)
Recall that the principal is assumed to know both an agent’s time preference and her
belief about future selves. The principal thus takes into account that the naif will give
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in to her time-inconsistent preferences in period t = 1 and choose effort levels according









































k + b− v(1− β), (3.19)
with k =
√
β2v2 + (2v2 + 6bv)β + (v − b)2. It is straightforward to show that αN





5 (k + b− v(1 + β))√






k + b− v(1− β) . (3.20)
Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 illustrate the relative size of incentive and resulting effort
levels for the three different types of agents.
3.3 Results
Since general functions only implicitly define the solutions to the maximization prob-
lems in Sections 3.2.4 to 3.2.6 we have assumed explicit functional forms. But even
these simple functional forms do not always allow for closed form solutions. If neces-
sary we will therefore stick to numerical examples to show the results of the paper. For
completeness we first establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 A time-consistent agent’s welfare is always higher than a sophisti-
cated or naive agent’s welfare.
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Proof: An agent’s welfare is defined as the sum of her instantaneous utility levels set-
ting β = 1. Without incentives only TCs maximize welfare. Both, a sophisticate’s and
a naif’s objective functions at time of effort choice differ from their welfare maximizing
objective functions. Their choices must thus be suboptimal. The optimal incentive
contracts offer both TCs and sophisticates their reservation utility levels. By the first
part of this proof the first exceeds the latter. A naif requests the reservation utility
level of a TC. She is thus offered a value for α such that she received UTC if she indeed
chose like a TC. But in period t = 1 she gives in to her present-bias and deviates from
her planned effort choice. Her realized utility level must thus lie below UTC . q.e.d.
The focus of the paper is the comparison of sophisticates and naifs. Naifs wrongly
predict their future behaviors: In period t = 0 naifs think that they will behave like
TCs in period t = 1. To accept the principal’s incentive contract in t = 0 they must
be given an perceived utility level that matches the reservation utility level of a TC.
This ‘commitment effect’ works in favor of a naif. However, once in period t = 1 a naif
deviates from her perceived effort choices and gives in to her present-bias. A naif is
thus harmed by this second effect. In contrast, a sophisticate anticipates that she will
act according to her present-biased preferences in t = 1 and thus requires an perceived
utility level that matches the reservation utility of an time-inconsistent agent only.
However, even though naifs receive a higher perceived utility level, they realize a lower
actual utility level. We show that, given Assumption 3.1, this second effect always
dominates. Naifs thus realize a lower welfare than sophisticates, and this welfare is
even lower than the welfare level naifs realize without incentives. This is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Given Assumption 3.1, in the presence of incentives a naive agent’s
welfare can be lower than a sophisticated agent’s welfare. A naive agent’s welfare can
thus be reduced by accepting the incentive contract.
Proof: The existence of a non-empty parameter space for which the result holds true
is shown by numerical example. Figure 3.5 plots welfare levels as functions of β, given
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Figure 3.5: Agents’ Welfare Levels with Incentives. The figure depicts welfare levels
as a functions of β, given v = 4. The top, straight line depicts a TC’s welfare. The curve
below depicts a sophisticate’s welfare, the lowest curve depicts a naif’s welfare. For β = 1
welfare levels coincide.
depicts a sophisticate’s welfare, the lowest curve depicts a naif’s welfare. For β = 1
welfare levels coincide. q.e.d.
From Proposition 3.1 we already know that sophisticates and naifs are always worse
off than TCs. We now show that, given Assumption 3.1, even though social welfare re-
alized with sophisticates and naifs is always below social welfare realized with TCs, the
principal’s profit can be higher if the agent is naive; it can be lower with sophisticates.
Proposition 3.3 Given Assumption 3.1, the principal’s profit from contracting with
naive agents can be higher than profit from contracting with TCs, even though social
welfare is always lower if agents have present-biased preferences. With sophisticates
the principal’s profit can be lower than with TCs.
Proof: The existence of a non-empty parameter space for which the result holds true
is shown by numerical example. Figure 3.6 plots levels of social welfare against β, given
b = 6 and v = 4. The top straight line is social welfare with TCs. The curve below
depicts social welfare with naifs, and the lowest curve with sophisticates. Figure 3.7
depicts profit levels. The straight line in the middle are profits in case of a TC. The
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Figure 3.6: Social Welfare Levels. The
figure depicts social welfare as function of β
for b = 6 and v = 4. The top, straight line
depicts social welfare with TCs, the curve in
the middle with naifs, the lowest with sophis-
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Figure 3.7: Profit Levels. The figure de-
picts profit levels as function of β, given b = 6
and v = 4. The straight line depicts prof-
its with TCs, the top, decreasing curve with
naifs, the lowest curve with sophisticates.
For β = 1 values coincide.
are the lowest, increasing line. q.e.d.
In the following we are interested in the change of social welfare when the principal
offers incentive contracts as compared to the situation without incentives. From Propo-
sition 3.2 we know that naifs are harmed by incentives. The principal, on the contrary,
gains when offering incentive contracts. From Proposition 3.3 we know that his profit
when contracting with naifs can increase, the more severe the time-inconsistency prob-
lem gets, i.e. the lower β. Furthermore, in the following we show that the agent’s loss
can exceed the principal’s gain. That is, social welfare may decrease if the principal
provides incentives relative to the situation without incentives. With TCs or sophis-
ticates this can never happen. Those agents always receive their reservation welfare
levels and the principal extracts the complete surplus from the additional, efficient
activity. This finding is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 Given Assumption 3.1, with naive agents social welfare may de-
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Figure 3.8: Welfare Comparison. The figure shows welfare levels as function of β, given
b = 2 and v = 4. The top straight line depicts social welfare with TCs. The curve that
coincides with social welfare with TCs at β = 1 is social welfare with naif agents. The curve
that lies below at β = 1 is the welfare of a time-inconsistent agent without incentives. Social
surplus with a naif decreases faster than a naif’s welfare without incentives and eventually
falls short of it as β decreases.
Proof: The existence of the effect is shown by numerical example. Figure 3.8 plots
levels of social welfare against β, given b = 2 and v = 4. The top straight line depicts
social welfare with TCs and is included as benchmark only. The curve that coincides
with social welfare with TCs at β = 1 is social welfare with time-inconsistent agents.
The curve that lies below at β = 1 is the welfare of a time-inconsistent agent without
incentives. Given the parameter, social surplus with a naif decreases faster than a
naif’s welfare without incentives and eventually falls short of a naif’s welfare without
incentives. Social welfare is then lower if the principal offers an incentive contract as
compared to the situation without incentives. With a sophisticate this cannot happen,
even though both a sophisticate’s welfare without incentives and social welfare with
incentives coincide with the respective curves for a naif. With naifs social welfare falls
short of a time-inconsistent agent’s welfare without incentives exactly at the value of
where the principal’s profit with sophisticates falls negative. For such low values of
γ the principal would thus not offer not offer an incentive contract to a sophisticate.
With naifs her rises as γ decreases. q.e.d.
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Proposition 3.4 shows that incentives can have detrimental effects. From a very dif-
ferent perspective, beginning with Titmuss (1970), there exists a literature discussing
negative effects of incentives. The main argument is ‘motivation crowding out’. Ac-
cording to this theory extrinsic rewards can be harmful because they may destroy in-
trinsic motivation. See Frey and Jegen (2001) for an overview of both ‘crowing theory’
and empirical evidence. For recent experimental evidence see Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000a, 2000b) and Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002). In the context of our model the cause of
the detrimental effect of incentives is very different. We show that naifs are harmed by
incentives because the presence of incentives increases the mistake they make due to
their present-biased preferences. By definition of naivete´, the agent does not anticipate
this behavior and thus does not get compensated for this mistake. Furthermore, we
have shown that the principal’s profit from providing incentives can be smaller than
the loss that accrues to a naive agent. In this case, social welfare is reduced by the
presence of incentives.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed self-control problems in a multi-tasking environment.
While the existing literature analyzed environments in which a present-biased agent
must decide when to accomplish a single task, in this model we look at situations in
which an agent must allocate effort between multiple tasks and decide how much effort
to exert. We furthermore assumed that effort devoted to different activities pays out
at different points in time.
More specifically, a principal offers a linear incentive contract for an immediately
rewarded task. Agents must allocate effort between this task and a private activity
that pays out only tomorrow. Such an activity could be, for example, caring for one’s
health or continuing to go to school. Effort costs accrue immediately. There are
three different types of agents. Time-consistent agents, sophisticated agents, and naive
agents. Throughout the paper we assumed away complications of adverse selection.
It was thus assumed that the principal knows the type of agent he is contracting
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with. We find that present-biased agents take decisions that do not maximize their
long-run welfare, irrespective of the intensity of incentives. Sophisticated agents are
never harmed by incentives relative to the case without incentives as they always
receive their reservation utility levels. However, naive agents can be worse off in the
presence of incentive contracts as compared to the case without incentives. On the one
hand, they wrongly expect a high reservation utility and participate only if they are
paid high enough wages. On the other hand, they wrongly predict tomorrow’s effort
choices which is exploited by the principal. Furthermore, even though agents with
time-inconsistent preferences are always harmed by their present bias, the principal’s
profit with naifs can increase as the present-bias becomes more severe. Finally we show
that social welfare can decrease in the presence of incentives even though the principal
offers an efficient additional production opportunity. With naive agents it can happen
that the additional welfare loss due to present-biased effort choices in the presence of
incentive contracts exceeds the principal’s gain from offering the incentive contract.
The model thus offers a new theoretical possibility of detrimental effects of incentives,
complementary to existing arguments like the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by
extrinsic rewards.
The results of the paper were shown assuming explicit utility functions. The exact
conditions under which the effects highlighted in this paper hold true remain to be
identified in future research activity. However, their existence could be established.
An possible extension of the model will be to drop the assumption that the prin-
cipal knows the type of agents the is contracting with and analyze possible screening
contracts. Another possible extension will be the analysis of a setting with immediate
private benefits and delayed wage payment. There are plenty natural situations imag-
inable where this constellation is of relevance. While continuing to work on one’s Ph.D.
thesis after 5 p.m. pays out only with delay, the private benefit of a relaxed evening
however accrues immediately.
Chapter 4
Inequity Aversion and Moral
Hazard with Multiple Agents∗
4.1 Introduction
We analyze how inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000)) interacts with incentive provision in an otherwise standard moral hazard model
with multiple agents.39 The theory of inequity aversion assumes that some but not all
agents suffer a utility loss if their own material payoffs differ from the payoffs of other
agents in their reference groups. The approach can explain a large variety of seemingly
diverging experimental findings that often conflict with the standard assumption of
pure selfishness.40 This paper goes a step further and applies the theory of inequity
aversion to the theory of incentives. If agents do not simply maximize their own
material payoffs but also care for other agents’ payoffs they will respond differently
to incentives than predicted under the assumption of pure selfishness. Incorporating
social preferences into the theory of incentives – thereby either exploiting them or
paying tribute to an additional constraint – may help to understand why real world
contracts often differ from those contracts found optimal by the standard theory.
∗The chapter is based on joint work with Ferdinand von Siemens from the University of Munich.
39See Grossman and Hart (1983) and Mookherjee (1984)
40For an overview of the literature see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and Camerer (2003).
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In a classic contribution to the theory of incentives Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991,
p. 24) state that “it remains a puzzle for this theory that employment contracts so often
specify fixed wages and more generally that incentives within firms appear to be so
muted, especially compared to those of the market.” The authors offer an explanation
for the paucity of incentives based on the assumption that agents conduct multiple
tasks, and that tasks are measured with varying degrees of precision.
We offer an alternative, behavioral explanation to account for the observation that
incentives offered to employees within firms are generally ‘low-powered’ compared to
‘high-powered’ incentives offered to independent contractors. We assume that within
firms social comparisons are pronounced whereas in the marketplace they are negligi-
ble.41 We further assume that an agent suffers a utility loss if another agent conducting
a similar task within the same firm receives a higher wage. We find that behindness
aversion (suffering only when being worse off) unambiguously increases agency costs
of providing incentives. As a consequence, behindness aversion may render equitable
flat wage contracts optimal – even though incentive contracts are optimal with selfish
agents. Hence, within firms where social comparisons are significant we find ‘low pow-
ered’ flat wage contracts to be optimal, whereas ‘high powered’ incentive contracts will
be given to ‘unrelated agents’ in the marketplace.
Furthermore, we argue that our analysis can contribute to the question of the
optimal size of a firm. Suppose the principal can set up different firms, but setting
up a firm involves fixed costs. The principal now faces a trade-off. On the one hand,
‘integration’ of several agents within a single firm causes social comparisons and, as
shown in this paper, increased agency costs of providing incentives. On the other hand,
‘separation’ of agents into different firms involves additional fixed costs. The solution
to this trade-off defines, in the context of this model, the optimal degree of integration.
More specifically, in this paper we derive optimal moral hazard contracts assum-
ing risk- and inequity averse agents that constitute each other’s reference group. The
agents however do not compare themselves to the principal. Agents carry out iden-
tical tasks and regard it as unfair if their wage payments differ. We further assume
41See, for example, Bewley (1999) for supporting evidence.
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that the principal is both risk neutral and selfish. To keep the analysis tractable we
consider the most simple set-up with two agents, two effort levels and two possible
output realizations; to receive closed form solutions we assume an explicit utility func-
tion and a linear inequity term as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the appendix we
however show that our results hold true (1) for any concave utility function and (2)
irrespective of the functional form of disutility from inequity. Effort is taken to be
non-contractible such that incentive compatible wages must condition on stochastic
output realizations. Hence, agents suffer if output realizations and thus wages differ.
We show that behindness aversion among agents unambiguously increases agency costs
of providing incentives. This also holds true if agents, in addition, suffer from being
better off unless they account for effort costs in their comparisons.
The intuition behind this finding can be seen as follows. Inequity aversion effects
an utility loss if output realizations diverge. The resulting, reduced utility levels could
be implemented without inequity aversion as well, simply by lowering the wages. Since
these lower utility levels were not optimal without inequity aversion, they cannot be
optimal now.
Increased agency costs can undermine efficiency in two ways. First, equitable flat
wage contracts may become optimal even though incentive contracts are optimal with
selfish agents. Second, to avoid social comparisons the principal may employ one agent
only, thereby forgoing the efficient effort provision of the other agent. This second effect
of inequity aversion is qualitatively different from the impact of risk aversion on optimal
contracts. The principal can respond to high degrees of risk aversion only by waiving
incentives and offering flat wages, whereas with inequity aversion – or more generally
with social preferences – he has an additional instrument at hand if he can control an
agent’s reference group. It is possible to eliminate inequity and still provide incentives
to at least one agent. We call this the ‘reference group effect’. Third, endowing the
principal with the option to set up a second firm at a fixed cost allows to analyze
whether ‘integration’ or ‘separation’ is optimal.
Further results are derived. Since optimal wages condition on the output realization
of the respective other agent as well, the sufficient statistics result due to Holmstro¨m
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(1979) does not apply. We find that inequity aversion renders team contracts optimal
even if output is uncorrelated. Analyzing the interaction between risk and inequity
aversion, we find that the additional agency costs due to inequity aversion are higher,
the higher the degree of risk aversion. With risk neutral agents inequity aversion does
not impact equilibrium agency costs as long as no limited liability constraint binds.
Finally, labor contacts often encompass a clause prohibiting employees to communi-
cate their salary. At first sight, inequity aversion could serve as an explanation for
this observation. We however show that secrecy of salaries only further increases the
additional agency costs due to inequity aversion.
Related Literature
Itoh (2003) and Demougin and Fluet (2003) are most related to our paper. Itoh (2003)
analyzes how inequity aversion among risk neutral agents changes optimal incentive
contracts, assuming limited liability to be the source of moral hazard. In contrast
to our results, Itoh finds that inequity aversion can never harm the principal. With
risk neutrality the principal can always choose a fully equitable contract out of the set
of contracts that are optimal without inequity aversion. Moreover, inequity aversion
can even increase the principal’s profit. With limited liability the principal may be
forced to pay the agents rents to provide incentives because there is a lower bound
on agents’ wage payments. However, inequity aversion enables the principal to punish
an agent harsher than paying the lowest possible wage level, simply by paying other
agents more, thereby reducing agents’ rents. Demougin and Fluet (2003) also analyze
a two agents moral hazard problem assuming risk neutrality and limited liability. They
compare group and individual bonus schemes for behindness-averse agents and derive
conditions under which either scheme implements a given effort level at least costs.
Inequity aversion between multiple agents is also analyzed by Rey Biel (2003) and
Neilson and Stowe (2003). Rey Biel (2003) analyzes a setting with two inequity averse
agents and a principal in which agents’ effort choices deterministically translate into
output. He exogenously assumes the participation constraint to be slack and finds
that the principal can always exploit inequity aversion to extract more rents from his
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agents. Neilson and Stowe (2003) restrict their analysis to linear piece-rate contracts
and identify the conditions under which other-regarding preferences lead workers to
exert more or less effort than selfish agents, and whether the optimal piece rate is
higher or lower for inequity averse agents.
Englmaier and Wambach (2003) and Dur and Glaser (2004) consider comparisons
between agents and principal. Englmaier and Wambach (2003) find that the sufficient
statistics result does not apply and that inequity aversion causes a strong tendency
towards linear sharing rules. Dur and Glaser (2004) show that inequity aversion can
be a reason for high incentives, even for profit sharing, as this reduces inequity.
In Bartling and von Siemens (2004) we analyze how incentive provision in team
production is affected if agents are inequity averse. In contrast to the classic result by
Holmstro¨m (1982) we find that efficient effort choices can be implemented by simple
budget-balancing sharing rules if agents are sufficiently inequity averse. Conditions for
efficiency become less restrictive the smaller the team. This fits common observation
that small teams often work well whereas larger ones suffer from free-riding.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the basic
model. In Section 4.3 we derive the optimal incentive contracts for inequity averse
agents. Section 4.4 presents our main results. Section 4.5 explores the implications of
our results for the optimal firm size. Section 4.6 analyzes the case with secret salaries.
In Section 4.7 we discuss comparison of rents, disutility from being better off, and
status preferences. Section 4.8 concludes. In the Appendix we discuss the generality
of our results.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Projects, Effort, and Probabilities
Suppose a principal can employ two risk averse agents. If employed, each agent manages
a project with stochastic output x ∈ {xl, xh}, where xh > xl and ∆x := xh − xl. Each
agent faces a binary effort choice. He either exerts effort, e = 1, or he shirks, e = 0.
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Effort costs are denoted by ψ(1) = ψ > 0 while shirking is assumed to be costless,
ψ(0) = 0. If an agent exerts effort, the output of his project is xh with probability pi
and xl with probability 1 − pi, where pi ∈]0, 1[. If an agent shirks, the output of his
project is always xl. Effort is assumed not to be contractible. The agents’ projects are
independent, their production outcomes are uncorrelated.
4.2.2 Preferences: Risk- and Inequity Aversion
We depart from the standard literature by assuming that agents are inequity averse in
the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).42 We assume that an agent’s utility is additively
separable in the following three components. First, each agent enjoys utility u(w) from
his wage payment w by the principal. To derive explicit results we assume this utility
function to take on the specific form43
u(w) = (−1 +√1 + 2rw)/r. (4.1)
This function is strictly increasing and convex for all w > −1/2r. Thus, the agent
is risk averse with respect to his income. The corresponding inverse function h(x) :=
u−1(x) = x+ rx2/2 is well defined for all x > −1/r. For small w, r can be considered
as the agent’s approximated degree of absolute risk aversion. This approximation is
correct at a zero wage: −u′′(w)/u′(w)|w=0 = r. Second, an agent incurs effort costs ψ
if he works; shirking is costless. Finally, an agent suffers from inequity. We assume
an agent’s reference group to be confined to the other agent, thus the agents do not
compare themselves to the principal. Agents carry out an identical task and regard
it as unfair if wage payments differ. Since the principal conducts a different ‘task’ his
payoff is not taken to be a point of reference. The identification of an agent’s relevant
reference group will, however, ultimately be an empirical question.
In the body of the paper we restrict attention to ‘behindness aversion’. Whenever
42See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for a related formulation of inequity aversion.
43In the appendix we show that our results neither hinge upon this explicit utility function nor
on the assumed linear formulation of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The chosen
functional forms however allow to derive closed from solutions.
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an agent receives a lower payoff than the other agent he suffers a utility loss, but agents
do not suffer if they are better off than the other agent. More formally, suppose agent
i ∈ {1, 2} receives wage wi, whereas agent j 6= i receives wage wj. Agent i′s utility
function can then be written as
vi(wi, wj) = u(wi)− ψ(e)− α ·max[u(wj)− u(wi), 0]. (4.2)
The parameter α ≥ 0 is a measure of behindness aversion. The higher α the more
an agent suffers from inequity. Notice that the above formulation does not imply
that agents compare utilities interpersonally, but rather that agent i suffers from the
inequity between the utility he obtains from wage wi and the utility he would enjoy
when receiving the higher wage wj himself. Both agents maximize expected utility.
Despite the evident experimental evidence on inequity aversion it is still an open
question what exactly people compare; whether they focus, for example, on wage pay-
ments or utility from wage payments, and whether they account for differences in
effort costs or not.44 In this paper, we assume that agents compare utility levels as
this renders the principal’s maximization problem well behaved.45 To avoid tedious
case distinctions we neglect the possibility that agents account for effort costs in their
comparisons. In Section 4.7.1 we however show that accounting for effort costs in the
inequity term does not conflict with but rather reinforces the qualitative results of this
paper. In Section 4.7.2 we show that introducing suffering from being better off, again,
only reinforces our qualitative results unless agents account for effort costs in their
comparisons.
The principal is both risk-neutral and unaffected by inequity concerns. He maxi-
mizes expected output minus expected wage payments.
44For a more detailed discussion of inequity aversion see Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 2003).
45Otherwise constraints are not linear, the maximization problem not concave, and the solution
not straightforwardly characterized by first-order conditions.
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4.3 Contracts
We focus on symmetric contracting such that the principal offers identical contracts
when employing both agents. The principal has three options. He can either employ
both agents and implement effort or shirking, or he can decide to employ one agent
only to avoid social comparisons.46 In the following section we derive optimal contracts
implementing these effort choices.
4.3.1 Benchmark: The Single Agent Case
The principal can avoid social comparisons by employing one agent only. Recall that
we have confined an agent’s reference group to the respective other agent working
with the same principal. With a single agent inequity aversion is thus irrelevant. The
optimal contract for the employed agent (incentive or flat wage contract) then depends
on the standard parameters of the model via the participation and incentive constraint.
Suppose first the principal wants to implement high effort. Since effort is not verifiable
wages must condition on stochastic output realizations and the classic risk-incentive
trade-off arises. Define wi as the agent’s wage if his output is i ∈ {h, l}, and define
ui := u(wi). To render the principal’s maximization problem concave, we rewrite the
principal’s objective function and the constraints in terms of uh and ul. An agents




and u∗l = 0 (4.3)
as the optimal contract, and profit can be written as







46In principle, he could also offer a ‘hybrid contract’: an incentive contract to one agent and a
‘non-incentive contract’ to the other agent. Note that due to inequity aversion such a ‘non-incentive
contract’ would not be a flat wage contract. It can be shown that considering the ‘hybrid contract’
would not change the qualitative results of this paper.
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as the ‘risk-agency-costs’ that have to be payed on top of the first-best cost of effort
implementation h(ψ) due to risk aversion.
Suppose now the principal offers a flat wage contract. The agent then never exerts
effort and the participation constraint is satisfied at flat wage wf = 0. The principal’s
profit in this case is P f1 = xl. The difference in expected profit from implementing
effort as compared to paying a flat wage is given by
B := pi∆x− h(ψ)−RAC.
Thus, it is optimal for the principal to implement high effort if and only if
B ≥ 0 ⇔ pi∆x ≥ h(ψ) +RAC. (4.5)
The principal offers an incentive contract whenever the expected output increase is
sufficiently large relative to the first best cost of implementing effort and the RAC.
The condition is more likely to be met if effort cost and risk aversion are small and
the information content of the project outcomes is high. Exerting effort is efficient if
pi∆x ≥ h(ψ) but risk aversion leads to a trade-off between insurance and efficiency and
causes additional RAC. This leads to inefficient effort choices if h(ψ)+RAC ≥ pi∆x ≥
h(ψ). If pi∆x ≥ h(ψ) +RAC the efficient effort level is implemented but risk aversion
reduces the principal’s expected profit.
In the next section we show that inequity aversion amplifies these effects. Inequity
aversion causes additional agency costs which unambiguously rise as the level of in-
equity aversion rises. This further reduces the principal’s expected profit, and it can
lead to additional inefficiencies. Throughout the paper we therefore assume incentive
condition (4.5) to be fulfilled. B < 0 is the uninteresting case since flat wage contracts
would then always be optimal – even without inequity aversion.
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4.3.2 The Two Agents Case
In this section we consider the two agents case. Both agents work within the same firm
and we thus assume that they compare their wage levels. An agent suffers a utility
loss in case he is behind. In contrast, we assume that an agent would not compare his
wage to the wage of an agent with whom he only interacts in the market, i.e. an agent
that works for another principal.
With incentive contracts inequity arises naturally as output is stochastic and in-
centive compatible wages must condition on output realizations. At first glance the
effect of inequity aversion on agency costs is ambiguous. Behindness aversion increases
incentives because exerting effort reduces the probability of being behind. At the same
time agents anticipate that even if they exert high effort with positive probability they
will be behind. Ex ante agents have to be compensated for this expected utility loss
to ensure participation.
We show that the positive effect on incentives is always dominated by the negative
effect on participation and, therefore, behindness aversion unambiguously increases the
agency costs of providing incentives. The intuition can be seen as follows. Without
inequity aversion the second-best optimal incentive contract assigns wage levels to each
possible output realization such that both IC and PC are fulfilled and binding. For
some output realizations (i.e. agent one is successful, agent two is not) the contract
assigns diverging wage levels to the agents (agent one receives a higher wage than
agent two, assuming the monotone likelihood ration to hold). If now inequity aversion
is considered, the utility of agents receiving less than others (agent two) is reduced
by the amount of suffering from being behind. However, this lower utility level could
have been achieved without inequity aversion as well – simply by lowering the respective
wage level, which reduces the principal’s cost. As this was not optimal without inequity
aversion it cannot be optimal now.
In the appendix we show that this intuition holds generally. Assuming only con-
cavity of the utility function we show that inequity aversion renders it weakly more
expensive to implement each possible effort level. However, our arguing does not hold
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when there is limited liability. With limited liability the lowest possible wage pay-
ment and thus the lowest possible utility level for an agent is bounded from below. To
provide incentives the principle may thus be forced to leave the agents rents. In this
case inequity aversion provides the principal with the possibility to reduce the lowest
possible utility level. An agent can now not only be punished by paying out the lowest
wage level but in addition by paying other agents a higher wage. The lowest possible
utility level for an agent can thus be reduced without violating the limited liability
constraint. This in turn enables the principal to reduce the agents’ rents.
Suppose first the principal does not want to implement effort. He then offers two
flat wage contracts. Since there is never inequity, inequity aversion is irrelevant and
the principal’s profit is simply
P f2 = 2 · P f1 = 2 xl. (4.6)
Suppose now the principal wants to implement effort. We show that the principal’s
expected profit is not just twice the expected profit in the single agent case but P i2 ≤
2P i1. As both agents are symmetric, we assume that optimal wages are symmetric
in the sense that they condition on the output realizations of both projects but not
on the identity of the agent. Denote by wij the wage of an agent with output i if
the other agent’s output is j. Define uij := u(wij) as an agent’s utility from wage
wij. As there are four possible states of the world, a contract determines four wage
levels: wll, whh, wlh, and whl, where h stands for high and l for low output. To render
the principal’s maximization problem concave with linear constraints, we rewrite the
principal’s objective function and the constraints in terms of uhh, uhl, ulh, and ull.
Recall that the maximum functions in the agents’ utility functions in (4.2) create
potential kinks. At these points, the utility functions and thus the PC and IC are not
differentiable, potentially rendering it impossible to characterize optimal contracts by
first-order conditions. However, the following lemma allows to avoid this problem.
Lemma 4.1 The optimal incentive compatible contract for two inequity averse agents
satisfies u∗hl ≥ u∗lh.
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Proof: Suppose this was not the case, that is uhl < ulh at the optimum. Then the IC
and PC are given by
(IC’) pi2uhh + pi(1− pi)[uhl − α(ulh − uhl)]− pi2ulh − pi(1− pi)ull − ψ ≥ 0
(PC’) pi2uhh + pi(1− pi)[uhl − α(ulh − uhl)] + pi(1− pi)ulh − (1− pi)2ull − ψ ≥ 0
Consider changes dulh < 0 and duhl = −dulh(1 − α)/(1 + α). This leaves (PC’)
unaffected but improves (IC’). The principal’s profit increases by








which is strictly larger than zero as (1 − α)/(1 + α) ≤ 1, dulh < 0, uhl < ulh, and
h′′(u) > 0. q.e.d.
Notice that dulh < 0 has a twofold effect on (PC’). On the one hand, this decreases
the agent’s utility if his own project fails whereas the other agent’s project is successful.
On the other hand, unfavorable inequity decreases if the agent himself is successful
whereas the other agent is unfortunate. In the latter case the agent’s utility increases.
If the inequity reducing effect dominates, α > 1, the principal may decrease both uhl
and ulh while keeping (PC’) unaffected and not impairing (IC’). In either case, the
principal can increase his expected profit without violating a constraint, and uhl < ulh
cannot be optimal.
By Lemma 4.1 we can introduce an additional constraint, uhl − ulh ≥ 0, without
restricting the attainable maximum. We call this constraint the Order Constraint
(OC). The maximum functions in the agents’ utility functions are thus removed and
the principal maximizes
P i2 = 2
[
xl + pi
2 [∆x− h(uhh)] + pi(1− pi)[∆x− h(ulh)− h(uhl)]− (1− pi)2h(ull)
]
(4.7)
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with respect to uhh, uhl, ulh, and ull, where
(IC) pi2uhh + pi(1− pi)uhl − pi2[ulh − α(uhl − ulh)]− pi(1− pi)ull − ψ ≥ 0
(PC) pi2uhh + pi(1− pi)uhl + pi(1− pi)[ulh − α(uhl − ulh)] + (1− pi)2ull − ψ ≥ 0
(OC) uhl − ulh ≥ 0.
are the constraints characterizing the principal’s choice set.47
We begin by assuming that the OC is not, whereas the IC and PC are binding.



















α(pi(1 + α(1 + pi))− rψ)
rk
(4.11)
where k = 1+αpi(2+α(1+pi)). The Lagrange multipliers for the PC and IC are given
by µ = 2(1 + rψ[1 + α(1 + pi) + 2piα2] + 2piα(1 + piα))/k and λ = 2(1 − pi)(rψ[1 +
piα + 2piα2] + piα(1 + 2piα))/pik. Since these are strictly positive, both the PC and
IC are indeed binding as initially assumed. We also have to check whether it holds
true that the OC is slack, i.e. whether we have u∗hl ≥ u∗lh. The difference is given by
(rψ + αpi(rpi − 1))/rpik. Thus, the OC is indeed slack and the solutions (4.8) - (4.11)
are valid if and only if either rψ ≥ 1 or rψ < 1 and α < α˜ where
α˜ := rψ/(pi(1− rψ)). (4.12)
47We do not consider dominant strategy implementation in this paper, i.e. we only look at contracts
such that the constraints are satisfied for one agent given that the other agent behaves as expected.
Even though both agents participating and exerting effort then forms a Nash equilibrium it is possibly
not unique.
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Finally, since h(u) is defined for u ≥ −1/r only, we have to verify that this always
holds. Algebraic manipulations show that u∗lh ≥ u∗ll. The solution is thus valid if
u∗ll ≥ −1/r, or ru∗ll ≥ −1. This condition holds with equality if r = r˜ = −(1+αpi)/(αψ).
Differentiating ru∗ll with respect to r yields αψ/k ≥ 0. Hence, ru∗ll rises in r. Since we
must have r > 0, r always exceeds r˜, and u∗ll never falls short of −1/r.
Suppose now that all the constraints PC, IC, and OC are binding. The binding OC
forces the principal to set ulh = uhl. This restriction on the contract design eliminates













− ψ = (1− pi)ψ
pi
(4.14)
u∗ll = −ψ. (4.15)
The Lagrange multipliers of the PC and IC are µ = 2rψ + 2 and λ = 4rψ(1 − pi)/pi.
Since both are strictly positive, the PC and IC are indeed binding as initially assumed.
As h(u) is defined for u ≥ −1/r only, the above solution is valid only if rψ < 1.
The overall optimal solution depends on whether the OC is binding or not, which
in turn depends on r,ψ and α. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Optimal Contracts For Inequity-Averse Agents)
i) Suppose rψ ≥ 1. The optimal incentive compatible contract for two inequity
averse agents is given by (4.8) - (4.11).
ii) Suppose rψ < 1. If α < α˜, the optimal incentive compatible contract for two
inequity averse agents is given by (4.8) - (4.11). If α ≥ α˜, it is given by (4.13) -
(4.15).
Proof: There are two cases. First, suppose rψ ≥ 1. Then solution (4.13) - (4.15) is
not valid as u∗ll < −1/r, whereas solution (4.8) - (4.11) is valid for all α as we always
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get (rψ + αpi(rpi − 1))/rpik > 0. Second, suppose rψ < 1. Then for all α < α˜ both
extreme points are candidates for the overall solution, but (4.8) - (4.11) dominates as
the maximum is not restricted by the OC. For all α ≥ α˜, only solution (4.13) - (4.15)
is valid. q.e.d.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Inequity Aversion Renders Team Contracts Optimal
Since we assume output to be uncorrelated an agent’s output realization does not
contain information about the other agent’s effort choice. According to the classic re-
sult by Holmstro¨m (1979) optimal wages should only condition on sufficient statistics
for effort choices. In our model wages should thus only condition on the own output
realization. Nonetheless, since agents compare the utility levels from their wages opti-
mal contracts also condition on the other agent’s output realization in order to reduce
inequity. Therefore, the sufficient statistics result does not apply.48 Define a team
contract as a compensation scheme such that an agent’s wage depends positively on
the other agent’s success. Thus, in a team contract we have whh > whl and wlh > wll.
As summarized in the following proposition inequity aversion renders team contracts
optimal.
Proposition 4.2 (Team Contracts)
The sufficient statistics result does not apply: Inequity aversion renders team contracts
optimal even if output is uncorrelated.
Proof: Comparison of the relevant utility levels in Proposition 4.1 yields u∗hh − u∗hl =
α(1 + α(pi + rψ))/rk ≥ 0 and u∗lh − u∗ll = α(1 + α(pi + rψ))/rk ≥ 0. q.e.d.
Since output is stochastic, agents obtain different output realizations with positive
probability even though both agents exert high effort. The unfortunate agent then
48In the context of interdependent preferences this result naturally arises. It was first shown in
Englmaier and Wambach (2003).
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suffers from obtaining a lower wage than the fortunate agent. The optimal contract
accounts for this effect and adjusts wage levels accordingly.
4.4.2 Inequity Aversion Causes Additional Agency Costs
In the benchmark case of a single agent inequity aversion is irrelevant and does not
influence the principal’s profit. This is also the case with flat wage contracts for two
agents as there is never inequity. However, with incentive contracts for two inequity
averse agents additional agency costs arise. Suppose rψ ≥ 1 or rψ < 1 but α < α˜
such that the optimal contract is characterized by (4.8) - (4.11). Substituting optimal
utility levels, the principal’s maximum profit is then given by
P i2 = 2P
i
1 − IAC, (4.16)
where
IAC :=
α(1− pi)(2rψ + piα(rψ − 1) + αr2ψ2)
rk
. (4.17)
denotes the ‘inequity agency costs’, the additional agency cost due to inequity aversion.
Inequity aversion has a negative effect on the principal’s maximum profit as the above
solution is only valid if either rψ ≥ 1 or α ≤ α˜ holds, and this ensures that IAC are
positive. Equivalently, suppose rψ < 1 and α < α˜ such that the optimal contract
is characterized by (4.13) - (4.15). Substituting optimal utility levels, the principal’s
maximum profit is then given by
P i2 = 2P
i






denotes the ‘inequity agency costs’ in this case. Again, the principal’s profit with two
hard working agents is strictly less than twice the profit with only one hard working
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agent as the IAC are always positive. Note that in the latter case the IAC do not depend
on α as the above solution is subject to the OC binding and inequity is completely
eliminated. However, inequity aversion reduces the principal’s profit as it forces him
to set u∗hl = u
∗
lh via the binding OC. We can now derive the following result.
Proposition 4.3 (Additional Agency Costs)
Inequity aversion among agents causes additional agency costs of implementing effort.
These agency costs weakly increase and converge as the level of inequity aversion rises.
Proof: Suppose rψ ≥ 1. The IAC are then given by (4.17) and rψ ≥ 1 ensures




2(1− pi)(1 + α(rψ + pi))(rψ(1 + αpi)− αpi)
rk2
, (4.20)







rψ(2pi + rψ)− 1
]
, (4.21)
where rψ ≥ 1 again ensures the expression to be positive. Suppose now rψ < 1. In
case α ≤ α˜ the above arguments on sign of IAC and their derivative w.r.t. α apply. In
case α > α˜ the IAC are given by (4.19) which is positive as we have r > 0, ψ > 0, and
pi ∈]0, 1[, does not change in α, and is thus equal to the limit as α→∞. q.e.d.
Proposition 4.3 proves that the negative effect of inequity aversion on the PC always
dominates the positive effect on the IC. The negative effect of inequity is however
bounded because the principal can always equate whl and wlh if α becomes too large.
The optimal contract then remains unchanged as α further increases. The intuition for
the dominance of the effect on the PC can best be seen when approaching the problem
from a different angle. Inequity aversion effects a utility loss in certain states of the
world. If the resulting reduced utility level were second-best optimal, then they could
be realized without inequity aversion as well – simply by lowering wage payments.
As lower utility levels are not second-best optimal without inequity aversion, they
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cannot be optimal now. In the appendix we show that this intuition straightforwardly
generalizes to less restrictive settings.
As an alternative intuition for the result consider the following. Suppose the OC
is binding. To eliminate suffering from inequity aversion utility levels in case of di-
verging output realizations are equated. This clearly impairs incentives to exert effort.
Hence, in cases with identical output realizations wage payments must become more
extreme. Agents then have to bear more risk for which they must be compensated. The
same reasoning holds true if the OC is not binding. In addition to the increased risk,
agents then also have to be compensated for the inequity they bear despite the wage
compression in case output realizations diverge. This leads to the next proposition.
Proposition 4.4 (Complementarity)
The more risk averse the agents, the higher the additional agency costs due to inequity
aversion.
Proof: In case the OC does not bind the IAC are given by (4.17). Differentiating




(1− pi)α2(pi + r2ψ2)
rk2
(4.22)
which is unambiguously positive. In case the OC binds and the IAC are given by (4.19)
the respective partial derivative is clearly positive. q.e.d.
Since contracts that account for inequity aversion lead to more risk bearing, the
higher the degree of risk aversion, the higher the additional agency costs caused by
inequity aversion. Risk aversion and inequity aversion thus have complementary effects.
Consider the extreme case of risk neutral agents, i.e. u(w) = w. The principal’s ex-
pected incentive compatible wage payment per agent is then ψ+pi(1−pi)(α+β)(whl−
wlh), the sum of the first-best costs of implementing effort and compensation for in-
equity bearing. Notice that in the context of this model a limited liability constraint
will never bind as we have normalized the success probability when shirking to zero.
There is thus no rent that has to be given to the agent, i.e. the PC is binding. Since
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inequity aversion has an unambiguously negative effect on the PC, any amount of in-
equity decreases the principal’s expected profit. A possible positive effect of inequity
aversion on incentive provision cannot be realized since incentives can be provided at
first-best costs already. With risk neutral agents (and no limited liability constraint
binding) a large set of optimal contracts can implement efficient effort choices at first-
best costs. With inequity aversion only a subset of these optimal contracts remains
optimal, namely those contracts with whl = wlh. The remaining subset of optimal
contracts is however non-empty. For example, the contract with whh = ψ/pi
2 and
whl = wlh = wll = 0 is always possible. It provides incentives at first-best costs and
eliminates all inequity. We summarize our findings in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 (Risk Neutrality)
With risk-neutral agents and no limited liability constraint binding, inequity aversion
reduces the set of optimal contracts but does not impact the equilibrium outcome.
Itoh (2003) also analyzes a moral hazard setting with risk-neutral agents but assumes
limited liability constraints to bind. In this case agents receive a rent. Inequity aversion
provides the principal with the possibility to reduce an agent’s utility below the level
that arises from paying the lowest possible wage level, simply by paying other agents
more. Inequity aversion can thus reduce the principal’s rent payments in case of effort
implementation, and inequity aversion can then have an impact on the equilibrium
outcome.
4.4.3 Inequity Aversion and Efficiency
In this section we derive the conditions under which inequity aversion causes an effi-
ciency loss similar to the efficiency loss that arises if risk aversion renders flat wage
contracts optimal. There are however two qualitative differences between risk agency
costs, RAC, and inequity agency costs, IAC. First, the RAC are unbounded. There-
fore, an efficiency loss due to underprovision of effort always occurs if only risk aversion
is sufficiently large. In contrast, the IAC are bounded. It can be that no inefficiency
arises even if the degree of inequity aversion goes to infinity. The reason is that the
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principal can always equate wage levels in case of diverging output realizations, thereby
eliminating inequity while still providing incentives. It is however not possible to pro-
vide incentives and eliminate agents’ risk. Second, if the RAC are large the principal
can only offer flat wage contracts to avoid the agents’ risk exposure. In contrast, there
are two means by which inequity can be avoided. As with risk aversion, the principal
can either offer flat wage contracts – thereby forgoing profits from effort implementa-
tion. We call this case ‘underprovision of effort’. Or he can employ a single agent only.
Then there is no reference group and thus no social comparisons and no suffering from
inequity. The principal will then provide incentives to a single agent – thereby forgoing
the profit from employing the second agent. We call this the ‘reference group effect’.
In the following we identify the conditions under which either case arises.
Underprovision of Effort
Two conditions have to be met such that inequity aversion renders flat wage contracts
more profitable than incentive contracts. First, the expected profit from two flat wage
contracts must exceed expected profits from a single incentive contract. This condition
ensures that offering two flat wage contracts is the best alternative to offering two
incentive contracts. Second, for sufficiently high levels of α the IAC must exceed the
difference in expected profits from two incentive contracts (without inequity aversion)
and two flat wage contracts. With flat wage contracts wages never diverge and inequity
aversion is irrelevant. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6 (Underprovision of Effort)
If and only if xl ≥ B and 2B < limα→∞ IAC, there exists a threshold level of inequity
aversion αˆ such that for all α ≥ αˆ flat wage contracts maximize the principal’s expected
profit, even though incentive contracts are profit maximizing with selfish or unrelated
agents.
Proof: The first condition ensures that expected profit from two flat wage contracts
exceed expected profits from a single incentive contract. Formally, P f2 = 2xl ≥ xl+B =
P i1 ⇔ xl ≥ B. Consider now the second condition. P i2 denotes the principal’s expected
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profit when offering two incentive contracts. If α = 0 we have P i2(α = 0) = 2P
i
1.
By assumption, 2P i1 − P f2 = 2B > 0. Without inequity aversion the principal thus
employs both agents and implements high effort. By Proposition 4.3, P i2 decreases in
α and converges to
lim
α→∞





We thus have P f2 > limα→∞ P
i




From (4.17) and (4.19) we know that limα→∞ IAC > 0. The parameter space for
which (4.24) holds is thus non-empty. If 2B, the gain of providing incentives to two
agents, falls short of limα→∞ IAC, the limit of the inequity agency costs of providing
incentives, there exists a unique threshold level of inequity aversion αˆ such that for
α < αˆ two incentive contracts, and for α ≥ αˆ two flat wage contracts maximize the
principal’s expected profit. Existence and uniqueness of threshold αˆ is ensured since
P i2 is continuous and strictly decreasing in α. q.e.d.
The left panel of Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of Proposition 4.6. Without
inequity aversion, α = 0, expected profits from two incentive contracts exceed expected
profits from both two flat wage contracts and a single incentive contract. Condition
xl ≥ B ensures that the principal’s best alternative to offering two incentive contracts
is offering two flat wage contracts. As α increases, the IAC increase and reduce the
principal’s expected profit from two incentive contracts. At αˆ the IAC equal the
difference in expected profits between two incentive and two flat wage contracts, 2B.
Therefore, for levels of inequity aversion exceeding αˆ, two flat wage contracts maximize
the principal’s expected profit.
Proposition 4.6 is the central finding our this paper: inequity aversion can render flat
wage contracts optimal even though incentive contracts are optimal with selfish agents.
We interpret this as an explanation for the observed ‘low powered’ incentives within















































Figure 4.1: Underprovision of Effort and the Reference Group Effect.
Left Panel: Expected profit levels for B < xl. In this case expected profits from two flat
wage contracts exceed profits from one incentive contract. If the additional agency costs due
to inequity aversion, IAC, exceed the difference in expected profits between flat wage and
incentive contracts, 2B, as α increases, then there exists a threshold level αˆ such that two
flat wage contracts maximize the principal’s expected profit for α ≥ αˆ.
Right Panel: Expected profit levels for xl < B. In this case expected profits from one
incentive contract exceed profits from two flat wage contracts. If the additional agency costs
due to inequity aversion, IAC, exceed the expected profit from an additional incentive contract
absent inequity aversion, B + xl, as α increases, then there exists a threshold level α¯ such
that a single incentive contract maximizes the principal’s expected profit for α ≥ α¯.
firms – as compared to ‘high powered’ incentives in the market. This interpretation
hinges upon the assumption that agents compare their wage payments within firms but
not within the market. Although the determinants of an agents reference group will
ultimately be an empirical question, co-workers within a firm are a natural candidate
for a reference group. However, crucial to our analysis is that there are two agents who
compare their wages and dislike inequity. Our results – though not our interpretation
– would hold if we assumed two principals, each of them offering an incentive contract
to a single agent, and these two agents comparing wages.
The Reference Group Effect
Suppose now that the principal can influence an agent’s reference group. Two con-
ditions have to be met such that inequity aversion renders it more profitable for the
principal to offer an incentive contract to a single agent than offering incentive con-
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tracts to two agents. When two inequity averse agents work for the principal they
compare their wage levels and suffer from inequity. In contrast, with a single agent no
comparisons take place, and thus no IAC arise. In Section 4.5 we further explore this
‘reference group’ or ‘firm size effect’ in a slightly enriched setting; for completeness we
now derive the conditions that have to be met in this basic set-up. First, the expected
profit from a single incentive contract must exceed expected profits from two flat wage
contracts. This condition ensures that offering a single incentive contract is the best
alternative to offering two incentive contracts. In contrast to the previous section,
here it must hold that xl < B. Second, for sufficiently high levels of α the IAC must
exceed the difference in expected profits from offering two incentive contracts (without
inequity aversion) and expected profits from offering a single incentive contract. With
a single incentive contract inequity aversion is irrelevant as there is no reference group.
This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.7 (Reference Group Effect)
If and only if xl < B and B + xl < limα→∞ IAC, there exists a threshold level of
inequity aversion α¯ such that for α > α¯ the principal employs a single agents only to
avoid social comparisons, even though employing both agents maximizes the principal’s
expected profit without inequity aversion.
Proof: As before, P i2(α = 0) = 2P
i
1 such that without inequity aversion it maximizes
the principal’s expected profit to employ both agents and implement high effort. How-











1 if and only if
B + xl < lim
α→∞
IAC. (4.25)
From (4.17) and (4.19) we know that limα→∞ IAC > 0, so the parameter space for
which (4.25) holds true is non-empty. Whenever the base output, xl, and the benefit
from giving incentives, B, are sufficiently small, there exists a unique level of inequity
aversion α¯ such that for α < α¯ two incentive contracts, whereas for α ≥ α¯ a single
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incentive contract maximizes the principal’s expected profit. Existence and uniqueness
of threshold α¯ is ensured since P i2 is continuous and strictly decreasing in α. q.e.d.
The right panel of Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of Proposition 4.7. Without
inequity aversion, α = 0, expected profits from two incentive contracts exceed expected
profits from both two flat wage contracts and a single incentive contract. Condition
xl < B ensures that the principal’s best alternative to offering two incentive contracts
is offering a single incentive contract. As α increases, the IAC increase and reduce
the principal’s expected profit from two incentive contracts – but not the expected
profit from a single incentive contract as in this case no social comparisons take place.
At α¯ the IAC equal the expected profit from an additional incentive contract without
inequity aversion, xl+B. Therefore, for levels of inequity aversion exceeding α¯, a single
incentive contract maximizes the principal’s expected profit.
In case neither xl ≥ B and 2B < limα→∞ IAC, the conditions stated in Proposition
4.6, nor xl < B and B + xl < limα→∞ IAC, the conditions stated in Proposition 4.7,
there is no inefficiency caused by the additional agency cost due to inequity aversion
– even if the degree of inequity aversion goes to infinity. The principal is nevertheless
harmed by inequity aversion since his expected profit is reduced by the amount of the
IAC. In contrast, the RAC will always lead to an inefficiency if only the degree of risk
aversion becomes sufficiently large.
The effect of inequity aversion in the case with ‘underprovision of effort’ is qual-
itatively similar to the effect of risk aversion. Providing incentives becomes more
expensive as either aversion becomes more pronounced, and this may render flat wage
contracts optimal for the principal. However, the ‘firm size effect’ is qualitatively differ-
ent from the inefficiency that can arise due to risk aversion. The principal can respond
to risk aversion only by adopting an agent’s contract, whereas with inequity aversion
– or more generally with social preferences – he has an additional instrument at hand
as he can control the agents’ reference groups. Incorporating this finding into richer
models with, for example, heterogeneous agents with respect to the degree of inequity
aversion or productivity, or allowing for multi-tasking will yield deeper insights into
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the determinants of real world wage contracts, the optimal design of institutions, and
the boundary of the firm. In the following section, while keeping the assumption of
homogeneous agents, we enrich the model by allowing the principal to separate the
agents into different firm at a fixed cost. We will argue that the interaction between
inequity aversion and moral hazard can contribute to the old question of the nature
and size of the firm.
4.5 The Nature and Size of the Firm
The ‘property rights approach’ of the theory of the firm – pioneered by Grossman
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) – defines a firm as the physical assets
it consists of. In contrast to the ‘transaction cost approach’ of the theory of the firm
(Coase (1937), Williamson (1975, 1985)), the property rights approach can explain
both, advantages and disadvantages (better incentives to invest for one, but worse
incentives for the other party) of ‘integration’ within a unified framework. An optimal
degree of integration, that is, an optimal firm size can thus be determined. In this
section, we propose a new approach. We focus on one characteristic that distinguishes
the firm from the market. The firm is seen as an economic entity within which social
comparisons matter – in contrast to the market in which they are negligible.
In this section we enrich our model by endowing the principal with the option to
separate the agents by setting up an additional firm. We assume that agents compare
payoffs only with agents that work within the same firm but not with agents that
work in distinct firms.49 Additional agency costs due to inequity aversion can thus be
avoided by separating agents into different firms. If agents can be separated, that is,
if social comparisons can be prevented at not cost, the purpose of this paper dissolves.
The principal would then always separate the agents. However, we further assume
that setting up a firm involves the expense of fixed costs, denoted by F . These fixed
costs are taken to be sufficiently low such that the principal realizes positive profits
when offering an incentive contract to a single agent, that is F < P i1. Alternatively,
49See, again, Bewley (1999) for supporting evidence.
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complementarities in production could be assumed such that, absent inequity aversion,
it is advantageous to have agents work together.
The principal now faces a trade off. On the one hand, employing two agents within
a single firm economizes on fixed costs (or enables the principal to realize complemen-
tarities in production). On the other hand, integrating the agents within a single firm
provokes social comparisons that increase agency costs of providing incentives. The
solution to this trade-off thus defines the optimal size of the firm, whether there is
‘integration’ of both agents within a single firm or ‘separation’ of the agents into two
distinct firms. If the firm is integrated, we can have both, incentive and flat wage con-
tracts. In case of separation, the principal will always offer incentive contracts. The
following proposition identifies the conditions under which either regime is optimal.
Proposition 4.8 (Optimal Firm Size)
i) If and only if F ≤ min[limα→∞ IAC, 2B] then there exists a threshold level of
inequity aversion ˆˆα such that for α ≥ ˆˆα separation is optimal: The principal
bears fixed costs F twice to set up two distinct firms, and she offers in each firm
a single incentive contract. For α < ˆˆα integration is optimal: The principal sets
up a single firm and offers two incentive contracts.
ii) If F > 2B then there is always integration, irrespective of the degree of inequity
aversion α. If, in addition, limα→∞ IAC ≤ 2B then integration with incentive
contracts is optimal for all α. If, in addition, limα→∞ IAC > 2B then there exists
a threshold level of inequity aversion α¯ such that for α ≥ α¯ integration with flat
wage contracts is optimal, whereas for α < α¯ integration with incentive contracts
is optimal.
Proof: i) If F ≤ 2B then it is always better to offer incentive contracts in two separated
firms than to offer two flat wage contracts within a singe firm. Recall that the gain of
providing incentives is given by B per agent, while the cost of setting up a second firm
is F . Notice that in both cases the degree of inequity aversion is irrelevant. The best
alternative to offering two incentive contracts within a single firm is thus separating
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the agents in two firms but still offering incentive contracts. Integrating two agents
with incentive contracts saves on fixed costs but provokes social comparisons, that is
additional agency costs IAC. If the latter exceed the first, F ≤ IAC, then separation
becomes optimal. From Proposition 4.3 we know that the IAC rise with the degree of
inequity aversion α; at α = 0 we have IAC = 0. If F ≤ limα→∞ IAC there must thus
exist a threshold level ˆˆα such that for α < ˆˆα we have F > IAC, i.e. integration, and
for α ≥ ˆˆα we have F ≤ IAC, i.e. separation.
ii) If F > 2B then, by the above arguing, the best alternative to offering two incen-
tive contracts within a single firm is offering two flat wage contracts within a single firm.
Notice that it is never optimal to offer flat wage contracts and to separate the agents.
Even if the IAC become very large there is thus never separation. Absent inequity aver-
sion the profit difference between the two regimes is 2B. If limα→∞ IAC ≤ 2B there
will thus always be integration with incentive contracts. If however limα→∞ IAC > 2B
then, by the above arguing, there exists a threshold α¯ such that for α < α¯ integra-
tion with incentive contracts is still optimal but for α ≥ α¯ integration with flat wage
contracts becomes optimal. q.e.d.
Figure 4.2 offers an illustration of Proposition 4.8. In all cases, at α = 0 the
expected profits from two integrated incentive contracts exceeds the expected profit
either from offering separated incentive contracts or offering two integrated flat wage
contracts. Notice that separated flat wage contracts can never be optimal. The left
panel of Figure 4.2 shows expected profit levels in case F < 2B. This condition
ensures that expected profits from two separated incentive contracts exceed profits
from two integrated flat wage contracts. If the additional agency costs due to inequity
aversion, IAC, exceed the cost of separation, F , as α goes to infinity, then there exists
a threshold level ˆˆα such that expected profits from two separated incentive contracts
exceed expected profits from two integrated incentive contracts for α ≥ ˆˆα.
The right panel of Figure 4.2 shows expected profit levels in case F > 2B. This
condition ensures that expected profits from two integrated flat wage contracts exceed
profits from two separated incentive contracts. If the IAC exceed the expected profit















































Figure 4.2: The Optimal Firm Size.
Left Panel: Expected profit levels with F < 2B. In this case expected profits from two
separated incentive contracts exceed profits from two integrated flat wage contracts. If the
additional agency costs due to inequity aversion, IAC, exceed the cost of separation, F , as α
increases, then there exists a threshold level ˆˆα such that separated incentive contracts become
optimal for α ≥ ˆˆα.
Right Panel: Expected profit levels with F > 2B. In this case expected profits from
two integrated flat wage contracts exceed profits from two separated incentive contracts. If
the IAC exceed the expected profit difference between integrated incentive contracts absent
inequity aversion and integrated flat wage contracts, 2B, as α increases, then there exists a
threshold level α¯ such that integrated flat wage contracts become optimal for α ≥ α¯.
difference between two integrated incentive contracts absent inequity aversion and two
integrated flat wage contracts, 2B, as α goes to infinity, then there exists a thresh-
old level α¯ such that expected profits with two integrated flat wage contracts exceed
expected profits with two integrated incentive contracts for α ≥ α¯.
In this section we have argued that social comparisons can contribute to the old
question of the the optimal degree of integration. We do not claim that social com-
parisons can fully explain the size of the firm nor do we claim that they are the main
determinant. However, many situation are imaginable where an employer – being in-
different otherwise – wants to separate employees to prevent social comparisons. Even
though throughout the paper we did not model heterogeneity in agents’ productivity,
consider the observation that many firms outsource activities very often (but certainly
not exclusively) at the extreme ends of the productivity scale. There are often external
consultants that are, in comparison to customary wage levels within the firm, relatively
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well payed. By the same token, employees of external cleaning companies earn rela-
tively little. Outsourcing of these activities may thus – at least partly – be explained
by the intent to maintain a balanced wage structure within the ‘core of the firm.’
An employer may not necessarily separate employees into different firms but, in case
this sufficiently cuts down social comparisons, into different, say, departments of a firm.
In this case our model can contribute to the literature on the internal organization of
the firm. Consistent with our arguing is also the observation that within firms (or any
other organization) there are often many small rungs in the job ladder, all distinguished
by differentiated job titles (junior analyst, senior analyst, junior consultant, senior
consultant, etc.). If employees tend to compare only to other employees on same rung
of the job ladder and accept that, for example, employees ‘above them’ may earn
more, then ‘separating’ agents into different ‘job categories’ may be explained by the
employer’s intent to cut down social comparisons. The determinants of employees’
relevant reference groups – be it a firm, a department, a job category, or some other
attribute – will ultimately be an empirical question. However, we claim that co-workers
within the same firm are a natural candidate.
4.6 Secrecy of Salaries
The central result of the paper states that inequity aversion among agents increases
agency costs. At first sight our results could serve as an explanation for the fact that
many labor contracts impose a clause that prohibits employees from communicating
their salaries to their colleagues. If – by way of secret salaries – social comparisons can
be prevented, the increase in agency costs can be prevented as well. In this section we
show that this is not necessarily the case.
Suppose agents can be separated such that the other agent’s output realization is
not observable. Suppose further that wages do not get communicated because labor
contracts prohibit this but that the contracts themselves are common knowledge. We
maintain the assumption that the agents’ reference group is the respective other agent
that is employed with the same principal. (If agents can be separated in a way such
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that they do not compare themselves any longer the IAC can trivially be avoided.) We
now derive the optimal incentive contract for both agents. Even though the agents
cannot observe each other’s project outcome and wages, they know that their wages
differ in certain states of the world because an incentive contract must condition wages
on project realizations. In order not to transfer information about the other agent’s
project outcome, each agent’s wage can only depend on his own output realization.
Thus, there are two wage levels only. The principal therefore maximizes
P s2 = 2xl + 2pi
2[∆x− h(uh)] + 2pi(1− pi)[∆x− h(uh)− h(ul)]− 2(1− pi)2h(ul) (4.26)
with respect to uh, ul, and under the incentive and participation constraint
(IC”) pi(1 + αpi)(uh − ul)− ψ ≥ 0
(PC”) piuh + (1− pi)(ul − piα(uh − ul))− ψ ≥ 0









At α = 0 wages and profit equal (twice) the single agent solution. With α increasing
the low wage increases in order to reduce inequity, and the principal’s expected profit
falls. Differentiating P s2 with respect to α yields
∂P s2
∂α
= −2(1− pi)ψ(1 + α(pi + rψ))
(1 + αpi)3
(4.28)
which is unambiguously negative. We can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4.9 (Secrecy of Salaries)
Separating the agents such that project outcomes and wages are unobservable ampli-
fies the negative effect of inequity aversion if the agents reference group remains the
respective other agent and contracts are common knowledge.
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Proof: Comparing (4.28) to (4.20) it can be seen that the ‘secrecy profit’ falls faster in
α than the profit in the two agents case. Subtracting (4.28) from (4.20) yields (2(1 −
pi)αpi(1+α(pi+rψ))(1+α(pi(pi(3+αpi(3+αpi)))+(2+αpi(4+α(1+2pi)))rψ))/(rk2(1+
αpi)3) which is always positive. q.e.d.
The ‘secrecy contract’ is therefore never optimal. Covering up the respective other
agent’s output realization and wage payments with intent to avoid social comparisons
does not mitigate but amplifies the principal’s problem. In the ‘secrecy contract’ wage
payments cannot depend on both agent’s output realizations since this would reveal
the respective other agent’s outcome realization and thus wage payment. In states with
diverging output realizations wages can therefore not be compressed as it was found
optimal in the previous sections. This restriction on the contract design renders the
‘secrecy contract’ too costly.
4.7 Discussion
4.7.1 Rent Comparison
Suppose now that agents compare rents, that is they explicitly account for effort cost
in their inequity term. Notice first that in equilibrium both agents exert effort such
that effort terms cancel out in the PC. We must, however, reconsider the IC because
an agent now has to account for the difference in effort costs in the inequity term when
considering to shirk. The IC can now be written as
(ICψ) pi
2uhh + pi(1− pi)uhl − pi2ulh − pi(1− pi)α(uhl − ulh)
+piαmax [uhl − ψ − ulh, 0]− pi(1− pi)ull − ψ ≥ 0.
Subtracting the l.h.s. of (ICψ) from the l.h.s. of (IC), the IC if effort costs are not
considered in the inequity term, yields
piα((2− pi)(uhl − ulh)−max [uhl − ψ − ulh, 0]) (4.29)
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which is always positive. Hence, considering effort costs in the inequity term can only
increase agency costs thereby reinforcing our results. The intuition is straightforward.
The expected utility when shirking increases because suffering from being behind is
now lower. The difference in utility from wages is reduced by the amount of effort
costs, if not cancelled. The incentive to exert effort is thus reduced.
4.7.2 Disutility from Being Better Off
In their original formulation of inequity aversion Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that
inequity averse individuals dislike both unfavorable and favorable inequity. In this
section we discuss the implications if suffering from being better off is incorporated in
our model. It now makes a crucial difference whether effort costs enter the comparison
or not.
Consider first the case in which agents compare utility from wages only. Instead
of the simplified version of inequity aversion assumed in the previous sections, agents’
utility function is now given by
vi(wi, wj) = u(wi)− ψ − α ·max[u(wj)− u(wi), 0]− β ·max[u(wi)− u(wj), 0].(4.30)
If β > 0, agents suffer from receiving a higher wage than the respective other agent.
Suppose the principal offers incentive contracts to both agents. Incorporating disu-
tility from being better off into our model has two effects. First, the agents’ PCs
are tightened. If agents are paid different wages in case their project outcomes differ,
an agent now also suffers from inequity whenever he is fortunate whereas the other
agent is not. As this happens with positive probability agents have to be compensated.
Second, incentive provision is impaired because suffering from being better off clearly
reduces the incentive to exert effort. Recall that the results in our model are driven by
the observation that the overall impact of inequity aversion on the principal’s profit is
negative – even when neglecting the utility loss from being better off. Incorporating
this disutility adds an unambiguously negative effect and would thus only reinforce our
results.
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Consider now the case in which effort costs enter the inequity term. Again, the
PC is tightened if β > 0. In equilibrium both agents exert effort and effort costs thus
cancel in the inequity term. However, effort cost enter the IC and suffering from being
better off may now facilitate incentive provision. To see this, assume the most extreme
case, which is ψ > uhl − ulh. A shirking agent that saves on effort costs is then always
better off than the other agent (who works) even if the other agent receives the higher
wage in case of diverging output realizations. The IC can then be written as
(ICβ) pi
2uhh + pi(1− pi)uhl − pi2ulh − pi(1− pi)ull − ψ
−pi(1− pi)α(uhl − ulh) + β [ψ − pi(2− pi)(uhl − ulh)] ≥ 0.
The positive effect of β on the ICβ may be very strong. As long as ∆x is sufficiently
large to ensure B ≥ 0, ψ can become very large without violating our assumption that
incentive contracts are optimal without inequity aversion. Intuitively, if an agent shirks
he saves on effort costs and may thus be better off than the other agent who exerts
effort. If agents suffer from being better off incentives to exert effort are increased. This
effect could, in principle, be so strong that agency costs are lowered in comparison to
the case without inequity aversion.50
4.7.3 Status Seeking
In the previous section we have discussed the possibility that agents suffer from being
better off than others. In contrast, suppose now that agents are status seekers, that
is they receive additional utility from being better off than others. In the context, of
this model this translates into β < 0. Incorporating status seeking into our model
has two effects. First, the agents’ participation constraints are relaxed. Whenever
diverging project outcomes realize the successful agent receives additional utility from
being better off than the unsuccessful agent. Second, there is an positive effect on
incentives because on top of a high wage an agent receives ‘status utility’ whenever he
is successful whereas the other agent is not. In summary, the unambiguously positive
50This effect is analyzed in Bartling and von Siemens (2004).
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effect of status seeking on the principal’s profit opposes the negative effect of inequity
aversion that we have identified in this paper. Since there is no natural lower bound
on β agency costs could, in principle, be reduced without bounds. Carrying this effect
to the extremes, status seeking would eventually result in contracts in which agents
actually pay the principal in order to be employed and sometimes receive ‘status utility’.
This is only reinforced if effort costs are considered in the inequity terms. However,
in this paper we focus on the more natural and more interesting case in which other-
regarding preferences provoke a trade-off between the positive effect on the incentive
and the negative effect on the participation constraint.
4.8 Conclusion
Recent insights from experimental economics have shown that many people are not
fully selfish but have some kind of social preferences. This, in turn, raises the question
of how other-regarding behavior interacts with incentive provision. In a moral hazard
model with risk averse agents we have shown that inequity aversion among agents
unambiguously increases agency costs unless agents compare rents and suffer from
being better off. As a result, optimal contracts for inequity averse agents may be ‘low
powered’, equitable flat wage contracts even when ‘high powered’ incentive contracts
are optimal with selfish agents. Accounting for inequity aversion may thus offer an
explanation for the scarcity of incentive contracts many real world situation – in which
verifiable performance measures would be available but are not contracted upon.
More specifically, assuming that social comparison are pronounced within firms
but less so in the market, we have argued that inequity aversion helps to understand
Williamson’s (1985) observation that incentives offered to employees within firms are
generally low powered as compared to ‘high powered’ incentive in markets.
Furthermore, we have argued that inequity aversion among agents and the resulting
increased agency costs contribute to the old question of the boundary of the firm. In an
enriched setting of the basic model, the principal could set up a second firm to separate
the agents with intent to avoid social comparisons. If this involves costs, the principal
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faces the trade-off to either bear increased agency costs or the cost of operating the
second firm. The solution to this trade-off defines an optimal size of the firm.
Incorporating our findings into richer models with, for example, heterogeneous
agents with respect to the degree of inequity aversion or productivity, or allowing
for multi-tasking promises to yield further insights into the determinants of real world
wage contracts, the optimal design of institutions, and the boundary of the firm.
4.9 Appendix
Throughout the paper we have assumed an explicit utility function in order to obtain
simple closed form solutions. As in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we also assumed a linear
inequity term. In this appendix we show that our results hold true for any concave
utility function and irrespective of the functional form the inequity term. To show
and illustrate the basic reasoning we, firstly, maintain the assumption that there are
only two possible output realizations. Later we will drop this restriction and allow for
arbitrary numbers of possible output realizations.
As benchmark, consider the single agent case. With only two possible outcome
realizations, wage levels are well-defined by the incentive and participation constraints.
Recall that the utility level arising from the wage payment in case of a high output
realization is given by uh, in analogy we defined ul. From
( ˜IC) piuh + (1− pi)ul − ψ ≥ pi′uh + (1− pi′)ul








pi − pi′ . (4.31)
If now a second agent is introduced and wages are contingent on the respective other
agent’s output realization, each agent faces an additional lottery. Suppose an agent’s
outcome realization is high. If the other agent works, he will also receive a high output
realization with probability pi, and a low output realization with probability 1 − pi.
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Recall that uij was defined as an agent’s utility from wage wij, if the agent’s output is
i and the other agent’s output is j. Absent inequity aversion we must have
piuhh + (1− pi)uhl = u∗h and piulh + (1− pi)ull = u∗l (4.32)
The inverse function h = u−1 specifies the wage payment that is necessary to generate
a certain utility level. The principal minimizes wage payments h(uhh) and h(uhl), and
h(ulh) and h(ull) such that (4.32) holds. From the first-order condition
pih′(uhh) + (1− pi)h′(uhl)(−pi)/(1− pi) = 0 (4.33)
and convexity of h(·) it follows that u∗hh = u∗hl = u∗h and, equivalently, u∗lh = u∗ll = u∗l .
The intuition is straightforward. The second-best utility levels that induce the agent
to exert effort are given buy u∗h and u
∗
l . If an agent’s wages depend on the other agent’s
output realization, in expectation he should nevertheless receive u∗h and u
∗
l . Incentives
are thus not affected but contingent wages introduce an additional lottery, and agents
must be compensated for the associated risk. Absent inequity aversion, wages will thus
be independent of the other agent’s output realization.
Consider now inequity averse agents. The second-best optimal utility levels in case
of high and low output realizations are still given by u∗h and u
∗
l , respectively. However,
in case of diverging output realizations there is now a utility loss arising from the
inequity. In analogy to (4.32) wage levels must now be such that
piuhh + (1− pi)(uhl − αmax[ulh − uhl, 0]) = u∗h, and (4.34)
pi(ulh − αmax[uhl − ulh, 0]) + (1− pi)ull = u∗l . (4.35)
It can be seen that the cost of providing the second-best optimal utility level are weakly
increasing in the level of inequity aversion α. Consider the following reasoning.
1. Fix uhl at some level.
2. Consider the set of (ulh, ull) such that an agent with a low output realization




















































































































Figure 4.3: Inequity aversion increases agency costs.
The negatively sloped, parallel lines depict the constraints subject to which the principal
minimizes wages. Without inequity aversion, the lowest iso-cost curves that satisfy the re-
strictions are tangent where uhh = uhl and ulh = ull. With inequity aversion, the constraints
become weakly more restrictive, depicted by the dashed lines. Utility combinations that
satisfy the constraints cannot lie on lower iso-cost curves.
receives an expected utility level of u∗l .
3. Given any ulh, the level of ull to yield u
∗
l is given by
ull =
u∗l − piulh + piαmax[uhl − ulh, 0]
1− pi (4.36)
4. Hence, the cost to implement u∗l weakly increases in α.
The reasoning for u∗h is analogous.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the above reasoning and shows how inequity aversion tightens
the constraints subject to which the principal minimizes costs. The decreasing, parallel
lines depict combinations of uhh and uhl, and ulh and ull that lead to expected utility
levels of u∗h and u
∗
l , respectively. The total differential of (4.32) at constant utility levels
yields their slope with −(1 − pi)/pi. The iso-cost curves in the case without inequity










h, as argued above. Consider
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now the case with inequity aversion. Algebraically, the combinations of uhh and uhl,




l are now given by (4.34)
and (4.35), respectively. The total differential of (4.34) while setting duh = 0 yields
duhh
duhl
= −(1− pi)(1 + α)
pi
, (4.37)
if we have ulh > uhl. For ulh ≤ uhl we get −(1 − pi)/pi. Graphically, with inequity
aversion, the dashed line depicting the combinations of uhh and uhl such that the agents
receives an expected utility level of u∗h is steeper for ulh > uhl and has the same slope
otherwise. Equivalently, the total differential of (4.35) while setting dul = 0 yields
dulh
dull
= − (1− pi)
pi(1 + α)
, (4.38)
if we have ulh < uhl, and −(1−pi)/pi otherwise. The dashed line depicting the combina-
tions of ulh and ull such that the agents receives an expected utility level of u
∗
l is flatter
for ulh < uhl and has the same slope otherwise. Hence, the constraints subject to which
the principals minimizes wage payments thus become (weakly) more restrictive.
The above reasoning generalizes straightforwardly to the case where one agent has
N and the other agent has M possible output realizations. Now, the solution to the
principal’s profit maximization problem is not determined by IC and PC alone any
longer. The principal first derives the contract that implements each action at the
least cost. She then implements the action that maximizes her profit. Incentive and
participation constraint for agent i in case the principal wants to implement ah can












Ui(xn, xm)[f(xn, xm | ah, ah)− f(xn, xm | al, ah)]− ψ ≥ 0
where f(·) denotes the conditional joint density function over output realizations, and
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Ui(xn, xm) is given by
Ui(xn, xm) = ui(xn, xm)− αmax[ui(xn, xm)− ui(xn, xm), 0]. (4.39)
ui(xn, xm) denotes the utility that arises from the wage payment in case the own output
realization is xn and the other agent’s output realization is xm. Ui(xn, xm) denotes
the utility level in this case net of a possible utility loss due to suffering from inequity
aversion. Equivalently for agent j. Denote by U the set of all Ui(xn, xm) and Uj(xn, xm)
such that ( ˆIC) and (PˆC) are binding,
U := {Ui(·), Ui(·) | ( ˆIC) and (PˆC) binding}. (4.40)
The principal chooses those Ui(xn, xm) and Uj(xn, xm) from U that minimize her cost.
The wage cost w(·) of providing the respective utility levels is given by
w(Ui(xn, xm)) = h(ui(xn, xm)) = wnm. (4.41)
Recall that h(·) = u−1. As can be seen from equation (4.39), for any strictly positive
level of α, the utility from wage to attain any fixed level of ‘net utility’ U must be
higher whenever uj(xn, xm) > ui(xn, xm). Since h
′(·) ≥ 0, the wage payment wnm
must be higher. Hence, if the principal wants to implement the high effort choice ah
her costs are weakly increased by inequity aversion. If the principal want to implement
al, she will pay a fixed wage and inequity aversion is thus irrelevant. With additional
expenses on notation, this reasoning generalizes to the cases with any finite number of
possible effort levels and more than two agents.
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